1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2	OFFICE OF TAX APPEALS
3	400 R STREET
4	SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
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9	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
10	APRIL 24, 2018
11	CORPORATE FRANCHISE AND PERSONAL INCOME TAX HEARING
12	APPEAL OF
13	SHARON MITCHELL
14	18011715
15	AGAINST PROPOSED ASSESSMENT OF
16	ADDITIONAL INCOME TAX
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27	Reported by: Kathleen Skidgel
28	CSR No. 9039

1	P R E	<u>s e n t</u>
2	Panel Lead:	 Teresa Stanley Administrative Law Judge
3		-
4	Panel Members:	Alberto Rosas Administrative Law Judge
5		Michael Geary Administrative Law Judge
6	Office of Tax Appeals Staff:	Dana Holmes
7	11	Ombudsperson
8	Appearing for Taxpayer:	Sharon Mitchell Taxpayer
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13	Franchise Tax Board:	David Gemmingen Tax Counsel
14		Ciro Immordino Tax Counsel
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1	400 R STREET, HEARING ROOM
2	SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
3	APRIL 24, 2018
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5	JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Calling the appeal
6	of Sharon Mitchell, case number 18011715. The date
7	is April 24th, 2018. It is 9:10 a.m. And the
8	location where this hearing is occurring is
9	Sacramento, California.
10	The panel judges are myself, Teresa
11	Stanley, Judge Alberto Rosas and Judge Michael
12	Geary.
13	And I'm going to ask you to restate your
14	names for the record, please.
15	MS. WEED: Christina Weed, counsel for
16	Sharon Mitchell, the appellant.
17	MS. MENDES: Lisa Mendes, counsel for
18	Sharon Mitchell, the appellant.
19	MS. MITCHELL: Sharon Mitchell.
20	MR. GEMMINGEN: David Gemmingen, counsel
21	for Franchise Tax Board.
22	MR. IMMORDINO: Ciro Immordino, Tax
23	Counsel, Franchise Tax Board.
24	MR. CORNEZ: Michael Cornez, Tax Counsel
25	for Franchise Tax Board.
26	JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Thank you. Feel
27	free to stop and ask questions along the way if
28	there are any. If I happen to be looking down, you

can catch the eye of one of my panel members.

MS. WEED: I'm sorry. I do have one question. Can you just sort of explain the approximate, you know, how things will go, how things will proceed during the hearing?

JUDGE STANLEY: Certainly.

MS. WEED: Format.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Certainly.

We're -- given the sophistication of the representation here, we're going to be following a little bit more formal processes. So we will have the appellant present the case first. And you'll have the opportunity to call witnesses.

We'll start with opening statements if you choose to do those. You don't have to do an opening statement. But we'll allow for cross-examination of any witnesses who testify. And the judges may have additional follow-up questions.

When appellant has completed presenting her case, then we will turn to the Franchise Tax Board. They haven't indicated that they have any witnesses to call, so that side ought to go quickly. And then we'll end with closing arguments if you choose to give those.

Then just as part of the process after that, once we close the record and take it under submission, we, as a panel, will deliberate and reach a decision and try to get that decision out

1 within a hundred days. 2 MS. WEED: Okay, thank you. 3 MR. GEMMINGEN: I'd just like to mention that the Franchise Tax Board does have an opening 4 5 statement. 6 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Well, first, I need 7 to go through the preliminary stuff. I know --8 thank you for your cooperation with both sides in 9 trying to get some of these exhibits admitted 10 without objection. 11 I'm just going to go down the list. And I 12 note that 1 through 25 was agreed admitted, to start 13 Is there any objection at this time to 1 14 through 25? 15 MR. CORNEZ: No, Your Honor. 16 JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Weed, those are yours, 17 so I don't suppose you object? 18 MS. WEED: No. 19 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. 20 Number 26 was the appraisal; and that one 21 the Franchise Tax Board had objected to relevance. 22 And is that still a standing objection? 2.3 MR. CORNEZ: Yes, it is. 2.4 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Ms. Weed, do you 25 want to respond to that? MS. WEED: Yes. I believe in one of 26 respondent's briefs -- I believe it's their reply 2.7 28 brief -- they indicate that with respect to the

basis issue we haven't provided any substantiation. So the appellant has actually paid for retroactive appraisal going back to 1991, at the time she inherited the property. So, you know, they've called into question the fact that we haven't substantiated the basis, so I would say it's entirely relevant.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Mr. Gemmingen?

MR. CORNEZ: Can I address that?

JUDGE STANLEY: Yeah.

MR. CORNEZ: So, as Exhibit 4 in the record shows, the Plaintiff inherited a partnership interest from her aunt. She has always asserted that she's a partner in the partnership, and that is in fact the reason why that this particular transaction is before this body because she had to have her partnership interest redeemed in order to engage in the transaction that she claims she did. And so she did not inherent a direct interest in the underlying real property; rather, she inherited an interest, a partnership interest.

The law requires that the taxpayer, under the Duty of Consistency Doctrine, start with the inherited basis of the partnership interest, which was shown on the partnership return -- or, I'm sorry, which was shown on the estate tax return that her aunt filed. Because of the size of her aunt's estate a -- an estate tax liability was owed,

therefore, the value that the estate put on the partnership interest had a tax significance. And for the taxpayer to now, some 25 years later, claim a different starting tax basis, violates the duty of consistency.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Can I just say that I think that goes to the merits of the argument and not to the relevance of the document itself. If they believe that they can -- if they want to try to present the fact that they had a different basis than is reflected on the probate statement or the initial 706 tax return, then I think that there's potentially relevance in the document that shows what the basis is.

MR. CORNEZ: Well, that --

MR. GEMMINGEN: I'm sorry.

MR. CORNEZ: But she didn't inherit an interest in real estate, and the appraisal is an interest in real estate. It's not an appraisal of a partnership interest. Nor does the appraisal reflect a condition of the property, whether or not there were lease payments, whether or not there was a mortgage. It's full of caveats and conditions and speculation as to the value of the real estate. But fundamentally, she didn't inherit an interest in a real estate, she inherited a partnership interest.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Like I said, I think those arguments go to the merits of her claim, not

1 to the relevance of the document. It is the sort of 2 document on which reasonable people rely in 3 valuating property. And I know that you don't think the property should be valued, but I think we're 4 5 going to admit Exhibit 26 and use it. And you can 6 argue, when you get the opportunity, you can argue 7 the validity of the using real property basis for 8 what you believe to be a partnership interest. 9 Twenty-seven, 27 and 28, I noted that there 10 were -- there was concern from the Franchise Tax 11 Board, mostly about privacy objection, which I think 12 we addressed by removing certain portions of that. 1.3 But somebody else had expressed a relevance objection to the 2007 tax returns. Does that 14

MR. CORNEZ: I don't believe so.

objection still stand?

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JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And 27, 28 and 29, I had the same objection. So are you objecting to admitting those documents at this time?

MR. CORNEZ: No. I would note that they did eliminate most of the partnership tax return on number 28. All the K-1's for the other partners. So it's a much shorter.

JUDGE STANLEY: Yes, yes. Okay.

On 30 to 32 there was no objection. That's still true today?

MR. CORNEZ: Correct. Yes.

JUDGE STANLEY: Thirty-three is a Legal and

1 Vesting Report. There was a relevancy objection to 2 that one; does that still stand? 3 MR. CORNEZ: No, we're withdrawing our objection. It appears it just reflects the 4 5 recordation of Deeds. JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And 34, I believe, 6 7 was also a relevance objection; does that still 8 apply? 9 MR. CORNEZ: Yes. 10 JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Weed, do you want to 11 address Exhibit 34? 12 MS. WEED: Yes. If I can just review that real quick for one minute. 1.3 14 So I believe that this letter is relevant 15 to the extent the appellant's intent with respect to 16 the 1031 exchange has been called into question, and 17 this letter seems to indicate that going back as far 18 as 1990 a like-kind exchange in connection with 130 19 Tampico Way, which is the property at issue, was

JUDGE STANLEY: Mr. Gemmingen or --

contemplated at that time.

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MR. CORNEZ: I would say that this letter is written to -- not to the taxpayer but to somebody else and it reflects another party. I don't know who PTLA is, but it doesn't seem to be the taxpayer. And the letter's not written to the taxpayer, so I don't know how that's relevant to the taxpayer.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So I'm going to

admit that as a hearsay document that will be subject to the -- to the rule in 11513 under the APA, the Administrative Procedure Act. Which means that it will only be considered if corroborated by other evidence.

Number 35 through 38, there was no objection; is that still true?

MR. CORNEZ: Correct.

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JUDGE STANLEY: And number 39, there were two objections. One has been sustained. So the part of that document and any testimony that would be presented would be precluded if it's a discussion of the law or an application of the law to facts.

MS. WEED: Judge Stanley?

JUDGE STANLEY: Yes.

MS. WEED: Would that include the witness?

It's Jeff Krajewski's memorandum. He's also going to testify, or I was planning to call him as a witness. He is a CPA, but he has testified in court as an expert and he's bound by the tax laws. And when he testifies, he speaks as to what the tax law is.

JUDGE STANLEY: So he can speak to the transaction and its application, and he can talk -- he can talk about it with his expertise, but just going through -- in that document it suggests that he's just going to explain the law to us.

MS. WEED: Okay.

1 JUDGE STANLEY: And we've got about eight 2 or more attorneys here who, hopefully, have 3 researched the law surrounding this. And since Mr. Krajewski is not an expert in the law, he 4 5 probably couldn't qualify to testify to that. So, you know, you can -- when you've got 6 7 him on the stand, we can see if there are any 8 objections that arise. 9 MS. WEED: Okay. I understand. Thank 10 you. 11 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And then there was 12 an objection to the percipient witness. Are you 13 still objecting to that given that Mr. Krajewski is 14 going to testify today? 15 MR. CORNEZ: I guess we would reserve our 16 right to see what his actual testimony is and 17 determine if he's a percipient witness of the 18 underlying the transaction, if he has any facts. 19 And until he testifies, we don't know. 20 JUDGE STANLEY: That's my feeling as well. 21 And I think that with respect to that document, 22 since it's just a summary of his testimony, I think 2.3 I'll reserve on whether to admit the document itself 2.4 or just accept his testimony as the evidence that we 25 use, that we have in the record. Number 40 through 45, there was no 26

MR. CORNEZ: Correct.

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objection.

JUDGE STANLEY: And the Declaration of Mr. Milner, which is marked as Exhibit 46 in the binder that we have today, is there any further objection to admission of that?

MR. CORNEZ: Is he here to testify today?

MS. WEED: He is not.

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JUDGE STANLEY: He --

MS. WEED: He is not.

JUDGE STANLEY: He is not.

MR. CORNEZ: So presumably it's treated under 11514 as hearsay, subject to all the normal rules?

JUDGE STANLEY: Correct. We'll admit it subject to 11513 and 11514 of the Administrative Procedure Act.

MR. CORNEZ: I do have one question with respect to that. And we got -- two different times throughout this process we got an e-mail of the Declaration, which did not change, but there were different exhibits attached each time. So I don't know if that was on purpose or accidental.

And so which exhibits -- it may not really matter, but which exhibits are attached -- I assume the exhibits attached to the Declaration that's in the record today are the only exhibits that are relevant; I just want to clarify that.

JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Weed, it looks like you have the non-binding Letter of Intent, a letter from

Mr. Goodman.

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MS. WEED: Yeah. The way that it's in the binder is the correct version, and at the last prehearing conference I actually had e-mailed the corrected version at that time.

MR. CORNEZ: All right. Thank you.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So the Exhibit 47 is admitted with exhibits that are attached today.

JUDGE GEARY: 46.

JUDGE STANLEY: I'm sorry, 46.

Okay. So that takes care of -- okay. I will just go back and do a little cleanup here because I noted that there were no objections to certain exhibits but did not state that they were being admitted. So that would be documents 27 to 33, 35 to 38, and 40 to 45. They will all be admitted without objection.

Okay. Moving on to respondent's exhibits.

We have A through S now. And I believe the only one that had an objection at the time of the prehearing conference was Exhibit N, which is a -- just what the FTB referenced as a courtesy copy of a case, the *Perkins* case. Is there still an objection to that, Ms. Weed?

MS. WEED: I had objected to that case and the *Salvatore* case just because I didn't believe it was evidence and should be admitted as an exhibit, but --

1 JUDGE STANLEY: Do you have a response to 2 that? 3 MR. GEMMINGEN: Well, they're both clearly on point and they go to the determination of the law 4 5 as well as how facts that are entered and the taxpayer's failure to negotiate should not be 6 7 considered the true seller of the property. JUDGE STANLEY: While I think it is not 8 9 essential for us to have copies of case law because 10 we have researched these cases and many more, I 11 don't see any harm to admitting them. They were 12 referenced as courtesy copies, and I'll note that 1.3 Salvatore was an exhibit presented by appellant as 14 well. So I'll just go ahead and admit those for 15 what it's worth. 16 MS. WEED: Okay. 17 JUDGE STANLEY: Are there any other 18 objections on A through S? 19 MS. WEED: What is S? 20 JUDGE STANLEY: S is the copy that we got 21 this morning, the partners' shared income, 2007 K-1. 22 MS. WEED: Oh, okay. 2.3 MR. GEMMINGEN: They're from their exhibit, 2.4 the partnership return they submitted. 25 JUDGE STANLEY: Except that we excluded 26 these. So this is something that we excluded from 2.7 appellant's exhibit and now you're proposing to put 28 it back in.

1 MR. GEMMINGEN: Yes. These go to relevance 2 as to the treatment of appellant by the partnership. 3 And they're the most contemporaneous documents that 4 go to establish them. 5 JUDGE STANLEY: So this is 2007, this Con 6 Med partnership return K-1's, right? 7 MR. GEMMINGEN: And then a California 8 Schedule D-1 by the partnership for the sale. 9 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay, wait. 10 So what I have is eight pages of K-1's and 11 then I have seller's final statement of two pages. And then I have 2007 Schedule D-1. That would also 12 1.3 be for the Con Med partnership return? 14 MR. GEMMINGEN: I'm sorry. The First 15 American Title are -- actually -- I beg your 16 pardon -- are not from the return. But there are other exhibits that do talk about it. 17 18 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. 19 MR. GEMMINGEN: But they go to the 20 treatment of the taxpayer as a partner. 21 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So these -- those 22 two pages were already admitted. The first eight 2.3 pages were not, right? 2.4 MR. GEMMINGEN: I'm not sure about that. 25 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. 26 MS. WEED: Judge Stanley, we would object 2.7 to the admission. We had agreed to withdraw them 28 because we didn't believe they're relevant.

I'm not aware that the other partners are being audited. And the letter we had to Caroline Mitchell, who was one of the partners in connection with 130 Tampico, respondent has said is not relevant. And so the scope of this is only with respect to Sharon Mitchell in 2007.

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JUDGE STANLEY: And Franchise Tax Board, you believe it has relevance?

MR. GEMMINGEN: It has great relevance to the treatment of the partnership and its consideration of her and her partner. It identifies her as a 10-percent partner at the end of the year. It shows that she received the same distribution amounts when coupled with the First American Title documents. And she had no appreciable change or economic interest in the transactions.

And the parties -- she, as listed as a 10-percent partner, gets the equivalent amount as the other 10-percent partners, double the amount of the 5-percent partners. And the parties have been -- other parties' last names have been removed, but it just shows what a 10-percent partner gets or a 5-percent partner gets, and what she's getting there and her, also, treatment as a 10-percent partner, as shown on line D in the upper left quadrant of her K-1.

MS. WEED: I would note that appellant has no control over the other K-1's of the other

partners. She has no control what they report on their returns. They have nothing to do with her.

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If they're incorrect, it would be up to those individual partners to contact the partnership. She has no control over them. They're not relevant to her.

We're not the ones who limited the scope of the audit, the respondent did, and it's just with respect to Sharon Mitchell.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And similarly to the issue of the appraisal that we admitted, I think I'm going to admit the first eight pages as Exhibit S, as Respondent's Exhibit S. And to the extent that the parties want to argue their relevance to this case, they'll have an opportunity to do so.

MS. WEED: Also, Judge Stanley, I would note the last page is a typed-up page that I've never seen before.

JUDGE STANLEY: I'm -- I pulled out the eight pages of the K-1's. I was going to deal with the other ones next.

MS. WEED: Okay.

JUDGE STANLEY: Because there are three other documents that were attached. So the first eight pages, it's marked and admitted as Exhibit S.

Then moving to the Seller's Final
Settlement Statement, that's a two-page document. I

1 believe that's already been admitted as part of 2 appellant's exhibits. 3 MS. WEED: Yes, that's correct. JUDGE STANLEY: So is there any objection 4 5 to marking this two-page document as T? 6 MS. WEED: No. 7 JUDGE STANLEY: I think they wanted this for easier reference. 8 9 MS. WEED: That's fine. No objection. 10 JUDGE STANLEY: So we'll mark the Seller's Final Settlement Statement of two pages as Exhibit 11 12 T, and it will be admitted as Exhibit T. 1.3 And then next we have a two-page D-1. 14 I think that was not excluded from the partnership 15 return, so I think that that is also appellant's 16 exhibit; is that correct? 17 MR. GEMMINGEN: Thank you, Your Honor. MS. WEED: Yes, that's correct. 18 19 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So there's no 20 objection to marking the two-page 2007 D-1 as 21 Exhibit U and admitting that; no objection? 22 MR. GEMMINGEN: I beg your pardon? 2.3 JUDGE STANLEY: The two-page Exhibit D-1 2.4 will be marked as Exhibit U and admitted without 25 objection. 26 The one page, the last page in the handout, 2.7 there's an objection that this document was never 28 presented before and we have no origin.

1 MR. GEMMINGEN: Well, this document simply 2 reflects the first page of the K-1 packet. You'll 3 see at line 10 there's a figure under column D, like David, of \$611,102. 4 5 JUDGE STANLEY: I don't want to go through 6 the whole thing, Mr. Gemmingen, because that would 7 be testimony. But --8 MR. GEMMINGEN: I was just showing the relevance for it. 9 10 JUDGE STANLEY: Well, the relevance is that 11 you -- it's an exhibit that ties back to other 12 exhibits, is that --1.3 MR. GEMMINGEN: Yeah, it explains the 14 figures on these exhibits here. 15 JUDGE STANLEY: Do you intend to present 16 those features during your argument? 17 MR. GEMMINGEN: Yes, I do. 18 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So --19 MS. WEED: Judge Stanley, this isn't 20 evidence. This is argument. 21 JUDGE STANLEY: Correct. I believe that to 22 be the case. I think that these facts should be 2.3 tied together when the Franchise Tax Board has its 2.4 opportunity to do its argument. 25 MR. GEMMINGEN: It was my plan to do 26 that. 2.7 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So I'm not going to 28 mark and admit this last, this final page of what

1 was handed to us today. So the document itself will 2 not be considered, but you can feel free to go 3 through the whole thing when it's your turn. Are there any other issues with respect to 4 5 exhibits that either party has? Ms. Weed? 6 MS. WEED: Not at this time. 7 JUDGE STANLEY: Mr. Gemmingen, Mr. Cornez? MR. GEMMINGEN: No, thank you. 8 9 JUDGE STANLEY: All righty. So the only 10 one that we still have to consider later on is 11 Mr. Krajewski's summary statement. And we'll take 12 that up later. 13 Restating the issues, the Franchise Tax 14 Board has two: 15 Did Con Med, the partnership, sell 100 16 percent of the Tampico Way property for tax 17 purposes; 18 Number two, was there an anticipatory 19 assignment of income from the partnership to the 20 taxpayer such that all income from the sale is 21 attributed in the partnership? 22 And Ms. Mitchell's issues are: 2.3 Did she meet the requirements of a 2.4 like-kind exchange of real property pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 1031; 25 26 And secondarily, what is the true basis of 2.7 her, either, partnership interest or property 28 interest, real property interest?

At this time, if there are no questions,

I'm going to ask if the appellant would like to make
an opening statement?

MS. WEED: Yes, I would.

JUDGE STANLEY: Proceed.

You can feel free to keep your seat if you want to.

MS. WEED: Okay.

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 $\mbox{\tt JUDGE STANLEY:}$ Whatever's more comfortable for you.

MS. WEED: Normally standing, but I don't think this is tall enough.

Okay. So the issue before your Board at this time is whether Sharon Mitchell completed a like-kind exchange. She has appealed the FTB's proposed denial of denying to treat her exchange as a like-kind exchange. But that's really the only issue. Any other issues that respondent has brought up are facts. They're issues of fact, not actual legal issues.

The appellant is responsible and has the burden of proof for establishing the facts in this case. And the facts show that a 1031 exchange was completed.

As a second issue in this case is what was Sharon Mitchell's cost basis in connection with 130 Tampico Way. We propose that she should've received a step up in basis at the time she inherited her

interest in 1991.

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Sharon Mitchell was a owner of 130 Tampico Way at the time the exchange occurred. This a fact. It's not an issue.

The closing statement that has been admitted into evidence by both appellant and respondent indicate that there were three sellers at the time that 130 Tampico Way was relinquished. It was Con Med, the partnership; it was Sharon Mitchell, the appellant; and it was Caroline Mitchell, the appellant's mother.

Appellant was listed on this closing statement and put her neck out there that if anything went wrong with the transaction, she would have been liable; the buyer would have looked to her. She absolutely owned 130 Tampico Way. Deeds were recorded, transfer taxes were paid. The partnership, by a majority vote, I believe unanimous vote, indicated that she could redeem her partnership interest.

So the fact is Sharon Mitchell was the owner of 130 Tampico Way. The issue of who was the seller is really just not an issue that applies.

Now, FTB has argued in some of its briefing that Sharon Mitchell was not always actively involved in every step of the Purchase Agreement and negotiating it, but that doesn't mean that Sharon Mitchell didn't own the property. If every time I

went and put an offer on a house, I mean, do I get my keys right at that moment when my offer is accepted? No, because that's not a sale. The sale or the transaction, the closing -- the sale occurs at closing, and the closing statement shows who the owners of the property were.

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Whoever negotiated the sale is irrelevant. Other entities and individuals negotiate on behalf of others all the time. And in this case there's a \$6.4 million property, 130 Tampico Way, that, you know, I believe most people would ask for assistance in negotiating a sale of this magnitude. So the fact that Sharon Mitchell wasn't involved in every single step does not mean she's not the owner and that Con Med is the only seller.

Sharon Mitchell is entitled to engage in a like-kind exchange pursuant to 1031. 1031, as you all know, provides that gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange of property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if such property is exchanged solely for like-kind property. In this case no gain is recognized until the taxpayer actually cashes in their investment.

Here, Sharon Mitchell had 130 Tampico Way, a commercial property, which she never intended to hold for personal use because it was a commercial property. She exchanged it for a property that was

like-kind. I don't believe this fact is in dispute.

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This is not, you know, an attempt to avoid or evade tax. This is just deferring the recognition of gain as Sharon Mitchell is entitled to do. In fact, 1031 is a code section that's automatic. You don't have to elect into it. If you qualify, you get the treatment because Congress, at the time they enacted 1031, was more concerned on the burden it would put on a real estate investor or other investor to pay tax before they had cashed out their investment. And in this case when 130 Tampico Way was relinquished, Sharon Mitchell obtained a like-kind property, which she still holds today.

I don't believe her intent could be questioned. She has never sold outright one of her investment properties. She completed three other like-kind exchanges in 2007 alone. She completed numerous other exchanges prior to 2007. Her intent is not an issue.

Now the pink elephant in the room, I think, is that respondent doesn't like the fact that this was the only property in 2007 that was exchanged out of California and into Arizona. That's the only difference between the other ones. All of the other like-kind exchanges were respected by IRS, the exchanges were duly reported on Sharon Mitchell's 2007 income tax return. They were never questioned by the IRS, and Sharon's testimony will corroborate

that. The exhibits in the file help to corroborate that.

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Sharon Mitchell is simply entitled to a like-kind exchange. And, again, we're not talking about the evasion of tax, it's just deferring the recognition of gain. If respondent believes that Sharon Mitchell is really just intending to evade tax, which is their burden of proof, I would welcome them to show me one bit of evidence that indicates she had an intent to evade tax and not an intent to do a like-kind exchange.

Now the argument about the fact that a 1031 exchange did not occur is a very weak argument. So respondent, as an alternate argument, has stated, sort of grasping at straws, that this is an Assignment of Income Doctrine issue if in fact a 1031 exchange occurred. But, again, the Franchise Tax Board or respondent misses the mark when it comes to 1031 exchanges.

With respect to the Doctrine of the Assignment of Income, the concern and the rationale is that if taxpayers are allowed to assign income to a third party, they will be able to avoid tax. But as we already know, this is not an attempt to evade tax. It is a deferral of recognition of gain.

That's it. It's permitted under 1031. California tax law fully complies to the federal law with respect to this section.

And then, just in closing, I would want to state that our second issue that we've brought before your Board is the step up in basis. We believe that Sharon Mitchell's testimony will corroborate the fact that a 754 election was made at the time that she should have received her step up in basis. We believe that some of the exhibits in our folder will corroborate this.

And, you know, the respondent is responsible for computing the correct amount of tax. They have the duty only to collect the correct amount of tax. And Sharon Mitchell is entitled to have her basis properly computed and respected and she's entitled to a like-kind exchange.

And so we would urge your Board to please find that a 1031 exchange did occur based on the evidence of this case and that Sharon Mitchell is entitled to a step up in basis.

Thank you.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Thank you.

Franchise Tax Board, you have somebody who's making an opening? Mr. Gemmingen?

MR. GEMMINGEN: Good morning. I'm David Gemmingen. And today I'm joined by Ciro Immordino and Michael Cornez.

And to get started today, as the Board will remember, the United States Supreme Court and the Board of Equalization precedent have repeatedly

confirmed that a transaction be characterized differently for tax purposes with respect to income tax consequences than the manner might be documented for civil law purposes.

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It's a longstanding principle in taxation that substance prevails over form and transactions of no economic substance are disregarded for income tax purposes. We come today to reaffirm and establish some basic income tax principles to ensure that income arising from the sale of real property is properly attributed to the party that owned and sold the property in question.

JUDGE STANLEY: Mr. Gemmingen, can you just speak a little more slowly so that Ms. Skidgel doesn't have to work so hard.

MR. GEMMINGEN: Okay.

We would like to also confirm that there are legal issues of who, for tax purposes, was a seller, as well as the legal doctrine of the Assignment of Income applies in this case.

Moreover, respondent's assessment in this appeal is correct and should be upheld since, for tax purposes, the partnership is the only party that is the true seller of the property and income from the sale is taxable to its partners, including the appellant, a 10-percent partner under partnership allocation provisions.

Respondent disallowed appellant's attempt

to defer gain from a later transaction for purported exchange since appellant was not the seller of the property for tax purposes and she repeatedly admitted that she played no role in the negotiation of the sale of the property.

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As her preparation has shown you and as will be demonstrated today, only the partnership, Con Med, owned the real property in question from its initial acquisition in the 1960s, to the partnership negotiation of its sale in December 2006, through the execution of the final terms of sale in February 2007. And only Con Med, the general partnership, was designated and acknowledged by the partnership itself in correspondence sent in March 2007 to its partners, as shown in Exhibit D in respondent's exhibits, as the property seller and owner during those negotiations.

Appellant repeatedly ignored supplemental briefing requests from the Board of Equalization to address her failure to participate in the sale of property and references to section 1031 demonstrates a continuing unwillingness to address the true issue at hand; that is, that the partnership was the true seller of the property.

California partnership law, in a single sentence it can be clear, provides that Corporations Code section 16501 that a partner is not co-owner of partnership property and has no interest in

partnership property that can be transferred either voluntarily or involuntarily.

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In addition, as a general partner in the partnership, as set forth in Corporations Code section 16404, appellant owed the partnership the duty of loyalty and duty of care. The fiduciary duty of loyalty means that partners must place the partnership's best interests above their own personal interests. That is to say, when a partnership contracts to sell its primary asset, a partner cannot take any action to obstruct that sale by the partnership. The duty of loyalty provides that partners may not act to harm the partnership's goal for their own gain.

Appellant's actions to discuss her purported distribution are all subject to her duty of loyalty and care to the partnership. In fact, as shown by the many documents provided by appellant, including Con-Med's, the partnership's, 2007 federal and California tax returns, the partnership still treated Appellant Sharon Mitchell, as a 10-percent partner up to the end of the partnership's year and to receive roughly the same \$662,000 amount that the other 10-percent partners in Con Med received.

In this case Con Med Properties, a

California general partnership, acquired commercial

property on Tampico Way in Walnut Creek during the

1960s, and solely owned that property up until the

sale by the partnership. As demonstrated by several of the sales documents provided by appellant, the partnership on its own account and for its own benefit commenced sale negotiations for 100 percent of the Tampico property, received a written and executed offer for the property in December 2006, as provided in Respondent's Exhibit A, more than 11 months before the sale ultimately closed in November of 2007.

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As the partnership negotiated the sale of the property for the next few months pursuant to subsequent counter-offers, including in February 2007, as shown by Exhibits B, C and D, the partnership was always the only party designated and contemplated as the property seller. We'll establish for two distinct reasons the Franchise Tax Board's allocation of income to appellant which arose from the partnership's sale of property and resulting tax assessment are correct.

First, Franchise Tax Board will demonstrate that for income tax purposes the partnership was the only party that sold the property. We'll show that appellant owned -- was a 10-percent partner in the partnership and, as previously briefed, partnership tax law, pursuant to section 702 of the Internal Revenue Code, as incorporated to the California law, works to allocate 10 percent of the partnership's gain from the sale of property to appellant.

Second, the partnership on November 27th, 2007, just as the sale of the property was closing, finally executed two Deeds related to the Tampico Way property. These two Deeds are Appellant's Exhibits 6 and 7. One Deed, signed on November 27th, reported for civil law purposes to transfer a 10-percent tenant-in-common interest in the property to appellant. And on that same day, November 27th, 2007, the partnership also executed the Joint Conveyance Deed to the two new buyers who acquired 100 percent of the property.

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The transitory timing of these documents, which were then recorded on November 29th and November 30th, respectively, illustrated appellant's actions as the representative previously acknowledged, and in her representative's own words, as provided in Respondent's Exhibit J, were designed to allow appellant to ride on the coattails of the partnership's sale of the property.

Appellant's actions with her 10-percent Deed and the Assignment of Income Doctrine, which has been described by the U.S. Supreme Court as the first principle of taxation, this doctrine stands for the proposition that one who earned the income is taxed on it regardless of who receives the proceeds.

We'll show that the partnership's negotiation of the sale of the property coupled with

the appellant's repeated admissions that she did not participate in the negotiations of the property's sale during her time as a partner and the partnership's ownership of the property during the commencement to the conclusion of the negotiations of the sale of the property illustrate that appellant's and her accommodating partnership's actions were attempts to improperly assign income. The result, that the income should remain and be attributed to the assignor, which in this case is the partnership.

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Finding in favor of the FTB that either the partnership was the only seller of the property for tax purposes or that appellant engaged in an improper attempt to have the partnership's income assigned to her, confirms respondent's assessment and forecloses the need to address appellant's claimed 1031 exchange since the result is that appellant had nothing left to sell or exchange. Since appellant is not the seller of the property, she cannot properly claim gain deferral for section 1031.

Thank you. We'll present our arguments after appellant's opening arguments.

JUDGE STANLEY: Thank you.

If you're ready to proceed, Ms. Weed, you have the opportunity to call your first witness.

MS. WEED: Yes. I would first call Jeff

1 Krajewski. 2 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. 3 Mr. Krajewski, there's a stand with a microphone over there, which will be helpful for 4 5 you. 6 And if you will please state your name and 7 spell it for the reporter. 8 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Jeff Krajewski, spelled 9 K-r-a-j-e-w-s-k-i. 10 JUDGE STANLEY: And if you'll raise your right hand, please. Do you solemnly swear or affirm 11 12 that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? 1.3 14 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes. JUDGE STANLEY: Thank you. You can be 15 16 seated. And if that microphone is not on, there 17 should be a button. 18 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Testing. 19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 20 BY MS. WEED: 21 Q. Good morning, Mr. Krajewski. 22 Good morning. Α. 2.3 Could you please briefly describe your 2.4 educational history for the Court? 25 Α. Yes. I've got a BS, Bachelor of Science, 26 in accounting, with a minor and a certification of special studies in computer sciences. 2.7 28 Q. Okay. And what is your current

1 occupation? 2 Α. I'm a Certified Public Accountant in the 3 State of Arizona. Q. How long have you been licensed as a CPA? 4 5 Α. Roughly 35 years. 6 Have you always worked as a CPA since the 7 time you were licensed? A. Well, there was a brief sabbatical, about 8 9 seven years. 10 Q. And what did you do during that time? I was a principal and vice chairman of a 11 commercial real estate investment firm, situated in 12 13 Phoenix, Arizona. 14 Q. Have you written any note-worthy 15 publications? 16 A. No. 17 Q. Were you hired by Sharon Mitchell to testify today? 18 19 Α. Yes. 20 Have you ever testified as an expert Q. 21 before? 22 Yes, on several occasions. Α. 2.3 Q. Do you know approximately how many times? Oh, geez. Over 35 years, maybe half a 2.4 25 dozen or so. 26 Do you know some of the courts that you've testified as an expert in? 2.7

They were predominantly state court,

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Α.

1 Arizona. 2 Q. Okay. Are you currently scheduled to 3 testify in any other courts? Α. Yes. 4 5 Q. Which one? A. United States Tax Court. 6 7 Q. Okay. In what capacity? Expert witness. 8 Α. And what is the scope of your testimony 9 Q. 10 that you will present in tax court? A. Centers around code section 280(e) and some 11 12 methodology that was employed by the taxpayer with 13 respect to restrictions thereunder. 14 Q. Okay. And that's 280(e) of the Internal 15 Revenue Code? 16 Α. That is correct. 17 Q. Do you anticipate that you will also cite 18 to case law in your testimony? 19 Α. Yes. 20 Is extensive knowledge of the Tax Code and Q. 21 tax case law necessary for your anticipated 22 testimony in tax court? 2.3 A. Yes. Q. Does your profession on a daily basis 2.4 25 require extensive knowledge of the Tax Code and tax case law? 26 2.7 A. Yes. MS. WEED: Can Mr. Krajewski please be 28

qualified as an expert witness?

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JUDGE STANLEY: Is there any objection?

MR. CORNEZ: Yeah, I have an objection.

We've already gone over this and you've already
determined that he's not an expert and he's not
testifying as an expert witness. So I'm not sure if
we're renewing this argument.

JUDGE STANLEY: No, we didn't rule that he was not an expert witness for purposes of testifying to this transaction and similar 1031 transactions.

We excluded his testimony relative to explaining the law to the panel.

MR. CORNEZ: Then I guess I would renew the objection because, as you well stated, the experts in this room are the three judges who are tax lawyers deciding the tax case, and it doesn't seem appropriate to have somebody explain the tax law to a panel of judges whose job it is to determine what the tax law is.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And, Ms. Weed, do you intend to have this expert testify as to this transaction and other 1031 transactions that he's been involved in or just to the law as it applies?

MS. WEED: I expect to ask him questions about his experience in connection with 1031 exchanges and any documents he's reviewed in preparation for today.

JUDGE STANLEY: That's valid testimony for

1 an expert witness. Do you have an objection to him 2 testifying as an expert? 3 MR. CORNEZ: Yes. JUDGE STANLEY: You still have an 4 5 objection? 6 MR. CORNEZ: Same objection. There is an 7 expert in the courtroom. I hate to say it over and 8 over, but the panel are experts in the law. 9 If I might ask him a couple questions to 10 further -- as further basis for my objection; would that be appropriate? 11 12 JUDGE STANLEY: Yes, except to the extent 13 that you're going to ask him about his knowledge of 14 the law, that just gets into --15 MR. CORNEZ: No, I'm not. 16 JUDGE STANLEY: -- the same decision. 17 Okay. I'm going to let you proceed 18 briefly. 19 MR. CORNEZ: It is briefly. 20 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. 21 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 22 BY MR. CORNEZ: 2.3 Q. Did you prepare the partnership's 2007 tax 2.4 return? 25 Α. No. 26 Did you prepare Ms. Mitchell's 2007 tax return? 2.7 28 A. No.

- Q. Were you involved in this transaction in any basis, at the time back in 2007?
 - A. Thank you. No.

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MR. CORNEZ: So he's not a percipient witness to this particular transaction. He was not involved in this particular transaction, and so we would say that there's no basis for his testimony.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And I'm going to go ahead and qualify him as an expert with respect to matters relevant to accounting for and qualified for 1031 exchanges based on his testimony that he's participated in such activities for 35 years and has the education and certification that I think qualifies him as an expert.

So you may proceed.

MS. WEED: Thank you, Your Honor.

DIRECT EXAMINATION (cont'd)

BY MS. WEED:

- Q. Mr. Krajewski, can you please describe the types of tax services you provide at your current firm or place of employment?
- A. It's a general accounting firm. We're involved in accounting, review services, tax preparation, tax planning, taxpayer representation with respect to all forms of ownership, whether that's individual, partnership, corporate, sub S, trusts, estates.
 - Q. Okay. Thank you.

Can you please describe the types of tax services you have provided throughout your 35 years of experience?

- A. Well, that pretty much runs the gamut with respect to what I earlier said. But, you know, just to repeat myself, tax preparation, tax planning, taxpayer representation.
 - Q. Okay, thank you.

 Do you have experience with 1031 exchanges?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. Please describe your experience with respect to 1031 exchanges?
- A. Well, I certainly get involved with those through my practice in assisting clients in structuring such transactions and accounting for and reporting the tax ramifications associated with those transactions. In addition, I've been involved, as I mentioned earlier, as a principal and vice chairman. On the commercial real estate investment firm, we were engaged in several 1031 exchanges.
 - Q. Okay. Thank you.

Are you a member of any professional organizations or groups that are relevant to the subject of a 1031 exchange?

A. Aside from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and the Arizona Society of Certified Public Accountants, no.

1 Q. Okay, thank you. 2 What documents have you referred to in 3 preparation of your testimony today? The correspondence relating to this 4 5 transaction, tax returns for both the taxpayer and 6 the Con Med partnership, and then various tax work 7 cases, code section 1031 and its related regulations. 8 9 Q. Okay, thank you. 10 And what case law have you referred to in 11 preparation for your testimony today? 12 That would include Magneson v. 1.3 Commissioner, Bolker v. Commissioner and Maloney v. 14 Commissioner. 15 JUDGE STANLEY: Excuse me. What was the 16 third one? 17 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Maloney. 18 JUDGE STANLEY: Just to be clear, I know 19 Franchise Tax Board is concerned about testimony 20 regarding the law itself, but for now he's just 21 testifying as to his -- what he reviewed in 22 anticipation of this hearing. 2.3 Sorry. MS. WEED: No, that's okay. Thank you. 2.4 BY MS. WEED: 25 26 Q. Have you referred to anything else? I believe that's it. 2.7 Α.

Okay. Have you ever completed a 1031

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Q.

exchange yourself?

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- A. In my capacity as principal and vice chairman of the real estate firm, yes.
- Q. Okay. In the course of your practice as a Certified Public Accountant, have you encountered any federal tax law that requires you to hold real property for a certain period of time before you relinquish it in a 1031 exchange?
 - A. No.
- Q. In the course of your practice as a Certified Public Accountant have you encountered any case law that requires you to hold real property for a certain period of time before you relinquish property in a 1031 exchange?

MR. CORNEZ: I'm going to object. Again, we're crossing into what the law is here.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay.

MS. WEED: I'm just asking if he's referred to any case law that has indicated that.

JUDGE STANLEY: So, just to be clear, because I know there's a standing objection as to the discussion of the law. An expert witness cannot testify on issues of law or application of law to the facts. However, they can testify as to what they relied on in reaching the conclusion that they did with respect to this case.

He has personal knowledge in the field of expertise that he's testifying about and he can

testify as to what he reviewed and he can testify as to what his opinion on the ultimate facts in this case are. The fact that he uses the law to support that opinion is valid information and the panel will accept it to the extent that it is relevant to us. Okay.

I'll note the standing objection though.
BY MS. WEED:

- Q. Mr. Krajewski, would you like me to repeat the question?
 - A. Please.

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- Q. In the course of your practice as a Certified Public Accountant, have you encountered any case law that requires you to hold real property for a certain period of time before you relinquish that property in a 1031 exchange?
 - A. No.
- Q. In your experience and practice, do you advise clients that they are required by the federal tax law to hold real property for a certain period of time before they relinquish said property in a 1031 exchange?
 - A. No.
- Q. In your experience are you aware of or did you assist with any 1031 exchanges that were disregarded because the property relinquished was not held for a certain period of time before the 1031 exchange occurred?

1 Α. No. 2 In your opinion is a 1031 exchange designed Ο. 3 to evade tax? 4 Α. No. 5 Q. What is the goal of a 1031 exchange? 6 Well, to maintain continuity of investment 7 and to defer the tax that would otherwise result from recognition. 8 9 Q. Okay, thank you. Are you aware of the Assignment of Income 10 Doctrine? 11 12 A. Yes. 1.3 Q. Have you advised clients on this topic? 14 Α. Occasionally. 15 Q. Can you please describe what the Assignment 16 of Income Doctrine is? 17 A. Well, to preserve the integrity of the 18 progressive tax rate structure under the United 19 States Tax Code, in the sense of prohibiting the 20 splitting or assignment of income to achieve a 21 different result. 22 Q. Based on your understanding of the facts in 2.3 this case, is the Assignment of Income Doctrine 2.4 applicable? 25 A. I don't believe so. 26 Q. Why not? 2.7 Well, because the taxpayer was not

attempting to evade tax but simply defer the

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recognition of the capital gain associated with the transaction in accordance with 1031.

Q. In your practice, do you advise clients on

basis considerations related to real property?

A. Yes.

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- Q. In your practice, do you advise clients on basis considerations related to inheritance?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. It has been asserted by the FTB in this case that Sharon Mitchell is not entitled to the step up in basis she claimed in connection with her inheritance in 1991 of a partnership interest that held 130 Tampico Way; is this correct?
 - A. Would you repeat that for me, please?
- Q. Yes. It has been asserted by the FTB in this case that Sharon Mitchell is not entitled to the step up in basis she claimed in connection with her inheritance in 1991; is this correct?
- MR. CORNEZ: We're going to object to that question.

JUDGE STANLEY: On what basis?

MR. CORNEZ: He's -- there's no evidence to support that we're making that assertion.

JUDGE STANLEY: That may require a rewording of the question.

MS. WEED: I'll withdraw that question.

JUDGE STANLEY: It's a valid objection.

MR. GEMMINGEN: Also, can you please have

1 her clarify what basis amount she's referring to, 2 please? MS. WEED: Question's withdrawn. 3 JUDGE STANLEY: Well, you'll have an 4 5 opportunity to cross-examine. So if you have that question after she's finished, you can feel free to 6 7 ask it of him. BY MS. WEED: 8 9 Q. Have you done any analysis of the basis in 10 this case prior to testifying today? 11 A. Yes. MS. WEED: One second. I need to grab an 12 13 exhibit. Was there an exhibit folder for the 14 witness? 15 JUDGE STANLEY: I think we have an extra 16 copy up here. 17 MS. WEED: The respondent's exhibits. I'm 18 sorry. 19 JUDGE STANLEY: Oh, you want respondent's 20 exhibits. 21 JUDGE GEARY: You won't be using your 22 exhibits, counsel? 2.3 MS. WEED: Thank you. Here's an extra. 2.4 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Thank you. BY MS. WEED: 25 26 Q. Mr. Krajewski, could you please refer to 2.7 Respondent's Exhibit G? 28 A. Okay.

1 Do you recognize this document? Q. 2 Α. Yes. 3 Can you briefly just describe what it is? Ο. Let me revisit it for a moment if I 4 5 might. 6 Ο. Okay. 7 MR. CORNEZ: Can I just clarify, also, that this is your Exhibit 15? 8 MS. WEED: Yes. 9 10 MR. CORNEZ: Okay. MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yeah, this memorandum had 11 to -- dealt with the determination of basis in 12 Sharon Mitchell's 10-percent interest in the Con Med 1.3 14 partnership. 15 BY MS. WEED: 16 Q. And at the time you prepared this memo --17 what is the date of the document? A. October 28th, 2015. 18 19 Q. At the date of this memo in October 2015, 20 were you aware at any time prior to preparing this 21 memo that a 754 election had been made on behalf of 22 Sharon Mitchell? 2.3 Α. I was not. 2.4 If a 754 election had been made, would that 25 have increased the basis, in your analysis? 26 Α. Yes. 2.7 Q. Why is that? 28 Α. Well, I say "yes" predicated on the

appraisal for the real estate. So to that extent that the appraised value would justify a step up in basis, the answer is yes.

- Q. Would a retroactive appraisal be the best way to determine the basis of the real property in question at the time Sharon Mitchell inherited the property, or the partnership interest?
- A. Yes, absent anything more contemporaneous.
 - Q. Okay. One minute.

Mr. Krajewski, in your experience assisting with 1031 exchanges, have you encountered a situation such as Sharon Mitchell's in which the partnership interests were redeemed closer to the closing of escrow?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Can you please describe that experience or that situation?
- A. Well, specifically a transaction I was involved in as the principal of the commercial real estate investment firm. We had a partnership that owned a commercial asset, and at the time of entering into the sales transaction there were a contingent of those investors that wanted to perform a 1031 exchange and then there was another contingent within the partnership that wanted to cash out. And so we effectuated a drop-and-swap-type transaction.

1 Q. And how close in time, if you recall, was 2 the drop before the exchange? 3 Α. I don't recall specifically, but within a couple of months. 4 5 Q. Okay. And was that 1031 exchange ever 6 challenged by the IRS? 7 A. It was not. Q. Was it ever challenged by the state in 8 which the exchange occurred? 9 10 A. It was not. 11 MS. WEED: We have no further questions at this time. 12 1.3 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. 14 MR. CORNEZ: Can we have two minutes to 15 prepare a more smooth questioning? 16 JUDGE STANLEY: Sure. We can take a break. 17 We'll take 10 minutes and hope to start promptly 18 after that. 19 MR. CORNEZ: All right. Thank you. 20 (Whereupon a break was taken from 21 10:15 a.m. until 10:30 a.m.) 22 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Let's reconvene 2.3 since it appears everybody's back. And we were at 2.4 the point where the Franchise Tax Board was given 25 the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 26 MR. CORNEZ: Thank you. I'm going to stand so I can see him better. 2.7 ///// 28

1 CROSS-EXAMINATION 2 BY MR. CORNEZ: 3 Q. Could you turn to Exhibit 15, or what was 4 our -- I'm sorry. 5 What was our letter? MS. WEED: G. 6 7 MR. CORNEZ: G, thank you. 8 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Okay. BY MR. CORNEZ: 9 10 Q. So you write in Item 6(b) that to the best 11 of your knowledge and belief there was no 754 12 election by the partnership. 1.3 Α. Yes. 14 Q. Has something occurred that changes that 15 conclusion? 16 A. Yes. At the time that this was drawn, I 17 was relying primarily on the partnership tax return. 18 I didn't see anything within it. 19 Subsequently, I was presented a 754 20 election, albeit unsigned, and without a valuation 21 schedule attached to it. But that's the extent of 22 it. Who presented that to you? 2.3 Q. Sharon Mitchell. 2.4 Α. 25 Q. Did you give that to taxpayer's counsel, Ms. Weed? 26 A. I believe she's --2.7 28 MS. WEED: It's not the witness's document.

He didn't give me any document, no.

JUDGE STANLEY: Well, is that -- that hasn't been included in any of the exhibits?

MS. WEED: That document was located after the deadline for exchanging exhibits, but I do have a copy with me.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Would you like to see a copy of that?

MR. CORNEZ: Well --

JUDGE STANLEY: It would be hard for you to address it without seeing it. It's hard for this panel to address, too.

BY MR. CORNEZ:

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- Q. But you don't know whether it was attached to any tax return or not?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. You don't know whether it was signed by the partnership or the managing partner or not?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. If, in fact, there was a valid 754 election filed by the partnership, and in the case of an inheritance of a partnership interest, I believe your testimony is that the partnership gets to step up its basis in the event that the inherited partnership interest has a greater value than the outside basis of that partnership interest at the time of inheritance?
 - A. To the extent that the 10 percent -- in

1 this case the 10 percent market value of that real 2 estate exceeded what was being carried within the 3 partnership's books, yes. Q. So your position is that the basis -- the 4 5 754 basis step up is the value of the underlying 6 real estate and not the value of ownership interest 7 that's inherited? A. To the extent a 754 election is made, 8 9 yes. 10 Isn't it true that health for investment or 11 continuity of interest, which is the doctrines that 12 you discuss in your testimony, are not the only 1.3 requirements for a valid section 1031 transaction? 14 Α. That's correct. 15 MR. CORNEZ: We have no further 16 questions. 17 JUDGE STANLEY: Do you have any follow-up 18 questions, Ms. Weed? 19 MS. WEED: One moment, please. 20 No further questions. 21 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Judge Rosas, do you 22 have some questions for the witness? 2.3 JUDGE ROSAS: Thank you, Judge Stanley. I 2.4 do have a few questions. 25 Good morning, sir. How are you today? 26 MR. KRAJEWSKI: I'm fine, thank you. 2.7 JUDGE ROSAS: I'm going to apologize in 28 advance, but I may butcher your last name. Will you

1 please repeat it? 2 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Of course. Krajewski. 3 JUDGE ROSAS: Krajewski. MR. KRAJEWSKI: Or Klieski (phonetic) if 4 5 you prefer. 6 JUDGE ROSAS: I'll go with the first one, 7 thank you. Mr. Krajewski, earlier during your 8 9 testimony you mentioned that you have been 10 representing clients as a CPA for over a period of 35 years; is that correct? 11 12 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Correct. 1.3 JUDGE ROSAS: And in that time you also 14 mentioned that you have assisted clients in 15 structuring 1031 exchanges. Approximately how many 16 1031 exchange transactions have you assisted? 17 MR. KRAJEWSKI: I'd be estimating, but 18 probably a dozen and a half, two dozen, over that 19 tenure. 20 JUDGE ROSAS: And in addition to assisting 21 clients in structuring 1031 exchange transactions, 22 have you also represented clients whose 1031 2.3 transactions were questioned or challenged by a 2.4 taxing agency? 25 MR. KRAJEWSKI: I've had none questioned. 26 JUDGE ROSAS: So just to be clear, you have 2.7 not represented clients at any audits by any taxing 28 agency regarding 1031 exchange transaction?

1 MR. KRAJEWSKI: No. My answer was that 2 they weren't challenged. I had one that was the 3 subject of an audit, but it was accepted as 4 presented. 5 JUDGE ROSAS: Sir, do you have the copy of 6 the exhibit binders there in front of you? 7 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes. 8 JUDGE ROSAS: I'm going to refer you to 9 Appellant's Exhibit 36. 10 MR. KRAJEWSKI: I believe I have only A through R here. 11 12 JUDGE STANLEY: You need the big one. 1.3 MR. KRAJEWSKI: That number again, please? 14 JUDGE ROSAS: Thirty-six. 15 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Okay. 16 JUDGE ROSAS: Specifically, I'm going to 17 refer your attention to the second page, second to 18 the last paragraph. 19 And specifically my question to you is, 20 what is the significance of that plan that seemed to 21 have been contemplated regarding providing for a 22 dissolution of the partnership prior to close of 2.3 escrow, followed with providing for distribution to each partner of an undivided interest in the 2.4 25 property? 26 MS. WEED: Excuse me, I -- Mr. Krajewski 2.7 didn't write this and has no knowledge of this 28 document, so I'm not sure how he's supposed to

answer that question.

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JUDGE ROSAS: I understand, counsel. Thank you very much, but I'm just trying to get the witness's expert opinion in terms of whether that provision in that letter holds any correlation in general for 1031 transactions or whether it's limited to the specifics of this transaction.

MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, in reading this, it would seem to suggest, or at least hint to the fact that a dissolution of the partnership was being considered -- and I could only speculate because it doesn't come out and say this -- but for purposes of allowing each of the partners to proceed according to their investment objective, whether that was to conduct a 1031 exchange or whether it was to cash out.

MS. WEED: Your Honor, I would still object to this on the basis that Mr. Krajewski didn't draft this. He has no knowledge of it. And the letter's from Tom Milner who is not a lawyer or a CPA or tax or financial expert. So I would object to him answering that question.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And I would be inclined to overrule that objection because of the fact that an expert witness, once qualified, can testify to hypotheticals. And I believe that Judge Rosas is using this letter for the purpose of presenting a hypothetical to get his expert opinion

on how that would have been treated or effected.

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So I think it's an appropriate question, and I don't know if Judge Rosas has gotten his answer that he was looking for.

JUDGE ROSAS: I have further questions, Your Honor. Thank you.

Sir, I'm trying to get a sense of whether one of the factors that you have seen in the successful drop-and-swap transactions that you have been involved in, I'm trying to get a sense of whether in those successful transactions if you have seen, if you have seen a partnership dissolution take place prior to the sale or whether that's any relevance in general?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: I have not seen a complete dissolution of a partnership.

JUDGE ROSAS: You say you have not seen a complete dissolution of a partnership. Can you elaborate on what you have seen?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: I have seen where partnership interests were dropped, essentially redeemed with the partnership and then held in tenants in common.

JUDGE ROSAS: And in reviewing this paragraph once again, it seems like there was a plan of action to assign the undivided interests to all the partners. When you mentioned that you've seen transactions where there is a partial dissolution,

1 in your experience is 100 percent of the interest 2 assigned to the underlying partners as tenants in 3 common? 4 MR. KRAJEWSKI: No, just those interests 5 that are being dropped from the partnership. 6 JUDGE ROSAS: You mentioned that you have 7 been involved in about -- if I recall from your 8 testimony -- approximately a dozen and a half to two 9 dozen 1031 exchange transactions; is that correct? 10 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes. JUDGE ROSAS: And in those transactions in 11 12 which you have been involved, sir, would you say 1.3 that there is a common set of characteristics that 14 are exhibited by these transactions? 15 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Can you be more clear? 16 JUDGE ROSAS: I'll try. 17 The dozen and a half to twenty-four 1031 18 transactions that you've been involved in, do they 19 all share a common set of characteristics that, in 20 your opinion, made them more likely to avoid audit 21 by one of the taxing agencies? 22 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, most of them didn't 2.3 involve a drop-and-swap-type strategy. They were 2.4 straight-up exchanges. 25 JUDGE STANLEY: Most of them did not, did 26 you say? 2.7 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Did not involve, yes. 28 JUDGE ROSAS: Aside from not involving a

1 drop-and-swap, what other common characteristics did 2 you see in those transactions? 3 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, in those that I've been involved with, generally they're -- we're 4 5 looking at a deferral of gain. The transactions 6 involve identifying replacement property within the 7 required 45-day timeframe and completing the 8 acquisition of that replacement property within the 9 sooner of 180 days or the due date of that year's 10 return, including valid extension. 11 Those are common denominators, if you 12 will. 1.3 JUDGE ROSAS: Speaking of common 14 denominators, earlier you discussed briefly the 15 issue of the holding requirement. Was the holding 16 requirement an issue in any of these 17 dozen-and-a-half to twenty-four dozen transactions 18 that you were involved with? 19 MR. KRAJEWSKI: An issue insofar as it 20 being challenged by anybody? 21 JUDGE ROSAS: Either/or, whether it was 22 challenged or not. 2.3 MR. KRAJEWSKI: No. 2.4 JUDGE ROSAS: Follow-up to that question, was there a holding period in those transactions 25 26 that you were involved in? 2.7 MR. KRAJEWSKI: A holding period consideration? Yes. 28

JUDGE ROSAS: And can you elaborate, if you
recall?

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MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes. That pertained to a transaction that I was involved in, again as a principal of the real estate investment firm I made reference to earlier. And what we were considering, what I was considering, is whether or not the dropping of the interest for those partners that were desiring to cash out within roughly a couple of months of the expected closing date would be a defendable holding period.

JUDGE ROSAS: And in terms of the defendable holding period, can you provide an average estimate of the length of the duration of the holding period for those transactions that you were involved in?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, the ultimate outcome, I think -- well, looked more toward identifying intent as opposed to trying to identify a specific period of time. And in all that I researched in the course of putting together that transaction, all the case law that I reviewed seemed to suggest that what was paramount in defending the holding period wasn't so much the amount of time as it was the intent of the individual or, let me say, taxpayer that was performing, attempting to perform that exchange.

JUDGE ROSAS: You mentioned that the importance of the amount of time wasn't as relevant

as the intent. However, in regards to the amount of time, can you provide an estimate of what the amount of time was for those transactions?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: For this particular transaction I'm referring to, it was a couple of months.

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JUDGE ROSAS: And based on your overall experience in dealing with 1031 transactions, specifically in drop-and-swap transactions, in your expert opinion, sir, how does Ms. Mitchell's transaction compare to those other transactions that you've been involved in?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: I think it's comparable insofar as the -- what she was intending to do.

And, if I may elaborate, in her instant case, she held an interest in the Tampico property for more than 16 years; and in all likelihood would have continued to do so if not for the tenant's decision not to further extend that lease.

In her particular case, she had demonstrated that her investment objective wasn't one for investing for gain, rather for cash flow which required -- her objective was to be able to continue the investment that she enjoyed with Tampico for those 16 years and had communicated with the partnership and through various correspondence with the buyer of that property, the property that she was looking to relinquish, that it was her

intention to want to perform a -- or conduct a 1031 exchange. And, in fact, ultimately she did.

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And, as Ms. Weed had indicated in her opening remarks, Ms. Mitchell continues to hold that investment she exchanged into more than 10 years ago. Which I think when you look at this transaction holistically, it's quite clear that she successfully achieved continuity of investment, and for all intents and purposes has maintained that investment for greater than 26 years, collectively.

So I think in her particular case, her actions have been consistent with the benefits that are available under code section 1031, and I believe what Congress had intended.

JUDGE ROSAS: I believe you mentioned looking at this transaction holistically. If we are to look at it holistically, and keeping in mind Appellant Ms. Mitchell's intent, as you described it, to perform a 1031 exchange, had she approached you, let's say in 2005, and expressed an intent to do a 1031 exchange because the partnership was going to sell the property, had she approached you in 2005, communicated that intent, pursuant to your advice would you have advised her to do anything differently than what had transpired here?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes.

JUDGE ROSAS: What would you have advised her to do differently?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, in all likelihood would have attempted to drop her interest perhaps sooner than what actually took place.

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I think in terms of the Purchase and Sale
Agreement, depending on, you know, if I advised her
in a -- prior to a perspective buyer being
identified, would have made her a party to the
contract at the onset, or subsequently by way of
Addendum to the Purchase and Sale Agreement.

However, in the course of reviewing this particular case, I did run across a document with respect to the assignment of interest where the partnership was effectively redeeming her 10-percent interest that was essentially acknowledged and signed off by the buyer of the property. So it was clear, at least through that action, that the buyer was aware that Sharon Mitchell was, in fact, a tenant-in-common interest pursuant to this sale.

JUDGE ROSAS: In addition to attempting to drop the interest sooner and being a party to the contract, would there have been any other things that, in your opinion, should have been done differently?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, depending on the expanse of time from the point in which the interest was dropped and the closing date, a separate accounting with respect to the income and expense associated with the underlying property as to which

1 related to the Con Med partnership and what portion 2 related to Ms. Mitchell's tenant-in-common interest. 3 In addition to that, we oftentimes see a Tenant-in-Common Agreement, whether between the 4 5 multiple tenant and tenants in common or the tenants 6 in common and the partnership. 7 JUDGE ROSAS: Anything else, sir? MR. KRAJEWSKI: I believe that covers it. 8 9 JUDGE ROSAS: And before I conclude, you 10 mentioned something earlier in regards to, I believe 11 you were addressing the Redemption Agreement. 12 believe you stated that the buyer signed off, so 13 they were aware of Ms. Mitchell's ownership 14 interest. 15 As a follow-up to that, do you know when 16 the buyers became aware of Ms. Mitchell's ownership 17 interest? 18 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, as I recall -- well, 19 I can't say specifically. But at the very latest, 20 the date of that Redemption Agreement, I believe, 21 was November 17th, 2007. So it had been, in all 22 likelihood, no later than that. 2.3 JUDGE ROSAS: Well, thank you, 2.4 Mr. Krajewski. I have no more questions at this 25 time. 26 JUDGE STANLEY: Judge Geary? 2.7 JUDGE GEARY: Yes, thank you. Let me turn 28 this on.

1 Mr. Krajewski, do you have a file that 2 pertains to your work on this case? 3 MR. KRAJEWSKI: I do. JUDGE GEARY: Does it contain every 4 5 document that you reviewed in preparation for your 6 testimony? 7 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Not with me, no. 8 JUDGE GEARY: You said that you reviewed 9 various correspondence. Can you, from memory or by reference to the file, or both, tell us what 10 11 documents you actually reviewed, other than the 12 cases that you referred to, to prepare for your 1.3 testimony? 14 MR. KRAJEWSKI: I'd have to go through them 15 one-by-one and let you know that. 16 JUDGE GEARY: Is your file right there? 17 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Is my file or the exhibit file? 18 19 JUDGE GEARY: No, your file. 20 MR. KRAJEWSKI: It's in my briefcase. 21 JUDGE GEARY: Would it contain most of the 22 documents you reviewed? 2.3 MR. KRAJEWSKI: No. 2.4 JUDGE GEARY: Would you take a minute and 25 get your file for me, please? 26 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Sure. 2.7 Okay. 28 JUDGE GEARY: Can you go through your file

1 and just pull out or identify for me correspondence, 2 other than correspondence that you've exchanged with 3 counsel for Ms. Mitchell, that you reviewed and relied upon, in part, in giving your testimony here 4 5 today? 6 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Sure, if you give me just a 7 moment. JUDGE GEARY: Sure. 8 9 MR. KRAJEWSKI: I'm looking at a Counter-offer to Counter-offer that appears to be 10 11 dated February 26, 2007. 12 I'm looking at yet another Counter-offer to 13 Counter-offer, dated February 6th, 2007. 14 I'm looking at an Agreement of Purchase and 15 Sale, dated December 14th, 2006 between Con Med 16 Properties, as seller, and PTLA Corporation, as 17 purchaser. 18

I'm looking at an Agreement of Redemption of Partnership Interests that is dated November 17th, 2007.

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I'm looking at exchange documentation with First American Exchange Company concerning
Ms. Mitchell's exchange of Tampico Way and its replacement properties. And this includes the Exchange Agreement with First American Exchange and its related exhibits.

I'm looking at the Declaration of Thomas Milner, which appears to be dated, by him, as of

March 21st. I'm not sure if that says 2018 or 2010 to be honest with you.

And that Declaration includes a series of unlabeled exhibits.

JUDGE GEARY: Are there five such exhibits?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: My copy shows five, yes, A
through E.

JUDGE GEARY: Okay.

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MR. KRAJEWSKI: I'm also looking at a correspondence from PTLA to Caroline Mitchell, dated August 29th, 1990.

I'm looking at a correspondence from the partnership Con Med Properties to all partners, dated August 20th, 1990.

I'm looking at an e-mail that appears to be from Thomas Milner to the Con Med partners, dated December 13th, 2003.

Another e-mail from Thomas Milner to what appear to be the partners of Con Med, dated January 12th, 2007 -- excuse me, January 5th, 2007.

I'm looking at another Memorandum from Thomas Milner to the Con Med partners, dated March 2nd, 2007.

I'm also looking at the Seller's Final Settlement Statement from First American Title Insurance Company, dated November 30th, 2007.

I am looking at an Election to Adjust Basis of Partnership Property Under Subsection 754, which

1 is unsigned and undated. 2 And then I've got -- and then I've got a 3 copy of the federal form 8824 with respect to the 2017 -- or, excuse me, 2007 tax return filed by 4 5 Sharon Mitchell. 6 And that's all that I have with me today. 7 JUDGE GEARY: Do you recall what other 8 documents you reviewed in preparation for your 9 testimony that you don't have with you today? 10 MR. KRAJEWSKI: You know, not -- not 11 without going through the full file back at the 12 office. JUDGE GEARY: In addition to the documents 1.3 14 that you've reviewed in preparation for your 15 testimony, have you obtained information orally from 16 any source that you've relied upon? 17 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Other than my conversations 18 with Ms. Mitchell. 19 JUDGE GEARY: Not other than. So that 20 would be one source of information. 21 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes. 22 JUDGE GEARY: Any others? 2.3 MR. KRAJEWSKI: That would be the extent of 2.4 it -- well, other than her counsel. 25 JUDGE GEARY: Has Ms. Mitchell told you 26 anything factually that you've relied upon here 2.7 today that is not also apparent from the documents

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you reviewed?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: I don't believe so.

JUDGE GEARY: Of the eighteen to twenty-four 1031 exchanges that you have been involved with, how many of those were drop-and-swaps?

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MR. KRAJEWSKI: I believe there were just two.

JUDGE GEARY: You indicated in response to a question from Judge Rosas that one of the things you might have advised Ms. Mitchell had you been involved early on in the planning process for this exchange or attempted exchange is that you might have told her to drop sooner. Why?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, I think with respect to the case law that I had reviewed, although there's nothing under code section 1031 or its regulations that make reference to a period of time, there is the suggestion within case law that the holding period is something that could be considered as an indicator of intent of the taxpayer. But nothing suggests a firm amount of time.

So the general thought is if you can position yourself in such a way that more time passes between the time of drop to the time of closing, that it would be a stronger indication of intent with respect to the exchange, and for the continuity to substantiate the fact that an asset was being held for investment purposes and not for

sale.

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JUDGE GEARY: And would that have been the reason, also, that you might have advised her to make sure she was included as a party to the original Contract of Sale if that could have been done?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes. I mean it would have been -- quite honestly, I'm not sure we would be sitting here today if she was specifically named as a party to the Purchase and Sale Agreement at the onset.

JUDGE GEARY: And same for the advice that you might have given regarding separate accountings of the various partnership or for other interests in the property for longer period of time before escrow closed on the sale?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, with respect to that, Your Honor, it's just for purposes of consistency, no matter what that period of time is. But from the moment that an interest is dropped to the point that it is exchanged to have a separation of accounting with respect to that tenant-in-common interest.

JUDGE GEARY: Thank you. Those are all the questions that I have right now.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. My judge panel asked a lot of the questions that I had, but I do have a couple before we turn it back to Ms. Weed.

Mr. Krajewski, when you discussed what

1 advice you would have given her under a hypothetical 2 situation where she had come to you earlier, you 3 noted that the Redemption Agreement that is in Appellant's Exhibit 19 and Respondent's Exhibit I is 4 5 dated November 17th of 2007. That was shortly 6 before the transaction, the sales transaction, 7 right? 8 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Can you give me the letter 9 exhibit once again, please? JUDGE STANLEY: It's either "I" in the 10 11 small binder or 19 in the large binder. 12 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Okay. The Exhibit I doesn't appear to have any of the signature pages. 13 14 What was the numbered exhibit again? 15 sorry. 16 JUDGE STANLEY: 19. 17 MR. KRAJEWSKI: 19. 18 JUDGE STANLEY: You referenced the date of 19 that, so I was just clarifying that the document 20 that you reviewed shows the date of November 17th, 21 2007. 22 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes, it does. 2.3 JUDGE STANLEY: And that was shortly before 2.4 the sales transaction was completed? MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes. 25 26 JUDGE STANLEY: So did you, in any of the 2.7 documents that you reviewed or in any statements 28 that you were given as the basis for this, did you

have or come across anything that related to negotiations before that Redemption Agreement was made and signed, presumably by the partnership?

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MR. KRAJEWSKI: I did view correspondence as it related to negotiations, yes.

JUDGE STANLEY: Did you find any reason to reach an opinion that it was in any sense beyond Ms. Mitchell's control that that Redemption Agreement was signed so late in the process?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, the -- I don't know that I would say it was beyond her control. She -- her mother, Caroline Mitchell, who was a partner and subsequent tenant-in-common, was a member of the board of Con Med. And I think that Sharon was relying comfortably on her mother's influence with respect to the transaction and assuring that everybody's interests were properly aligned in the transaction.

When I say "everybody's interests,"

Sharon's interests as a tenant-in-common. Although at the time during the negotiation process, Sharon didn't hold a tenant-in-common interest, it was clear from the correspondence that I did view that the anticipation and expectation was that a -- it was both Sharon and Caroline's intention to want to consummate and exchange for their interest in the real estate.

JUDGE STANLEY: So you said that you would

1 have made her a party to the contract and advise her 2 to have an addendum, making her a party to the 3 contract. But none of the documents that you reviewed evidenced that there was any attempt to do 4 5 that? MR. KRAJEWSKI: I didn't see any of that. 6 7 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Did any of the 8 documents that you reviewed show that Sharon 9 Mitchell exercised any dominion and control over the 10 property, other than that she signed off on the sale and had a Grant Deed assigned to her? 11 12 MR. KRAJEWSKI: None that I recall. 13 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And you said that 14 the exhibit that you have isn't signed. Did you see 15 a signed Redemption Agreement? 16 MR. KRAJEWSKI: I believe that was the 17 lettered exhibit. It appears that the numbered 18 exhibit is. 19 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay, I see that. 20 With respect to this Sale Agreement, 21 there's another copy of that that I see that's 22 unsigned. Did you review one of those that has a 2.3 signature on it? It's unclear from Exhibit A. 2.4 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Exhibit A? 25 JUDGE STANLEY: Exhibit A is signed by 26 PTLA. 2.7 Do you have one that shows who signed it on behalf of Con Med? 28

1 MR. KRAJEWSKI: The signature line under 2 Exhibit A for Con Med is blank. 3 JUDGE STANLEY: Can you look in your exhibits, Ms. Weed? 4 5 MS. WEED: Which exhibit is that? 6 JUDGE STANLEY: I'm looking for the 7 Purchase Agreement, the Sales Agreement. It's 8 Exhibit A in respondent's exhibits; and when I look 9 at that, I don't see a signature for Con Med. 10 MS. WEED: I don't believe I have that in 11 my exhibits. 12 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. I'm just going to --13 unless other questions have come up for any of the 14 judges --15 JUDGE GEARY: I do have one question by way 16 of clarification. My notes may not be accurate, but 17 did you say you saw a copy of the Redemption 18 Agreement that the buyer that ultimately bought the 19 property signed off on? 20 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Acknowledged it, yes. 21 JUDGE GEARY: Is it one of the signatures 22 that's on the exhibit, the numbered exhibit, that --2.3 19? 2.4 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Let's see. No. The 25 document I'm looking at, or the Exhibit 19 that I'm 26 looking at appears to have signature pages for the 2.7 respective partners of Con Med, but doesn't appear 28 to include the acknowledgement and signature that

1 was that of the buyer. 2 JUDGE GEARY: Do you have that document in 3 your file? MR. KRAJEWSKI: I don't believe I have that 4 5 with me, but it is in my files. 6 MR. CORNEZ: Judge Geary, I believe it's 7 Exhibit 18, page -- I think it's the second to the 8 last page of Exhibit 18. MR. KRAJEWSKI: Yes, that is the document 9 10 to which I'm referring. 11 JUDGE GEARY: Okay. So you were referring, 12 in your testimony originally, to the Assignment 13 Agreement that is acknowledged by a representative 14 of PTLA. 15 MR. KRAJEWSKI: That's correct. 16 JUDGE GEARY: All right, thank you. That's 17 my only clarification. Thank you. 18 JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Weed, do you have 19 follow-up questions for the witness? 20 MS. WEED: Yes, I do. 21 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 22 BY MS. WEED: 2.3 Q. Okay. Mr. Krajewski, when I was asking you 2.4 questions earlier I believe you testified that you 25 had not encountered any federal tax law or case law 26 that requires you to hold real property for a 2.7 certain period of time before you relinquish it in a 28 1031 exchange; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

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- Q. So with respect to the holding period, you have also indicated that if you had perhaps met with Sharon Mitchell earlier than 2007 you may have advised her, you know, a variety of things, one of them being that the interest needed to be dropped, you know, as soon as possible; is that correct?
- A. Well, I don't know that I would use the term "needed." And my response to your question earlier, which was "no," is that there's nothing under law that requires us to do so, just as a point of clarification.
 - Q. Okay, thank you.

So I'm just curious, you know, what are you basing your advice to clients on? Is there some amorphous policy with the IRS or state taxing agency that's being implemented and for fear that this rule of thumb about a holding period will be arbitrarily applied you're advising clients in this way? I just, I'm trying to figure out the basis for this.

A. Well, it -- and I can't cite the material or the guidance offhand. But in the course of my readings and the research over the years, both in advising clients as well as structuring transactions in the real estate business in which I was a participant, it seemed to suggest that the passage of time would assist in supporting the taxpayer's intent.

But again, under 1031 and its regulations, there is nothing that specifically refers to the element of time other than the prerequisite conditions that a property, replacement property be identified within 45 days and the acquisition of that identified replacement property occur no later than 180 days, or the due date of the return for the year of exchange, including valid extension. Those are the only references to time under the law that I'm aware of.

Q. Okay, thank you.

And you also mentioned that you had assisted with an exchange in which there was a holding period before the exchange of, perhaps, two months or less; is that correct?

A. Yes.

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- Q. And so why does that occur? I mean, in reality in, you know, in practicality is it always possible to know when the appropriate time is to drop out your interest from a partnership?
- A. Well, I don't believe so. I mean it's facts-and-circumstance-based and every situation is different. So I can't say that there's a rule of thumb in that regard.
- Q. Then why is it not always practical to drop the partnership out sooner?
- A. Well, in some respects, I mean when you -the dropping of that interest is typically done when

the consortium of investors associated with that partnership have differing objectives. And the idea here is that in Sharon Mitchell's instant case, if all of the partners of Con Med had desired to want to effect an exchange, then there would have been no need for Sharon to have her interest dropped.

As it was, most all of the other partners, with the exception of Caroline Mitchell, desired to cash out their investments. Sharon did not.

- Q. Going back to the hypothetical that if Sharon Mitchell came to you prior to 2007, would her intent with respect to completing the exchange have been questioned by you?
 - A. Not the intent.

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- Q. And in your opinion when we are talking about intent, are we talking only about the relinquished property?
- A. You're looking at the transaction as a whole. So in my opinion, it includes not only the relinquished property but the replacement property as well.
- Q. Okay. You stated, I believe, that the only evidence of Sharon Mitchell exercising dominion and control over the property was the Grant Deed that was recorded; is that correct?
 - A. I don't think I said "Grant Deed," but yes.
- Q. Okay. I believe you also referred to the Seller's Closing Statement in your file?

1 Α. Yes. 2 In your opinion does the existence of that Ο. 3 document and the fact that Sharon Mitchell is listed as one of the owners indicate she had dominion and 4 5 control over the property? 6 Α. It does. 7 In your opinion at what point during the transaction does the sale occur? 8 A. At the point of closing. 9 10 MS. WEED: Okay. I believe that's all the 11 questions I have at this time. 12 MR. CORNEZ: I have a couple, please. 1.3 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 14 BY MR. CORNEZ: 15 Q. I think you said that you saw 16 correspondence between Mrs. -- Ms. Mitchell and the 17 buyer. Did I hear you correctly? Did I 18 misunderstand what you said? 19 I think that may have been Caroline Α. 20 Mitchell, not Sharon Mitchell. 21 Q. All right. And other than the 22 acknowledgement of receipt that we spoke about, 2.3 which is at the end of Exhibit 18, did you see any 2.4 other documentation to indicate that the buyer knew 25 of Sharon Mitchell's ownership of the underlying 26 real property? 2.7 A. Certainly the closing documents.

MR. CORNEZ: Okay.

1 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. I'm sorry to do 2 another round, but I'm going to ask you if you have 3 any follow-up questions? 4 JUDGE ROSAS: I do not, but thank you, 5 Judge Stanley. JUDGE STANLEY: Judge Geary? 6 7 JUDGE GEARY: I do not. 8 JUDGE STANLEY: I did have one that came 9 up. 10 So I believe you said that you did include, 11 when you were going over the list of documents that 12 you have with you today, you did include the e-mail from January 5th, 2007 that is in Exhibit 44? 1.3 14 MR. KRAJEWSKI: I'm --15 JUDGE STANLEY: Can you just verify that? MR. KRAJEWSKI: I'm going to trust you 16 17 saying so. Otherwise I have to go through this 18 again because I didn't make note of it. 19 JUDGE STANLEY: Well, you can look at 20 Exhibit 44 and tell me if that was one of the 21 documents you reviewed. 22 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Okav. 2.3 Yes. 2.4 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And with respect to 25 having advised -- your hypothetical that you would have advised her to have been involved in the sales 26 2.7 process sooner, would it change your advice if you 28 saw under bullet item number one that there was some concern by other partners that an earlier drop would potentially foul the deal?

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MR. KRAJEWSKI: Well, my opinion, my professional opinion, having been involved with all this -- when I say involved with all this, actually as an investor in real estate -- is simply trying to more efficiently manage the sale process rather than attempting to manage that process by committee.

You know, if you can limit the points of friction to the least number, then you're going to proceed with the transaction more efficiently. And in this particular case, from everything I saw, Sharon Mitchell's objectives in terms of the disposition of the Tampico property were aligned with the objectives of the Con Med partners, with the exception of the desire of wanting to conduct an exchange.

So in terms of those things most commonly negotiated in the sale process, not the least of which is the disposition price, but the due diligence and everything like that, as long as Sharon's objectives were in proper alignment with the partnership's, there would be less, if any, need for her to be directly involved with that.

Now, talking hypothetically, if Sharon's interests, the taxpayer's interests, at any point in time became different or divergent with the partners of Con Med, then I would expect that she would have

taken further courses of action. But that need -- did not appear to arise in everything that I reviewed.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And Judge Rosas asked you earlier about the dissolution of the partnership being originally anticipated to occur prior to this sale.

In the second paragraph of that same bullet item on Exhibit 44, if they utilized the solution expressed in that section, would that have mirrored your advice to her at the time that you would have thought they did the dissolution contingent upon the close of escrow, that it would still effect a valid transfer in 1031?

MR. KRAJEWSKI: I don't know that I would have followed that advice necessarily. The idea of -- I mean if the partnership were to completely dissolve, if that's what they're suggesting there, and that all partners then would hold a tenants-in-common interest, I'd have to think about that. I'm not sure that that would have satisfied me at the time.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Do you have any follow-up questions now, Ms. Weed?

MS. WEED: Not at this time. Thank you.

JUDGE STANLEY: Franchise Tax Board?

MR. CORNEZ: No questions. Just a further

point.

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1 JUDGE STANLEY: Further point for closing 2 argument? 3 MR. CORNEZ: Well no, it's not for closing argument. If he's finished testifying. 4 5 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So you don't have a 6 question for this witness. Are you going to address 7 exhibits again? 8 MR. CORNEZ: No. I want to address this 9 witness. So you have -- it appears that you're 10 deeming him to be an expert witness. And, 11 therefore, as this panel knows, there's no 12 attorney-client privilege between the attorney that retains an expert and the expert. 13 14 And so we would ask that he provide us a 15 complete copy of his file, including all 16 correspondence between him and Ms. Weed in the event 17 that an issue needs to be addressed and that we 18 might need to do supplemental briefing to address 19 it. 20 JUDGE STANLEY: Do you have a response to 21 that? 22 MS. WEED: Just object on the grounds of 2.3 relevance to all of the communications and all of 2.4 the documents. I'm not sure what the scope of this 25 is.

this is an attempt at late discovery and we're so

panel have a different opinion on this, I believe

JUDGE STANLEY: Unless the judges on my

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far into the process that I don't think it would be helpful to completion of this process to require him -- to keep our record open for further briefing and require him to give you a complete list of all the documents that he's reviewed and show you copies of them. I believe that that's just further discovery and I think that ship has sailed.

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MR. CORNEZ: He referenced a document today that nobody has seen or heard of or been referenced prior to today, which is this unsigned 754 election. So I don't think that that's true, that the ship has sailed because we did not know that he was going to be designated as an expert witness until today.

MS. WEED: Well, that document is not admitted because we missed the deadline on that. If you would like a copy of that specific document, I have a copy. But it's not an admitted exhibit.

JUDGE STANLEY: I believe that since he's testified specifically to that document that it would be helpful to have that in the record. So if you do have a copy, I can ask Ms. Holmes to make additional copies for the Franchise Tax Board and the judges.

So we will mark that as Appellant's Exhibit 47 and give a chance to the parties to review it before I ask you if you have any objection to it.

So, we may want to take another short recess.

1 MS. WEED: Yeah, I only have one copy. 2 JUDGE STANLEY: You have one? 3 MS. WEED: May I approach? JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Holmes can get that 4 5 from you and make copies for everyone. 6 We'll just go off the record and recess for 7 a few minutes. (Whereupon a break was taken from 8 11:35 a.m. until 11:40 a.m.) 9 JUDGE STANLEY: First of all, do you have 10 11 any objection to admitting that into evidence? 12 MR. CORNEZ: I'm sorry? 1.3 JUDGE STANLEY: Do you have any objection 14 to admitting that into evidence? 15 MR. CORNEZ: Well, yes, lots of objections. 16 It's not signed. It's not dated. We don't know 17 which tax return it was attached to, if it ever was. 18 We don't know where it came from. We don't know who 19 provided it. We don't know who typed it. 20 But other than that --21 And the key fact would be that if in fact 22 there were a 754 election, it would have had to have 2.3 been on the 1990 tax return. I believe it was 1990 when she inherited her interest. So if it showed up 2.4 25 in any year after that, it wouldn't matter anyway. 26 There's just a bare typed piece of paper. 2.7 So for those reasons, we would object.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Ms. Weed?

1 MS. WEED: Just to clarify, I believe it 2 was the 1991 return. And, I mean, we didn't admit 3 this. We didn't think we made the deadline. It's not signed. We can have Sharon testify about it and 4 5 what she recalls, but we have not tried to admit 6 it. 7 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And rather than admitting it at this point then, let's reserve that 8 9 for Ms. Mitchell's testimony and see if we can lay 10 any more foundation for it. It can always be 11 entered as a hearsay document without any supporting

But let's just set that aside and keep it marked as Exhibit 47 for now, and we'll address that later.

admissible evidence, though it would have no real

But I wanted to return to Exhibit 39 and ask if it is your intent to either withdraw that exhibit or lay a foundation for admitting the first page-and-a-half into evidence?

MS. WEED: Can we ask Mr. Krajewski some questions about it in order to hopefully lay some foundation?

JUDGE STANLEY: That would be acceptable. Go ahead.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. WEED:

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use.

Q. Mr. Krajewski, can you please turn to

1 Exhibit 39? 2 A. Okay, I'm there. I'm there. 3 Q. Did you -- do you recognize this document? 4 5 A. Yes. 6 Ο. Did you prepare it? 7 Α. Yes. 8 When did you prepare it? Q. 9 Α. I completed it on March 29th, two thousand -- uh, let's see. 10 Q. I believe --11 12 Α. Huh. Let's see. That actually is That would have been -- I believe that 13 misdated. 14 should have been 2018. 15 Q. Okay. So that looks like it might be a 16 typo? 17 Yeah. Α. It should be 2018? 18 0. 19 Α. Yeah. 20 Q. Okay. 21 Just by way of explanation there, I think I Α. 22 was in the heat of tax season, working on 2017 2.3 returns and that's all that was on my head. 2.4 Sorry. 25 Q. Are the contents of this Memorandum based 26 upon the documents you reviewed in this case? 2.7 A. Yes. 28 MS. WEED: We would move to admit this

document.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Franchise Tax Board?

MR. CORNEZ: Well, are we admitting the whole thing?

JUDGE STANLEY: We're talking about page 1 and half of page 2.

Well, wait. Wait, wait.

So the only part that we've excluded appears to be the discussion of the cases, which would be half of page 2 and all of page 3. The rest seems to be documentation in a memo by Mr. Krajewski based on what he reviewed.

MR. GEMMINGEN: I'm sorry, could you please restate?

JUDGE STANLEY: I'm sorry. I was looking down at the exhibit while I talked.

So the only part that we've excluded expressly so far is the second half of page 2 and all of page 3.

MR. GEMMINGEN: Well, one item is -- on the items prior to December 2006, there's a relevance issue because the Purchase and Sale Agreement referenced at the bottom of page 1 specifically states that supersedes all prior agreements. And so the items that are referred to above relate to conversations that the operative agreement here, Purchase and Sale Agreement as amended, specifically overrides.

1 JUDGE STANLEY: So are you arguing about 2 the merits of their arguments? 3 MR. GEMMINGEN: I'm arguing about the relevance of letting in the items on the first 4 5 page. JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. I'm going to admit 6 7 the remainder of the document based on the fact that 8 it may have relevance to the argument that Ms. Mitchell is making and the fact that the witness 9 10 has testified that he based what he wrote in this memo on the documents that he reviewed for this 11 12 case. And we will give it the weight it deserves 1.3 when we deliberate. 14 So I'm going to admit only those portions 15 of 39 that don't relate to discussion of the law. 16 Okay. Is there anything else that you need to address before this witness is released? 17 MS. WEED: No. And I think he has to catch 18 19 a flight. 20 JUDGE STANLEY: All righty. Then if you --21 MR. CORNEZ: Oh, I have a couple hours of 22 questions. 2.3 No, no questions, Your Honor. 2.4 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Then, Mr. Krajewski, 25 you're released. And thank you for being here. 26 MR. KRAJEWSKI: Thank you. 2.7 JUDGE STANLEY: At this point we can 28 probably break for lunch and give you some time

1 before you have your next witness testify. 2 How long do you think you'd want to break, 3 until 1:00 o'clock? MS. WEED: Yeah, 1:00 o'clock should be 4 5 fine. 6 JUDGE STANLEY: Franchise Tax Board, are 7 you okay with that? 8 MR. CORNEZ: Yes. 9 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. We'll recess and go off the record. 10 (Whereupon a break was taken from 11 12 11:48 a.m. until 1:04 p.m.) 13 JUDGE STANLEY: All right. It looks like 14 everybody's back, so we'll reconvene the hearing in the matter of Sharon Mitchell. And I will ask Ms. 15 16 Weed to introduce her next witness. 17 Back on the record in the matter. MS. WEED: Yes, I would like to call the 18 19 Appellant Sharon Mitchell at this time. 20 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And would you prefer 21 her to just stay there or --22 MS. WEED: Where do you want to go? 2.3 MS. MITCHELL: I'm fine. 2.4 JUDGE STANLEY: There's copies of the 25 exhibits up there. 26 MS. WEED: Whichever you prefer. 2.7 JUDGE STANLEY: We don't want you to be uncomfortable, Ms. Mitchell. 28

1 MS. MITCHELL: Okay. Well, I can stay 2 here. 3 MS. WEED: Okay. JUDGE GEARY: Counsel, just make sure that, 4 5 even though she's sitting right next to you, that 6 you have her project her voice well enough through 7 the microphone so that everyone can hear. MS. WEED: Okay. 8 9 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Ms. Mitchell, will 10 you please rise and state your name and spell it for 11 the record, please. 12 MS. MITCHELL: Sharon Mitchell, S-h-a-r-o-n M-i-t-c-h-e-l-l. 13 14 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And raise your right 15 hand. 16 Do you swear or affirm that you will tell 17 the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? 18 19 MS. MITCHELL: I do. 20 JUDGE STANLEY: Thank you. 21 DIRECT EXAMINATION 22 BY MS. WEED: 2.3 Q. Okay. Sharon, can you please -- what is it 2.4 that you do for a living? 25 A. I am both an artist and a real estate 26 investor. 2.7 Q. Okay. And what is your understanding of 28 the 1031 exchange?

- A. In a 1031 exchange the capital gains is deferred and the ability to continue with your investment is -- it perpetuates it so you continue to grow.
- Q. Okay. What were the first 1031's that you were exposed to?
- A. Oh, my mother. That was her -- she was very good at real estate and very knowledgeable and she did a lot of those.
- Q. Do you remember how far back you remember her doing 1031 exchanges?
- A. I was, I think, not much more than a child other than -- yeah. She had -- and they were called "Starkers" at the time. But she was doing them then.
- Q. Okay. In your estimate, how many 1031's did your mother successfully complete over her lifetime?
 - A. I counted them recently, 29. But she lived a long life.
 - Q. And were they all successfully completed?
 - A. They were.
 - Q. In 2007, were you actively involved in partnership discussions?
 - A. Wait. Say that again?
 - Q. In 2007, were you actively involved in partnership discussions?
 - A. No.

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1 Was your mom? Q. 2 Α. Oh, yes. 3 Did you trust your mom to negotiate on your Ο. behalf? 4 5 A. Very much, yes. 6 Q. Did your mother mentor you with respect to 7 1031 exchanges? 8 Α. She did. She always explained what she was 9 up to. 10 How many of the 1031 transactions you have done consisted of a California property being 11 12 exchanged for an out-of-state property? 13 I think out of -- I think there were 14 three. 15 Q. Okay. 16 Yeah. Α. 17 Q. Is there anything you can refer to, to 18 refresh your recollection? 19 A. Well, I'm looking here -- I would have 20 totaled these up -- and I wrote a note to myself 21 that in the totality would be three from my 22 lifetime, one, you know (inaudible) --2.3 HEARING REPORTER: I'm sorry. I didn't 2.4 hear the last part of your answer. 25 MS. MITCHELL: Oh, I'm sorry. Three in the 26 totality of my lifetime. In 2007, there would have 2.7 been one out of the four exchanges was. ///// 28

1 BY MS. WEED: 2 Q. Okay. So one property; is that correct? 3 Α. Mm-hmm. Q. How many of the 1031 exchanges that you 4 5 have completed have been subject to audit? A. Just this one. 6 7 Q. Are you aware --8 And you're talking about the Con 9 Med property --10 A. Oh, I'm sorry. Q. -- at 130 Tampico? 11 12 Α. Yes. 13 JUDGE STANLEY: Can you be careful not to 14 talk over each other because that will be very difficult for our reporter to catch. 15 16 MS. MITCHELL: Oh, right. Right. I'm 17 sorry. BY MS. WEED: 18 19 Q. In connection with 130 Tampico Way, are you 20 aware if any of the other partners have been audited 21 at this time? 22 A. I'm not aware of anyone else being 2.3 audited. 2.4 Q. Are you aware of whether the partnership 25 reported the whole amount of the sales proceeds for 26 the sale of 130 Tampico Way? 2.7 A. They reported their share. My share was 28 not part of their tax return.

- Q. Okay. Do you have experience negotiating real estate transactions?
 - A. Now or then?
 - O. Now.

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- A. Now? More experience because I've had to.
 - Q. Okay. And what about in 2007?
- A. No. I really relied heavily on my mother's expertise, and that's the way things were. She was very good at it.
- Q. Okay. Except for the transaction at issue with respect to 130 Tampico Way, have you converted any other partnership interests in connection with the like-kind exchange in the past?
 - A. No.
- Q. When did you acquire your partnership interest in Con Med?
 - A. March 1991.
- Q. At the time that you inherited your partnership interest, do you know -- did you know which property the partnership owned?
- A. Not really at the time. It wasn't something that was part of my normal statement.
- Q. Okay. When do you think you became aware that the partnership owned 130 Tampico Way?
- A. When I -- when they settled the estate and they said, here, here's your thing.
- Q. So that would have been around 1991?

- A. Yeah. My mother was the executrix of the estate and she, you know, laid out this, this, and this, and the partnership was included in that.
- Q. At the time you inherited the partnership interest, do you recall how many partners there were total?
 - A. No, not in 1991, I really don't, no.
 - Q. Okay. What about in 2007?

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- A. In 2007, there would have been 17, including my mom and I.
- Q. Okay. What was your role in the partnership?
 - A. I had the right to vote.
- Q. Okay. And what was your mother's role in the partnership?
- A. She was always, from the inception of the partnership, she was always very actively advising both John Stewart -- or Jack Stewart was the original general partner, and Tom Milner who took over later on, because she had so much more real estate experience than they did. So they were oftentimes calling and asking for advice. And they actually kind of became friends at a certain level.
- Q. Was your mother heavily involved in the sale negotiations of 130 Tampico --
- A. Oh, I forgot to say one thing. She was a general -- she was elected to, uh -- what do you

1 call it? 2 JUDGE GEARY: Board? 3 MS. MITCHELL: Executive board, yeah. And that was during the sale. 4 5 BY MS. WEED: 6 Q. Was she heavily involved in the sale 7 negotiations for 130 Tampico Way? 8 A. Indeed she was. 9 Did you trust your mother's judgment and 10 expertise in handling the negotiations? 11 A. Absolutely. Q. When did you become aware that the 12 13 partnership was intending to sell 130 Tampico? 14 A. You know, I don't really remember a 15 specific date. I'm sorry. I can't really recall. 16 It would have been pretty early on before the sale. 17 Maybe as early as 2003. I'm going to say 2003. 18 Is there any document you can refer to that 19 might help refresh your recollection? 20 A. Yes. There might be some of the 21 exhibits. 22 Q. I'm going to refer you to Exhibit 41, 2.3 Appellant's Exhibit 41. 2.4 A. Okay. O. Please review the document. 25 26 Α. Okay. 2.7 Q. Have you seen this document before? 28 Α. Yes, I have.

Q. What is your understanding of what this document indicates?

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A. This would have been our general partner Tom Milner, and he would have been e-mailing to everyone that our tenant who had been there for so many years, they're PTLA, they were not -- they basically were not doing well. And they had put some things out on the table like didn't want to partner with them, didn't want to do -- some other changes in how our relationship was.

None of the partners were interested in becoming ownership partners and being a kind of outside venture with PTLA. Basically they also were bringing to our attention that there was really like a lot of capital improvements, kind of a big number.

JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Mitchell, I'm sorry to break your flow. But you have a very quick speech pattern.

MS. MITCHELL: Oh, I'm so sorry. I'm so sorry. Okay.

JUDGE STANLEY: And when you're looking down it's harder to hear your words.

MS. MITCHELL: Okay.

PTLA had basically asked us for more funding for capital improvements, and none of that was a very exciting thing to hear.

Then at that point people -- I think that was when the sale probably came to, you know, my

attention, because I know my mom was looking into getting an appraisal. You know, she basically was in charge of that end of it.

BY MS. WEED:

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- Q. Okay. And what is the date of that document?
 - A. It's December 7, 2004.
- Q. All right. And can you please refer to Exhibit 42?
 - A. Okay.
- Q. Can you -- do you recognize this document?
- 13 A. Yes.
 - Q. And can you briefly indicate to us what it indicates -- what your understanding is that this document indicates?
 - A. Okay. Let me just read over it just for a second.
 - Okay. So this is just an update from Tom Milner to the partners. And what he is saying is that my mom was doing a little reconnaissance, kind of, contacting PTLA to confirm that they were still in negotiations with John Muir because that's kind of where they were thinking of heading and we needed to know that that was actually still a thing.
 - Q. What do you mean heading to John Muir?
 - A. They were in negotiations to leave a section of a building that was under the umbrella of

the John Muir system, and they were pretty serious about it. I mean they were -- they actually had approached Kaiser and Kaiser turned them down.

But John Muir was entertaining an idea of having an independent sort of assisted care facility within their system. And as long as they were still in negotiations with John Muir, it was not -- that's the writing on the wall. I mean they're not going to stay with us.

- Q. You mean the current tenant?
- A. Yeah, PTLA was our tenant.
- Q. Okay.

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A. And so other than -- I mean there's a little aside about people were confused about when the lease was up. That needed to be checked on because they wanted out.

It does mention my mom was opposed to selling unless there was no other option. She wasn't selling like a turnover property generally.

- Q. And what is the date of this document?
- A. This document is -- it's kind of hard to read that date, but it looks like December of 2003.
- Q. Okay. If you recall, when did you first convey your intent to conduct a 1031 exchange to the partnership?
- A. Again, I just don't know of an exact date, other than to say that it was always my intention to

conduct a 1031 because I don't do business any other way and have never done.

- Q. To whom did you convey your intent?
- A. This would have been our counsel, Richard Goodman. I spoke with Tom Milner. The real estate agents that we need to have us help target properties, both in Arizona and in California; that would be John Vickers in California and John Miller in Arizona, and he's someone we eventually went with.
- Q. Okay. If you know, when did the partnership become aware of your intent to conduct a 1031 exchange?
- A. Again, I don't know an exact date. Chances are it would have been Tom Milner saying something to them. I don't remember meetings with them. I think all this stuff happened with e-mail. So it would have probably been an e-mail that went out. But it was early on.

Let me -- may I refer to my notes?

Q. If it would refresh your recollection and Judge Stanley approves.

JUDGE STANLEY: Certainly. I don't hear any objections.

MR. CORNEZ: Well, what notes are these?

MS. MITCHELL: I just have a timeline.

JUDGE STANLEY: So is that an objection,

Mr. Cornez?

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If somebody refers to a document to refresh their memory, the other party has the right to at least see what -- to what she's referring.

So if you want to see that --

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MR. CORNEZ: I would like to see it.

JUDGE STANLEY: Would you mind just passing that over so they can see to what you're referring?

MS. WEED: To the extent that this could contain some attorney-client privilege, though, how would that be handled?

JUDGE STANLEY: Well, does the document to which she's referring, is that -- are you claiming that that's a privileged document?

MS. WEED: There are attorney notes on there, yes. So to the extent that the attorney notes cannot be redacted, I don't think that, as a privileged document, that they have a right to see it if she's fully using it to refresh her recollection and it's not an admitted document.

JUDGE STANLEY: Well, so under typical civil law evidence rules they would have the right to see to what she's referring.

Since this is an administrative hearing and we like to give leeway to people, I would think that if you'll accept her description of it, of what she's referring to, would that satisfy the Franchise Tax Board?

MR. CORNEZ: I would reserve, until I hear

1 the answer, to know whether I would object or not. 2 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. 3 MS. WEED: So she's not going to read any of it into testimony. I think she just needed to 4 5 refresh her recollection based on her notes she 6 prepared to testify today. 7 JUDGE GEARY: May I ask a question? Could 8 she refresh her recollection by reference to one of 9 the exhibits that's already been admitted? 10 Counsel? 11 MS. WEED: One moment, please. 12 JUDGE GEARY: Okay. 13 While you're looking, Counsel, I believe 14 you indicated that the document's not being 15 admitted. But it is a document that has to be 16 produced; if the witness's making reference to it to 17 refresh her recollection, it has to be produced for 18 counsel for his review. 19 And it looks to me -- I'm not speculating, 20 but it looks like she's reading questions and 21 answers. Do you want -- if you want her to use that 22 to refresh her recollection, be prepared to produce 2.3 it for counsel. 2.4 MS. WEED: Okay. Understood. BY MS. WEED: 25 26 Q. Okay. So without referring to your notes 2.7 and if you know, when did the partnership become

aware of your intent to conduct a 1031 exchange?

- A. I can't give you an exact date, but I do know that there are in existence e-mails where general partners mention to the partners that Caroline -- there's a discussion of a 1031 exchange, and that goes back to well before the close of escrow, possibly even back to even a year before. I know there's documents somewhere in that pile that have reference, but I can't tell you an exact date off the top of my head.
- Q. Once you were made aware of the sale did you have the intent to do a 1031 exchange?
 - A. Absolutely.
- Q. Was it always your intent to have the partnership buy you out once you were aware of the intent to sell?
 - A. Yes.

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- Q. Why?
- A. Because we wanted to continue to have an investment that grows. Our income stream was really what we lived on. We didn't live off of capital that you generate from flipping this building. That wasn't a thing for us.
- Q. Okay. Was there an order to exchange the property?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Do you know if the partnership ever agreed to extend the escrow period and date of closing in this transaction?

1	A. Yes, it did.
2	Q. Okay. How do you know?
3	A. There is a Counter-offer to a
4	Counter-offer, maybe even to a Counter-offer that
5	has that as a stipulation. And that I do know
6	the date of that document. It's February of 2007.
7	Q. Can you please refer to what has been
8	admitted as Respondent's Exhibit C?
9	A. Exhibit C?
10	Q. Just review it.
11	Do you recognize this document?
12	A. You mean their exhibition list?
13	Q. Exhibit C.
14	A. Oh, I'm sorry. I was reading the wrong
15	thing. Oh, yeah. Yeah. Sorry.
16	Q. And what does this document indicate to
17	you?
18	A. This is the Counter-offer to the
19	Counter-offer.
20	Q. Okay. And what was your understanding of
21	why this Counter-offer was made?
22	A. Well, because we needed to extend the
23	closing to be able to effectively do our 1031.
24	Q. Okay. To the best of your recollection,
25	did Tom Milner ever notify the partners that you
26	intended to do a like-kind exchange?
27	A. Absolutely not.
28	Q. Were you a named seller on the escrow

1 statement? Α. Yes. 3 Ο. Do you know who else was named as a seller on the escrow statement? 4 5 Α. Caroline Mitchell and Con Med. 6 Ο. And yourself, correct? 7 Α. Yeah. Me and my mom and Con Med. 8 Did you understand that having your name 9 listed on the closing statement would make you civilly liable as an individual for any issues 10 arising from the actual sale? 11 12 Α. Yes. 1.3 Did you pay any of the closing costs or 14 escrow fees? 15 Α. Yes. 16 Q. Prior to the time 130 Tampico Way was sold, 17 did you record a Deed from the partnership to 18 yourself? 19 A. Yes. 20 Do you recall if a transfer tax was paid at 21 this time? 22 A. Yes, there was. 2.3 Was a Deed recorded from you to the buyers 2.4 of 130 Tampico Way? 25 A. Yes. 26 Do you recall who was listed on the Deed? 2.7 Α. All of us or just the sellers?

In connection with the transfer of your

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Q.

1 interest. A. Well, my mom and I were listed as the 3 sellers. And the buyers were -- the PTLA had changed into another entity to buy the property, so 4 5 it was -- they were calling themselves Tampico 6 Investors and Meadow Investors, LLC. 7 Q. Okay. Did you ever believe redeeming your 8 partnership interests and exchanging it under 1031 9 as an individual would allow you to potentially 10 avoid paying tax? A. No. 11 12 Q. If you could please refer to Appellant's 1.3 Exhibit 5. 14 A. Appellant. That's this? That's me. 15 Exhibit 5. All right. 16 Yes, I'm looking at it. 17 Have you seen this document before? Q. 18 Α. I have. 19 Did you prepare it? Q. 20 Did I prepare it? Α. 21 0. Yes. 22 No. Α. Q. Who did? 2.3 2.4 Α. Armanino in Walnut Creek. 25 JUDGE STANLEY: Excuse me. I didn't 26 hear. MS. MITCHELL: Armanino. It's a CPA firm. 2.7 Armanino, A-r-m-i-n-i-n-o. 28

1 MS. WEED: A-r-m-a-n-i-n-o. JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Mitchell, I'm going to 2 3 just ask you to try to slow down again. MS. MITCHELL: I'm so sorry. 4 5 JUDGE STANLEY: You just normally talk, you 6 normally talk in a fast pace. 7 MS. MITCHELL: Yeah. 8 JUDGE STANLEY: Especially when you're 9 looking down at documents, it tends to trail off and 10 it doesn't quite work. We can't hear you and get the full benefit of your testimony. 11 12 MS. MITCHELL: I'm sorry. I'll do 1.3 better. 14 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Friendly reminder. 15 MS. MITCHELL: I know. Thank you. BY MS. WEED: 16 17 Q. So Exhibit 5, have you seen this document before? 18 19 Α. I have seen it. 20 Q. You said you did not prepare it. You said Armanino did. 21 22 Mm-hmm. Α. 2.3 Q. Did you review the document when they 2.4 presented it to you, when they had completed it? 25 A. Yes, I think I did. 26 Did you review it with the person who 2.7 prepared it? 28 A. You know, that part, I don't remember.

- Q. Okay. Do you know who you reviewed it with?
- A. It might have been my mom; she was the executrix of the estate. So I just don't know. I can't give you an answer on that.
- Q. Okay. So as you sit here today, do you understand what this document indicates?
- A. Well, I thought it meant the cash basis I had in Con Med, you know, the basis from when my aunt died.
 - Q. Okay.

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- A. And in this, it's so hard to read the date, when she died. But it was March, I know that.
 - Q. Okay.

JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Mitchell, again, you looked down and I don't think I understood a word you just said in that last sentence.

MS. MITCHELL: The first page of the exhibit has the date that I acquired the property, which would have been the date of my aunt's death. It's hard to read because the scan is not very good, but it says "1991," and it was March of 1991.

BY MS. WEED:

- Q. And what is the title of this document?
- A. It says "Like-Kind Exchanges," and it says "Form 8824."
 - Q. Okay. And so if you look at page 2, there are some numbers reported. Do you know what these

numbers represent?

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- A. I think I do, yes.
- Q. And what do you think these numbers indicate?
 - A. Let me move that microphone.

Okay, so the first number on line 16 is the -- I think that's the one we were buying, right? Not sure, but I'm thinking.

The one on 18 would be the cash -- the basis for Con Med as it would have been on the 1991, you know, my aunt died. And the number below that is, you know, minus that.

So what it says at the very bottom is that the new property that I'm going into, in spite of the fact that I'm paying this larger number up there, which normally means that would be your new basis since you just bought it, instead of it being the larger number, it's a smaller number because it's frozen in time. So no matter how much it appreciates or how much equity it ends up having in it, when you sell it your basis is still the number from 1991. So it's like it's frozen in time.

- Q. Okay. And can you refer to the last number indicated on that page?
 - A. Yeah.
 - O. I think it's line 25.
- 27 A. Yeah.
 - Q. Do you have any understanding of what that

indicates?

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- A. Well, that would have been the value of the actual physical building at the time of my aunt's passing. Isn't that it? Right there?
 - Q. I'm sorry. Line 24.
- A. Oh, line 24. That's the amount of what we would -- I mean that's what my part of the building would have been, minus the basis of Con Med.
 - Q. And what do you mean by your part?
- A. Well, the building itself was bought by my mom and I. So this is half of it. We bought it 50/50. We exchanged into it 50/50, which is what we always tended to do. So that just represents my ownership of the 50 percent of the building that we're going to exchange into.
- Q. Okay. Are you aware that the FTB is claiming the cost basis of the property you exchanged is 29,395?
 - A. I am well aware of that, yes.
 - Q. Do you agree with this assertion?
 - A. No.
 - Q. Why do you disagree?
- A. Because I didn't sell a share of a partnership of -- a noncontrolling share of a partnership. I sold my equity in a building, in a physical building.
- Q. Do you have any evidence to support the fact that the basis the FTB asserted against you is

1 incorrect? 2 A. I don't think I do. 3 Q. Okay. Would it refresh your recollection to refer to the retroactive appraisal you had 4 5 done? A. Oh, God yes, of course. I'm so sorry, I 6 7 apologize. Yes, of course I do. 8 9 Q. It's okay. Do you need to refer to that? It's Exhibit 10 26. 11 12 Α. Yes. 13 Ο. And can you just briefly tell us why you 14 obtained this retroactive appraisal to 1991? 15 I couldn't find the original. 16 Q. Okay. So you believe that there was an 17 original appraisal done --18 Α. Mm-hmm. 19 Q. -- close to 1991 at the time your aunt 20 died? 21 Α. I know there was. 22 How do you know? Ο. 2.3 Α. Because I found all the others. 2.4 Okay. Is there any provision in the Q. 25 Partnership Agreement that indicates an appraisal would have been done? 26 2.7 A. Uh-huh. There is a clause in the agreement that if somebody dies -- actually, there's kind of 28

an arbitrary appraising of the property if somebody passes.

If somebody inherits their share, the partnership also can also have an option to buy them out, at which point also an appraisal would be required. And everybody was doing it. I mean people were dying. They were old because this is in '69.

- Q. That is the Second Amended and Restated Partnership Agreement that you're referring to?
 - A. I am referring to that agreement.
- Q. Are you aware of any other specific partners who made 754 elections at the time they inherited their interests?
 - A. Oh, yes, all of them. Yes, they did.
 - Q. Anyone specifically?
 - A. Tom Milner, the general partner.
 - Q. Okay. And how do you know?
- A. Because he was so nice; when I told him that I couldn't find my appraisal, he sent me his. But it wasn't very useful because it was from 2001. That's years past. But he had an appraisal done. He had done the election. And that's, you know, what people were doing as the older members of the partnership were passing away.
- Q. Okay. Do you recall the cost basis reported on your return form 8824?
 - A. 260 --

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1 Q. Exhibit 5.

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- A. I need to look at that. It's 200 and 60 -- I'm going to have to stand up. Two six -- it looks like a six seven four eight. I'm sorry.
- Q. And what was the fair market value reported on the appraisal, the retroactive appraisal you obtained?
- A. The entirety of the property would have been worth 2,250,000, which would have put my 10 percent at 200,000.
- Q. Okay. And so is it correct that 10 percent of that would be about 225,000?
- A. Oh, yeah. Sorry. I did the math wrong. Yes, 225,000.
 - Q. Why do you believe there is this discrepancy of 266,000 versus 225,000?
 - A. You know, I'm amazed it got that close considering it's been so long. I just think it's a time thing.
 - Q. Do you know what the amounts reported on your 8848, do you remember what that amount was based on at the time you reported it?
 - A. Wait, did you say 88 --
 - Q. 8824.
 - A. -- 24. Well, it would have been based on the original appraisal.
- Q. And when you had the tax return in 2007, your form 1040, prepared by Armanino, did you

prepare -- or did you provide the source documents
to prepare the return?

- A. I did not. That would have been my mom. She was the executrix, she handled everything.
 - Q. But for your individual return in 2007?
- A. Oh, my individual return? I handed them what I had. I don't know -- I don't remember very much about that. I don't think that was my usual thing --
- Q. Is it your understanding that the -JUDGE STANLEY: Again, Ms. Weed, you two
 are talking over each other a little bit at the end.
 So you guys need to be careful about that. We can't
 catch everything when you do that.

MS. WEED: Okay.

BY MS. WEED:

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- Q. Is it your understanding that the information indicated on the form 8824 would have been based on information you provided to the accountant?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Do you know what a 754 election is?
- A. Yes.
 - Q. Do you recall if a 754 election was made at the time you claimed you should have received a step up in basis?
 - A. If it was, I just can't find it.
 - Q. Do you have any other information to

suggest or to corroborate your belief that you -that a 754 election occurred in 2007?

- A. The only thing I could think of is that it was required, everyone did it. My mother would not have skipped that.
- Q. Okay. Did the IRS ever contact you about the 1031 exchange in question?
 - A. No.

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- Q. Did the IRS ever send you correspondence in connection with the 1031 exchange in question?
 - A. No.
- Q. Do you recall if you reported the 130 Tampico property on your Schedule E?
 - A. No, I don't think I did.
 - Q. Why not?
- A. That -- well, we were reporting all the rental property on a cash basis, which meant that if there were no transactions occurring, you know, expenses, in particular income coming in or expenses being paid out, during that time, there simply would be nothing to report.
- Q. Did you ever realize any rental income as an individual from the 130 Tampico property?
 - A. I did not.
- Q. Did you ever have any discussions with your CPA with respect to your 2007 return about how to handle the 130 Tampico investment on your return?
 - A. Not at the time. No, I don't remember

discussing it at the time, no.

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- Q. Did your CPA advise you on the transaction and whether there was any income to report on your Schedule E?
- A. Well, yeah, because it wasn't there. By virtue of the fact that it wasn't there, you know that there's nothing to report.
- Q. Okay. In 2007, did you understand the steps of a real estate sales transaction?
 - A. I think I did, yeah.
- Q. What did you -- what did you understand them to be?
- A. One enters into a sales contract, the buyer puts down enough money. They then have a certain amount of time to do whatever, you know, due diligence they want to do.

Negotiations ensue because there's always something. And then as it gets closer to, you know, the closing, that's when all the stuff really happens and then it gets finalized at the closing.

- Q. Based upon the experiences you've had, when do you believe a sale is executed?
 - A. At the closing.
 - Q. Was this your belief in 2007?
 - A. Yeah, it would be, yeah.
- Q. Was it your understanding that when the Purchase Agreement was entered into, that the property was sold at that time?

A. No, not at all.

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- Q. Were there still negotiations to take place after the Purchase Agreement was entered into?
 - A. Yes, there were.
- Q. Do you know which negotiations took place after the Purchase Agreement was entered into?
- A. There was a price change. Basically we went -- let's see. I think we ended up getting a little more for it actually. And then the second was the whole business with having to extend or allowing us to extend the closing so that we could do our 1031.
- Q. Okay. Why did you effectuate the transaction in question the way that you did?
- A. I'm not sure I understand exactly what you mean.
- Q. In connection with the exchange of your interests in 130 Tampico Way and all of the related components of that, why did you do it that way?
 - A. Oh, on advice of counsel.
 - Q. Anything else?
- A. Well, that's because that's how we do it.

 I'm not really sure -- I'm kind of still not really sure -- it's a very broad-based --
- Q. What was your intent in completing the transaction the way you did?
- A. To do our 1031, continue our income stream from an investment that we had had since 1969.

- Q. To the best of your recollection, what did your counsel, in connection with this transaction, advise you in terms of completing the transaction?
- A. He advised us about how to time our documents.

Let's see. Just, you know, he told us when we needed to do things, how papers were supposed to be filed.

- Q. Did you follow his advice?
- A. Yes, we did.

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- Q. Were you ever advised by a tax professional, CPA or attorney, that you needed to hold the property, as an individual, for a certain period of time before being eligible to conduct the 1031 exchange?
 - A. No.
- Q. Were you ever made aware of any state law which would ever have required you to hold your interest in the property as an individual for a certain period before the 1031 exchange could take place?
 - A. No.
- Q. After your partnership interest was redeemed, did you record the transfer to you?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. When?
- A. Well, it would have been closing, right?

 I'm thinking that's when that stuff would have

been.

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- Q. Did you record a Deed?
- A. Mm-hmm. Yes. Yes, we did.
- Q. If you refer to -- if you could please refer to Exhibit 6, Appellant's Exhibit 6.
 - A. Okay.
 - Q. Do you recognize this document?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. And please briefly indicate what it is?
 - A. It is -- sorry, I have to get closer.
- Okay. This is Con Med partnership granting to Caroline Mitchell and myself, my mother's 8-percent and my 10-percent interest.
- Q. And what is the date of that Deed?
- A. Oh, November 29th, 2007. Yes, I can see that.
 - Q. Do you recall if the Lease Agreement with Con Med, that the Lease Agreement with Con Med had with the tenant of 130 Tampico was ever amended after your interest was redeemed?
 - A. No, it was not.
 - Q. And why is that?
 - A. It didn't really make sense. I mean the tenant was the buyer. And everything -- you know, I mean we were so close to closing that reworking a lease that involved signatures of more than 17 people, it didn't make sense as a business decision even just to pay someone to do that, especially

1 since the tenant was the buyer. I mean it's not in 2 their interest to do something that's against their 3 lease. Are you familiar with the tax liability 4 5 asserted against you? 6 Α. Yeah. 7 Ο. Did you pay this amount? 8 Α. I did, if it's the right amount, yes. 9 Q. Do you recall what the amount was? 10 Little over 80,000. Α. Okay. If you could please refer to 11 Q. 12 Appellant's Exhibit 45. 1.3 Do you recognize this document? 14 Α. I sure do. Yes, I do. 15 What do you believe it indicates? Ο. 16 This was the -- this was my notification of Α. 17 what I owed; not just what the original tax would 18 be, but it includes penalties and interest. 19 Okay. And what is that amount? Q. 20 It is \$80,702.24. Α. 21 Is it your understanding that this case has 0. 22 been converted to a claim for refund? 2.3 Α. Yes. 2.4 Do you believe you are a tax-compliant 25 taxpayer? I do. 26 Α. 2.7 Q. What do you base this belief on? 28 Α. I try to file very conscientiously. I pay

1 professionals a lot of money to make sure that 2 everything is done correctly and in a timely 3 fashion. MS. WEED: That's all the questions I have 4 5 at this time. JUDGE STANLEY: Franchise Tax Board? 6 7 MR. CORNEZ: Yes. Just a few little 8 questions. 9 Did we give the 754 election an exhibit 10 number? JUDGE STANLEY: We marked that as Exhibit 11 12 47, but we haven't admitted it yet. So for 13 reference, 47. MR. CORNEZ: All right. 14 15 CROSS-EXAMINATION 16 BY MR. CORNEZ: 17 Q. Ms. Mitchell; is that correct? 18 A. Yes, it's correct. 19 Q. Okay, thank you. 20 Could you please look at Franchise Tax 21 Board's Exhibit A. That is the agreement, the 22 original Agreement of Purchase and Sale. 2.3 A. Right. 2.4 And you stated you were familiar with 25 that? 26 Α. I am. 2.7 Q. Is your name listed there? 28 Α. I'm sorry, what?

1 Is your name listed anywhere in there as Q. 2 seller? 3 Not to my knowledge, no. Α. Would you look at Exhibit B, which is one 4 Ο. 5 of the Counter-offers. Mm-hmm. 6 Α. 7 Is your name listed anywhere in that as a seller? 8 9 Α. No, it is not. Q. Would you look at Exhibit C, which is 10 another Counter-offer. Is your name listed anywhere 11 in that as a seller? 12 13 A. No, it is not. 14 Q. Do you know if Exhibit C was the final --15 was signed by your Con Med partnership? 16 Α. Do I know if it was signed? 17 Q. Yes. 18 Α. I would imagine it was since the sale took 19 place. 20 You're not aware of another Ο. 21 Counter-offer? 22 A. No, no, no. I think this was signed 2.3 because -- who had it -- one of us -- there was a 2.4 signed copy floating around. 25 I can't tell you because I don't have it in front of me. I don't know how to speak to that. 26 2.7 But I would imagine. Who knows.

Q. Were you listed in any documents, given to

1 the buyer, as a seller? 2 Just that one -- there was one 3 acknowledgement at the end of the Redemption Agreement where there is a point or the buyer does 4 5 sign something that has my name on it. 6 Could you look at Exhibit 15? 7 Α. At what? 8 Well, I'm seeing how good my memory is 9 here. 10 No, that's not it. 11 JUDGE GEARY: Try 18. 12 MS. MITCHELL: Oh, it was this one, yeah. 1.3 BY MR. CORNEZ: 14 Q. Could you look at Exhibit I, please? 15 Α. Exhibit -- oh. 16 Okay. Well, this is not the document I was 17 thinking of. 18 Ο. Would you look at Exhibit I, please. 19 Α. Yes. 20 Q. Is there anywhere in that where the buyer 21 acknowledges --22 No, no, no. I misspoke. 2.3 Q. I realize that, but --2.4 Yeah. No, I'm sorry. My apologies. 25 not get it right. 26 Okay. Could you just look at Exhibit I, 2.7 please. 28 A. Yes.

1 Is there anywhere in that document where 2 the buyer acknowledges --3 A. No, there is not. JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Mitchell, please wait 4 5 until he finishes asking the question before you 6 answer so --7 MS. MITCHELL: Okay. JUDGE STANLEY: -- she can get it recorded 8 9 in order. Thank you. BY MR. CORNEZ: 10 11 Q. Would you please look at --12 Α. Oh, wait. My mom and my name is on here. Would you look at Exhibit 18, please. 1.3 Q. 14 MS. WEED: I think she needs time to 15 review. 16 MS. MITCHELL: I'm getting confused between 17 documents and there's so many of them. Can I have a 18 second? 19 JUDGE STANLEY: Yes. 20 MS. WEED: Can you clarify which exhibit 21 we're looking at, please? 22 MR. CORNEZ: Exhibit I. 2.3 MS. MITCHELL: Okay. So what was the 2.4 question, again? BY MR. CORNEZ: 25 26 Q. Is there anywhere in that document that 2.7 indicates the buyer is aware of the redemption? A. Not that I can see. 28

Q. Could you look at Exhibit 18, please, the last page -- or the second to the last page.

A. Oh, it's already open.
Okay.

- Q. Acknowledgement of Receipt of a Copy of Assignment by Buyer.
 - A. Okay.

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- Q. Is that -- the Acknowledgement, is that the first time the buyer knew that you were now the owner of the real property?
- A. No, because my mother had been in contact with the buyer for a long time.
 - Q. Do you have any documentation of that?
- A. She was a big phone person. She couldn't type because of her arthritis, so she tended to phone people.
- Q. How familiar are you with the sort of -for lack of a better word -- the knitty-gritty of
 1031 transactions in the sense of transferring the
 old cases to the new property, whether you have new
 debt, whether there's a change in the value, change
 in prices, that kind of thing?
- A. I would have to say that that's what I rely on professionals for. And certainly in 1991, absolutely, I was less involved in this.
 - Q. I'm talking about in 2007.
- A. Oh, I'm sorry. In 2007, yeah, same thing.

 I was aware of what was going on. I did get to have

conversations about it. I wouldn't dream of trying to do the math.

- Q. But is it your understanding that the fair market value of the acquired property has to be at least equal to or, if not, greater than the fair market value for property you gave up?
- A. Well, the thing is we had three buildings we were exchanging, not just Con Med.
- Q. So this form that we talked about, Exhibit 5, I believe it was, which also is much easier to read inside Exhibit 29, which is her actual tax return and there's a copy of it that's not shrunk. So it's a little challenging to find it within the tax return, but it's much easier to read.
 - A. Mm-hmm. So 29?
 - Q. Yeah, Exhibit 29.
 - A. Okay.

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- Q. But I don't know that we need to be looking at it for you to answer my question.
 - A. Okay.
- Q. You just stated, I believe, that you traded three properties for the Arizona property.
 - A. Well, yeah.
- Q. And, in fact, the description on the 8824 in Exhibit 5 is that you gave up residential rental.
 - A. Well, for the Con Med?
- Q. Right. But you traded three properties, not just one.

1 My recollection is that they were all put 2 into one building. 3 Q. Okay. So that the -- on the second page, the \$266,000 carryover basis that you claimed, was 4 5 not just for the Con Med property that you gave 6 up -- went for all three properties? 7 A. No, actually, because they weren't sold 8 yet. They sold in 2008. 9 So you did a -- you included the acquired properties on the 2007 return but not the basis? 10 11 MS. WEED: Objection. 12 MS. MITCHELL: I have no idea what you're 1.3 asking. 14 JUDGE STANLEY: You'll have an opportunity 15 for rebuttal examination if you're trying to clarify 16 something that --17 MS. WEED: I don't want her testimony to be 18 misstated. I can tell she's having trouble keeping 19 up. She's also been told to slow down, and she 20 needs to be able to think about her answers. 21 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. 22 Ms. Mitchell, let me just ask you, feel 2.3 free to take your time and look at the documents 2.4 that he's referencing and take the time that you 25 need to refresh your recollection or your 26 understanding before you answer his questions. 2.7 MS. MITCHELL: Mm-hmm.

JUDGE STANLEY: And then, Ms. Weed, if

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there are any follow-up questions after they're done with the cross-examination, you have the full right to ask her clarification questions that'll help.

BY MR. CORNEZ:

- Q. So you relinquished three properties in 2007?
- A. My mom and I did, took the combination of all of our holdings together to get the other one.
- Q. And you included all of those on the 2007 tax return?
- A. No. I don't think so. I don't know. This is -- you're asking me a question that I can't really answer because I don't know that much about tax returns. I have no way of knowing. Maybe yes, maybe no. I'm sorry to be so vague, but I'm not a tax professional.
- Q. So you cannot answer whether or not the \$266,000 basis was attributable just to the partner -- to the Con Med property or whether it included all three properties?
- A. I don't know. I mean I think it shouldn't have done because the sales of the other two properties weren't in 2007.
- Q. Can you look at the Exhibit 25. That is the Second Amended and Restated Partnership Agreement.
- A. Okay.

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Q. You stated that it provided that if a

1 partner were to transfer his interests that there 2 could be a valuation of the property, I believe is 3 how you phrased it. Yeah, I know there was something in it 4 5 about that. And I know there was something in the 6 original Partnership Agreement about that. It's 7 been a while since I've read this one. Q. What is the date of this agreement? 8 1997. 9 Α. 10 So is it your testimony that the 1991 11 Partnership Agreement had the same provision? 12 Α. I'm talking about like the original, original, original. I mean --13 14 Q. Well, what was in effect in '91? 15 A. Oh. Oh. I would imagine the original, 16 original, original. 17 MS. WEED: If you know. 18 MS. MITCHELL: If I know -- well, okay. 19 If I don't know, then I don't know. 20 BY MR. CORNEZ: 21 Q. Can you look at page 15, paragraph 39 22 then? 2.3 Α. Okay. 2.4 Q. So it provides that the partner's interest 25 in the partnership shall be valued and it provides some terms. Would you agree that that's what it 26 2.7 says?

A. I think it does.

1 JUDGE STANLEY: Just make sure you take 2 your time before you answer --3 MS. MITCHELL: Okay. 4 JUDGE STANLEY: -- so you can have an 5 opportunity to review what he's talking about before 6 you just agree with him or disagree with him. 7 MS. MITCHELL: Okay. Let me take a second 8 if you don't mind. 9 So how far down am I reading? BY MR. CORNEZ: 10 11 Ο. Probably just the opening sentence. 12 Α. Oh, the opening sentence. 1.3 Q. Without regard to A, B, C and D. 14 Oh, wait. May I read it out loud and you Α. 15 can tell me whether this is the right thing? 16 Q. Sure. 17 It says, "Valuation by procedure. Α. 18 value of a partner's interest in the partnership for 19 purpose," it says, "of paragraphs 31, 32 and 35 of 20 this amended agreement shall be determined by 21 appraisal as follows..." 22 Q. Correct. So you testified that you 2.3 inherited a partnership interest from your aunt; is that correct? 2.4 25 A. My understanding was that the partnership 26 interest is partially based on the value of the 2.7 property.

Q. That wasn't my question.

1 Oh, okay. Α. 2 My question was, you inherited a Q. 3 partnership interest from your aunt? I suppose I did, yeah. 4 5 Q. You did not inherit a direct ownership in 6 the underlying real estate? 7 Α. I thought I did, actually. But I 8 apparently, according to you, I didn't. So the valuation of the real estate owned 9 10 by Con Med is not the same thing as a valuation of a 11 partnership interest? 12 A. That's true, yes, that's very true --I don't know actually. You're asking 13 14 questions that I don't necessarily have the means to 15 answer. 16 Q. Okay. Have you read the appraisal that you 17 thought was in March, I guess it was? 18 The only thing I read was the first number 19 of it and I was like, "Yay." 20 Q. Well, did you -- well, you didn't read it, 21 okay. 22 I have one more question. Could you look 2.3 at Exhibit 30, please? 2.4 A. Can you just give me a second, please? I 25 need to turn this phone off, please. 26 Ο. Okay, sure. 2.7 Α. Thank you.

Q. Technology, huh?

- A. I put it on vibrate and it still -- and then my watch chimes in on everything.
 - Q. Can you look at Exhibit 30, please. And can you tell us what your understanding of Exhibit 30 is?
 - A. Oh, this would be the First American

 Exchange Company. And it's the -- it's listing this

 part of the exchange. And I think the rest of it

 is --

Am I just talking about the first page?

- Q. Well, the whole thing actually. Just generically, what the whole thing is.
 - A. It is -- they're exchange documents.
 - Q. Okay. That's fine.

Well, let's see. Page 6, at the top, and page 7, at the top; could you look at those two pages?

So starting with page 7, it shows seller's charges and seller's credit. I'm pretty sure all of us who've done real estate find escrow reconciliation complicated.

- A. Mm-hmm.
- Q. But it shows that there's a line item called prorations; do you see that?
 - A. Mm-hmm.
- Q. And it shows rents, what looks basically one day?
- 28 A. Huh.

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1 So the monthly rent, I presume, looks like 2 it was \$17,500 a month, so one day is \$583.87. 3 Do you understand what that means, the seller's charge is \$583? 4 5 A. Well, actually not really. I haven't 6 really looked at this, to understand it. 7 Well, I mean -- I don't know. I'm so 8 sorry. I really don't know what that's all about. 9 Q. Can you then look at page 6. The same line "prorations" -- or what -- page 6 looks to be, if 10 11 this is your page, it says seller is "Sharon Mitchell, trustee." 12 13 A. Mm-hmm. 14 Q. And it shows for prorations, rent 15 prorations as charged to you of \$58. Do you know 16 what that is? 17 A. No, I don't actually. No, I don't quite 18 understand what that is. 19 MR. CORNEZ: I have no further questions. 20 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Do you have some 21 follow-up rebuttal questions? 22 MS. WEED: Just like two or three. 2.3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. WEED: 2.4 25 Q. Sharon, if you could please refer, once 26 again, to Respondent's Exhibit C. And just briefly, 2.7 do you recognize this document? 28 A. Yes.

- Q. And briefly, what does it indicate?
- A. It indicates that the -- it's a Counter-offer to all the other offers, and it has to do with the ability to, instead of having the closing date at August 31st, 2007, the closing date is extended 60 days so that we could do our 1031 exchange. So the new closing date is 60 days longer.
- Q. Okay. And what is the date of this document?
- A. The date of this document is February 26, 2007.
 - Q. Okay.

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And can you please also refer to

Respondent's Exhibit B. And do you recognize this

document?

- A. Yes. Yes, I recognize this.
- Q. Please briefly indicate what this document indicates?
- A. It's another one of the counters to the counters. And it has the offer is modified to increase the purchase price from 6,200,000 to 6,400,000.
 - Q. And what is the date of this document?
- A. The Offer to the Counter-offer -- I'm sorry, my apologies.

1 It is -- this is really hard to read. 2 Oh, it's down here. I'm sorry. I was 3 reading the top of the thing. It was dated February 6th, 2007. 4 5 Q. So is it safe to say that the partnership 6 knew of your intent to do a like-kind exchange at 7 least as early as February 2007? 8 A. Yes, it is. 9 Q. And is it safe to say that in February 2007 10 negotiations were still ongoing? 11 A. Yes. 12 MS. WEED: Okay. I have no other questions 1.3 at this time. 14 JUDGE STANLEY: Mr. Cornez, do you have any 15 follow-up? 16 MR. CORNEZ: No, thank you. 17 JUDGE STANLEY: Judge Rosas, do you have 18 any questions? 19 JUDGE ROSAS: I do, Judge Stanley. Thank 20 you. 21 Good afternoon, Ms. Mitchell. How are you? 22 MS. MITCHELL: Fine. 2.3 JUDGE ROSAS: First of all, thank you for 2.4 your patience during these inquiries. We appreciate 25 your time. 26 And it's especially difficult coming down here at lunch. 2.7 28 MS. MITCHELL: This is true.

JUDGE ROSAS: Ms. Mitchell, earlier you were speaking of your mother and her extensive knowledge and background, and I'm just trying to get a sense of whether there were any formal arrangements in which she was able to represent you in these negotiations?

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MS. MITCHELL: Well, insofar as she was on the executive board, she had her fingers on the pulse of the entire thing. And she -- I mean I think of that as being, you know, as pretty official. I don't think it gets any better than that.

If I may say, she was offered the general partnership and she had to decline it because her health was beginning to go. But they thought highly enough of her to make her the offer.

JUDGE ROSAS: And in terms of the negotiations that took place, I realize there was some correspondence from Mr. Milner that indicates that ballots were included to the partners for their vote.

MS. MITCHELL: Mm-hmm.

JUDGE ROSAS: Did you personally sign those ballots or did your mother sign those on your behalf?

MS. MITCHELL: I signed -- I think I signed all of them on my own.

JUDGE ROSAS: And my next question, just

1 for clarification, is actually for your counsel. 2 Mrs. Weed, just to be clear, we did not 3 receive any copies of any partnership or partner ballots; is that correct? 4 5 MS. WEED: I don't believe so. 6 JUDGE ROSAS: That's my understanding as 7 well, but I just wanted to be clear. 8 And Ms. Mitchell, just in terms of trying 9 to get a better sense of your mother's role as a 10 representative for you, were there any official 11 documents, for example, a Power of Attorney that 12 provided her with the ability to sign over --1.3 MS. MITCHELL: Absolutely. She had my 14 Durable Power of Attorney. She could've done 15 whatever she wanted to. We actually had each 16 other's Power of Attorneys, but I certainly didn't 17 utilize mine over her because why would that happen? 18 But no, she had my Power of Attorney, 19 absolutely. 20 JUDGE ROSAS: And just to be clear, was 21 that a written Power of Attorney? 22 MS. MITCHELL: It was. It was very 2.3 ironclad. It was written by Richard Goodman. 2.4 was a Durable Power of Attorney. It was the real 25 thing. 26 JUDGE ROSAS: Do you recall when that 2.7 Durable Power of Attorney was executed? 28 MS. MITCHELL: I don't really recall.

1 know it was in play. It was certainly a valid document. 3 JUDGE ROSAS: And Mrs. Weed, just to be 4 clear, we did not receive a copy of that Durable 5 Power of Attorney, correct? MS. WEED: I don't believe so. 6 7 JUDGE ROSAS: I would like to refer your attention to what has been admitted as Exhibit 3, 8 9 please. 10 MS. MITCHELL: If you let me have just a 11 minute. 12 JUDGE STANLEY: I'm sorry. I didn't 13 understand that. 14 MS. MITCHELL: Can I have just a couple of 15 minutes? 16 JUDGE STANLEY: Absolutely. Take your 17 time. 18 JUDGE ROSAS: Of course. 19 And if it helps in any way, I'm just going 20 to ask you about that second paragraph. 21 MS. MITCHELL: The second paragraph, okay. 22 Are you talking about the one that just 23 says "assuming the sale"? 2.4 JUDGE ROSAS: That is correct. 25 MS. MITCHELL: Okay. 26 JUDGE ROSAS: So, first of all, what is Exhibit 3? 2.7 28 MS. MITCHELL: It is an e-mail from our

general partner Tom Milner to our partners, and it's dated July 22nd of 2005.

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JUDGE ROSAS: And did you receive a copy of this e-mail around July 22nd, 2005?

MS. MITCHELL: Yeah, absolutely.

JUDGE ROSAS: And Ms. Mitchell, my question is, perhaps you can clarify, in that second paragraph there's a discussions about an assumption that if the sale of the property comes to pass, and then in parentheses it says a "big if." And I'm just wondering if you can provide some testimony in terms of the context of why was there doubt that a sale might take place?

MS. MITCHELL: I do remember there was some vexing exchanges about price and deferred maintenance. That there was a lot of deferred maintenance on the building. But I don't remember anything past that, I'm sorry.

JUDGE ROSAS: So just to be clear, other than some of the back and forth regarding deferred maintenance and the cost, you don't recall anything else regarding the "big if" as referred to?

MS. MITCHELL: I have a feeling that Tom was, you know --

Okay. You're right. I don't know. I should not speak to this because I'm about to start guessing.

JUDGE STANLEY: Let me say, while he's

1 checking it, I understand you're trying to be very 2 helpful, both with Mr. Cornez and Judge Rosas, but 3 you have a perfect right to say "I just don't remember that" or "I don't know." 4 5 MS. MITCHELL: Thank you. I'm also losing 6 my voice. I think I do want some tea actually. 7 JUDGE ROSAS: On that note, I'll take a 8 drink of water while you drink. 9 If you could refer to Exhibit 44, please. 10 MS. MITCHELL: Okay. JUDGE ROSAS: And what is Exhibit 44? 11 12 MS. MITCHELL: May I have a second? JUDGE ROSAS: Of course. 1.3 14 MS. MITCHELL: Okay. I think I've absorbed 15 as much as I can. 16 JUDGE ROSAS: And of course you can refer 17 to it for your recollection. My primary question 18 is, my first question, what is Exhibit 44? 19 MS. MITCHELL: It is an e-mail from Tom 20 Milner, our general partner, to the partners. And 21 it is an update of the status of our offer from 22 PTLA, the current tenant who was the buyer. And 2.3 it's saying that -- it's listing pros and cons of 2.4 the current offer that was on the table at the time 25 and just going through some points that had come up 26 in conversations with partners, you know, wanting to 2.7 do different things and having certain questions and 28 issues.

1 JUDGE ROSAS: And this e-mail, which was 2 dated January 5th, 2007, did you receive that 3 e-mail? MS. MITCHELL: I did. 4 5 JUDGE ROSAS: And I notice that the e-mail 6 references a phone conference that took place apparently two days prior, so that would be 7 8 Wednesday, January 3rd, 2007. Were you a part of 9 that phone conference?

MS. MITCHELL: I believe that would also have been my mom.

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JUDGE ROSAS: So you have no recollection of whether you took place -- I mean, whether you were involved with that phone conference?

MS. MITCHELL: I can't remember.

JUDGE ROSAS: In the e-mail there's a reference that during the meeting there was a discussion about breaking up the partnership into tenancy-in-common interests, but there was a concern that one party break out of the deal by changing his or her mind during escrow.

I realize that you may have testified that you were not in attendance during that phone conference, but by any chance did you have any conversations with your mother regarding these reservations that someone had?

MS. MITCHELL: I don't recall having a conversation about it at all actually.

JUDGE ROSAS: As I mentioned, in that e-mail Mr. Tom Milner makes a reference to breaking up the partnership and transferring tenancy-in-common interests to former partners.

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In your situation, your tenancy-in-common interest was given to you about 11 months after this e-mail. Do you know why there was such a delay between the transfer of your tenancy-in-common interest after this meeting?

MS. MITCHELL: Yes, actually I do. The partnership -- this might seem a little long-winded. But the original partners in 1969, they knew each other really well and there was a lot of trust involved with that.

Over the years those older members, very much like my aunt, had passed away. So we had a whole new generation of people who didn't know us. And when it was, you know, early on when we started saying, okay, we want to drop out of the partnership, there were just a few members who said, well, who are these people? You know, what are they going to do that's going spoil -- I think the term "muddying the waters" came up, that it would be muddying the waters.

And because there was also -- there were a few sticking points. It's not an accident that Tom said, you know, it's a "big if." There were just a few points where it looked like maybe this wasn't

1 even going to happen. And the last thing that these 2 guys -- I'm sorry, "guys" -- the last thing that 3 these other members of the partnership wanted was to have a couple of wildcards, as far as they could 4 5 tell, running amok. That was a concern, and that's 6 what I -- I remember that very specifically. 7 JUDGE ROSAS: And before I move on from this exhibit, the e-mail also mentions that the 8 9 partnership would present a Counter-offer the 10 following week. And, in fact, it seems like Con Med 11 did present a Counter-offer. 12 By any chance did you have any involvement 1.3 in the making of that Counter-offer, or did perhaps 14 your mother, representing you? 15 MS. MITCHELL: It'd be my mom. 16 JUDGE ROSAS: And what was her involvement with the terms of that Counter-offer? 17 18 MS. MITCHELL: I can't specifically say 19 what it would have been, but she was a heck of a 20 negotiator. 21 JUDGE ROSAS: I'd like to now refer your 22 attention to Exhibit 36. Ms. Mitchell, what is 2.3 Exhibit 36? 2.4 MS. MITCHELL: May I take a moment? 25 JUDGE ROSAS: But of course. 26 MS. MITCHELL: Am I reading the whole thing 2.7 or just like a specific? 28 JUDGE ROSAS: No, I'm just asking if you

1 can just clarify what is this Exhibit 36. 2 MS. MITCHELL: Well, I can tell you what it 3 is, but I haven't finished reading it. It is an indication from the general partner to the partners, 4 5 telling them that he has -- our partnership has an 6 agreement. It does have some contingencies. 7 JUDGE ROSAS: And this Exhibit 36 is dated March 2nd, 2007, correct? 8 9 MS. MITCHELL: It is. 10 JUDGE ROSAS: Do you recall receiving a 11 copy of this shortly after that date from 12 Mr. Milner? MS. MITCHELL: I would have, yes. 1.3 I don't 14 recall, but it would be unlikely that I wouldn't 15 have gotten it. 16 I'm sorry, I really don't remember. 17 JUDGE ROSAS: That's fine, Ms. Mitchell. 18 MS. MITCHELL: Yeah. 19 JUDGE ROSAS: No worries. Like my esteemed 20 colleague Judge Stanley mentioned, we'd rather you 21 not speculate or try to quess. 22 You don't recall? 2.3 MS. MITCHELL: Yeah. 2.4 JUDGE ROSAS: You don't recall. It did 25 happen in 2007. 26 MS. MITCHELL: Yes. 2.7 JUDGE ROSAS: Just for purposes of 28 clarification, in that second paragraph it lists --

1 it says that the contract had been signed. And it 2 lists -- I'm sorry, it states that the contract 3 consists of five separate documents. MS. MITCHELL: Mm-hmm. 4 5 JUDGE ROSAS: The first one has already been admitted as Exhibit A. Number 2 is a 6 7 Counter-offer. 8 And just for purposes of clarification, 9 Mrs. Weed, we did not receive number 2, correct? 10 MS. WEED: I don't believe so. I don't believe we could locate that one. 11 12 JUDGE ROSAS: Okay. Number 3 is a Counter-offer by the 13 14 Purchaser. And also for clarification purposes, 15 Mrs. Weed, we did not receive a copy of that 16 Counter-offer by the Purchaser, correct? MS. WEED: Is that number 3? 17 18 JUDGE ROSAS: Correct. 19 MS. WEED: I'm not sure which three of 20 those are the two that have been provided based on 21 that description. 22 I don't believe we have one titled number 2.3 five. 2.4 JUDGE ROSAS: One of the Exhibits Number 4 25 refers to Exhibit B, and Number 5 on that list refers to Exhibit C. 26 2.7 MS. WEED: They're not titled the same 28 thing, so I'm not certain.

1 JUDGE ROSAS: Ms. Mitchell, do you know if 2 the contract was amended after the February 26, 2007 3 Counter-offer? 4 MS. MITCHELL: I don't think I can say that 5 off the top of my head. 6 Okay. I'm getting a little confused. 7 Whenever you start saying the Counter-offer to the 8 Counter-offer to the Counter-offer, it just sounds 9 like Monty Python. 10 JUDGE ROSAS: Thank you for that extra Counter-offer. 11 12 MS. MITCHELL: I know I did. JUDGE ROSAS: Ms. Mitchell, I notice that 13 14 we've been going for an hour and a half. I know 15 that our wonderful court reporter/stenographer needs 16 a break, as well as our OTA staff, and I'm sure the 17 rest of the people in the audience. 18 If, Judge Stanley, maybe perhaps we can 19 take a brief break. 20 JUDGE STANLEY: It depends. Do you have a 21 substantial number of questions remaining? 22 you're getting close to the end, I'd rather wait 2.3 until after that. 2.4 JUDGE ROSAS: I do not believe I'm getting 25 close to the end. 26 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. All right. 2.7 let's take a 10-minute break and give people a

little rest in between.

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(Whereupon a break was taken from 2:30 p.m. until 2:40 p.m.)

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JUDGE STANLEY: We're going to go back on the record in the hearing of the matter of Sharon Mitchell.

And Judge Rosas would like to ask a few more questions.

JUDGE ROSAS: Thank you, Judge Stanley.

Ms. Mitchell, during the examination by
Mr. Cornez, he discussed Exhibits A, B and C, which
are the Purchase and Sale Agreement and two
Counter-offers. And he discussed how your name does
not appear as a seller on any of those three
documents.

Now, my -- before I ask my question, I just want to give a little bit of background, which may assist you in answering the question.

So we have this contract, which lists one seller, Con Med, and one buyer, PTLA Corp. The last Counter-offer is dated at the end of February, I believe February 26, 2007. Then nine or ten months later when you signed the Grant Deed over, obviously you're listed on that Grant Deed as the seller, and now we have two new buyers, not PTLA, two different entities.

So I'm hoping that you can walk us through, because we don't have any amended agreements or contracts, I'm hoping that you can walk us through

what happened at the end of February 2007 when the agreements were just between Con Med and PTLA Corp., to what happened nine, ten months later when eventually now we have three sellers, you, the partnership, your mother and two new entities. I'm hoping that you can provide a timeline and details in terms of how that change came about.

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MS. MITCHELL: Are you talking -- I guess, are you asking if I knew about the kind of interworkings of the PTLA and the other entities?

JUDGE ROSAS: Not necessarily. I'm just hoping that you can explain the change within those nine and ten months, because, as I mentioned, we don't have any documentation, we don't have any amended agreements. So if you could, with your testimony, walk us through how the agreement morphed from back into one seller and one buyer to having three sellers and two buyers nine months later?

MS. MITCHELL: I kind of can't actually. I don't remember the manifestation of their change to being something other than what they originally were. I don't remember that.

JUDGE ROSAS: Can you at least speak to the change in regards to the sellers? Do you know how during that nine- or ten-month timeframe how it changed from just having Con Med listed as a seller to having you, Con Med, and your mother listed on that Grant Deed?

1 MS. MITCHELL: Well, because we redeemed, 2 you know -- we redeemed our interests. 3 JUDGE ROSAS: And do you know at what time period within those nine months was the buyer made 4 5 aware that there would be a change in the identities of the sellers? 6 7 MS. MITCHELL: I don't remember that. 8 JUDGE ROSAS: Ms. Mitchell, with all the 9 back-and-forth negotiations was there a moment when you knew with certainty that this transaction would 10 close? 11 MS. MITCHELL: I don't remember like some 12 13 sort of epiphany happening, no. 14 JUDGE ROSAS: Thank you, Ms. Mitchell. Ι 15 don't believe I have any more questions at this 16 time. 17 JUDGE STANLEY: Judge Geary, do you have 18 any? 19 JUDGE GEARY: Yes, I do. Just a few. 20 Ms. Mitchell, the Redemption Agreement 21 through which you received the undivided interest in 22 the real property, who prepared that? If you know. 2.3 MS. MITCHELL: It was Richard Goodman. 2.4 Richard Goodman. 25 JUDGE GEARY: Okay. And was Mr. Goodman 26 the attorney that you made reference to earlier who 2.7 you indicated was telling you how to go about this 28 process?

1 MS. MITCHELL: He was the attorney for all 2 He was the attorney for Con Med, for the 3 whole partnership, and he was our attorney who handled all of our 1031 exchanges, going back to the 4 5 '80s. 6 JUDGE GEARY: And when you say "our," you 7 mean yourself and your mother? 8 MS. MITCHELL: My mom's and mine. Our 9 personal. Attorney to the partnership, personal 10 attorney for our 1031 exchanges, and we had a very 11 longstanding client, you know, relationship with 12 him. JUDGE GEARY: Okay. And did Mr. Goodman 1.3 14 keep you apprised of any developments that occurred 15 with respect to the sale between the date of the 16 February 26, 2007 offer and the day on which the 17 Redemption Agreement was first presented to you? 18 MS. MITCHELL: Personally, I'm -- it's more 19 likely that he --20 Again, speculation. 21 I'm just going to run aground on this kind 22 of question. It's been a very, very long time. 2.3 JUDGE GEARY: Okay. Well, the response "I 2.4 don't know" is entirely appropriate if you do not 25 know or do not remember. 26 MS. MITCHELL: I don't know. 2.7 JUDGE GEARY: I gather that it's possible

that he might have talked to your mom and your mom

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1 talked to you? 2 MS. MITCHELL: That is the more likely 3 scenario. JUDGE GEARY: Was that typically how you 4 5 gained information about how these real estate 6 investments were developing? 7 MS. MITCHELL: Yeah. I would have to 8 answer "yes" to that. 9 JUDGE GEARY: Okay. So you're reasonably 10 confident that Mr. Goodman prepared that Redemption 11 Agreement, correct? 12 MS. MITCHELL: Yes, I know he did. 1.3 JUDGE GEARY: Do you have any recollection 14 of how or where or when it was first presented to 15 you for signature? 16 MS. MITCHELL: No, I don't. 17 JUDGE GEARY: It's -- did you ever -- do 18 you recall ever being concerned about timing, about 19 when the sale was going to take place or --20 Let me ask you this question first: Before 21 the Redemption Agreement was presented to you, did 22 you already know that there was going to be a 2.3 redemption whereby your partnership interests would 2.4 be redeemed for an undivided interest in the real 25 property? 26 MS. MITCHELL: I think that was the plan 2.7 all along. 28 JUDGE GEARY: Okay. So you did expect that

1 to happen? 2 MS. MITCHELL: Yeah. 3 JUDGE GEARY: And you expected that to happen before the conclusion of the sale to the 4 5 buyer? MS. MITCHELL: Yes. 6 7 JUDGE GEARY: And were you aware -- let's 8 see. Were you ever concerned about why it was 9 taking so long for the sale to conclude? 10 MS. MITCHELL: I don't remember being worried about it at all, to be honest. 11 12 JUDGE GEARY: Were you continuing to 1.3 receive the benefits of your partnership share? 14 MS. MITCHELL: Yeah, I believe I was still 15 getting my checks. 16 JUDGE GEARY: So the income stream was 17 continuing --18 MS. MITCHELL: Yeah. 19 JUDGE GEARY: -- and you weren't worried 20 about it? 21 MS. MITCHELL: I was not. 22 JUDGE GEARY: Okay. Do you recall if when 2.3 the Redemption Agreement was first presented to you, 2.4 you knew that the sale was about to close? MS. MITCHELL: Yes. 25 26 JUDGE GEARY: Were you ever concerned about 2.7 the timing, the relatively short period of time 28 between the Redemption Agreement and the sale

1 closing? 2 MS. MITCHELL: No, I felt reassured that my 3 attorney was flying the airplane. JUDGE GEARY: Did he ever specifically --4 did you ever ask him about that particular issue, 5 6 the timing? 7 MS. MITCHELL: I did not. 8 JUDGE GEARY: You were simply confident 9 that he was handling it? 10 MS. MITCHELL: Oh, yeah. We worked with 11 him for years. 12 JUDGE GEARY: You mentioned that your 1.3 mother had a Power of Attorney for you and you had a Power of Attorney for her. 14 15 MS. MITCHELL: I did. 16 JUDGE GEARY: Do you know whether the other 17 partners were aware that your mother had a Power 18 of Attorney -- had your Power of Attorney? 19 MS. MITCHELL: I don't know that. 20 JUDGE GEARY: Those are all the questions I 21 Thank you. have. 22 MS. MITCHELL: Mm-hmm. 2.3 JUDGE STANLEY: And I want to thank you for 2.4 your patience with all of us. When we've got panels 25 of three, it may seem like we're grilling you and 26 we're just -- I think what we're trying to 2.7 accomplish here is just to fill in the gaps so we 28 can make a reasoned decision in your case.

And just as a follow-up to the ones that you've already answered, I just had just a couple more.

You talked about an appraisal back when the -- when you transferred your share, an earlier appraisal of the property. Do you actually see that appraisal?

MS. MITCHELL: I saw a stack of appraisals.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So you know that -- you believe it to have been in there?

MS. MITCHELL: The appraisals were done of all the properties for the estate tax.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And you also talked about -- you also talked about the fact that there was some concern about -- by the older partners about some people maybe doing things that they didn't agree with. I don't want to put words in your mouth.

MS. MITCHELL: It would be the -- I'm sorry, if you would like some clarification -- younger partners.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay.

MS. MITCHELL: The older people were altogether. In 1969 when they made their original investment, they were -- I don't want to use the word "buddies," but they were, you know, they were good with each other. And as people passed away,

then you had people inherit their share and then they didn't know -- we haven't met them and they haven't met us. And I think they were the ones who might have been concerned. That's all I can think of, because I know the rest of the people were good with it. JUDGE STANLEY: Did you get that information from discussions amongst the partners, or did you get that relayed to you? MS. MITCHELL: Just from my mom because she knew everyone. She's, you know, since 1969, you know, they've been doing this and I think they were good with each other. JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. And then just one --15 well, two little quick ones. You mentioned the 16 Power of Attorney that your mother had, and you said you don't recall the date that it was signed. you recall the time reference, a year? MS. MITCHELL: If I had my phone on, I could actually probably find it. JUDGE STANLEY: You have a copy of the actual Power of Attorney on your phone? MS. MITCHELL: I have it on a cloud. If I can get it to work. My reception isn't so great. know for a fact that I have that document. JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. But you don't remember whether it was last year or years ago? MS. MITCHELL: No, it would have been

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1 current with the transactions. 2 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So you specifically 3 did the Power of Attorney in anticipation of what we're talking about here? 4 5 MS. MITCHELL: No, not at all. The Power of Attorney had been in effect for a while. We gave 6 7 each other our Powers of Attorney for all kinds of 8 things. 9 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So when you say "for a while," for a while prior to this transaction? 10 MS. MITCHELL: Yes. It existed prior to 11 the transaction. And in both of our instances it 12 13 was something that we considered a necessary thing 14 to have in case of anything. 15 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. One last question. 16 Do you still own the Arizona property? MS. MITCHELL: I do. 17 18 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay, thank you. 19 MS. MITCHELL: Thank you. 20 JUDGE STANLEY: Ms. Weed, do you have 21 follow-up rebuttal questions now? 22 MS. WEED: Yes, I do. 2.3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION (cont'd) BY MS. WEED: 2.4 25 Q. Just to quickly clarify, Sharon, do you 26 recall if the DPOA was in effect prior to 2007? 2.7 A. It was. 28 So with respect to -- you know, there's

been a lot of talk about your partnership interest and when that was redeemed and when the Deeds were recorded. And, you know, we've also talked about the fact that there were ongoing negotiations as much as you can recall.

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So if you wanted to do this 1031 exchange -- which we have corroborating evidence indicating that you do or you did -- why did you wait to drop your partnership interest?

A. We waited because the idea of having two of us -- and like I mentioned, there were some new partners who didn't know us and, sadly, worried that we were crazy people or something. So if we had redeemed our partnership interests early on and pursued negotiations over here on the side, the people that were worried about that, they weren't cool with it.

And to -- I mean, as I have mentioned, the attorney that was handling the partnership and the sale and everything, Richard Goodman, he was also our exchange attorney and it was suggested that we not drop out.

The redemption of our Partnership

Agreement, our partnership interest is contingent on
the close of escrow, so that we couldn't, you know,
go fool around over here or do something that would
spoil it for the rest of the people. That's pretty
much why we waited. That's the only reason why we

waited. There was no other reason to not drop out sooner except for that.

- Q. Well, didn't you testify that in 2007 there were approximately 17 partners?
 - A. I believe that there were.

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- Q. Do you believe that all of these partners were involved in the negotiations actively?
 - A. No, I know they weren't.
- Q. Was there any concern about having so many different parties negotiating; you know, did the partnership have that concern?
- A. Well, I think it probably -- my take on it is yes.

I hate to say this, it's going to sound really insulting, but some of those people that were on board at that point just weren't good or savvy about how to conduct something like this. My mom was. Tom was decent; he knew what he was doing.

You know, the input that they were getting, the concerns were addressed on a first-come first-serve basis. But I don't remember anyone being encouraged to go down and meet with PTLA and say, hey, by the way, let's do something on our own. No way.

Q. So you have also indicated you intended to do a 1031 exchange during this whole process. Did you believe during -- in 2007 or during these negotiations that your interests were aligned with

those of the partnership?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Okay. Did your mother actually get involved in the negotiations?
 - A. Very much so.
 - Q. And was your mother a wallflower, Sharon?
- A. No. You know, she was very polite. Very well, you know, raised. But she didn't take any nonsense.
- Q. Okay. Do you know if it was your mom's negotiating abilities that led to some of the Counter-offers in connection with the Purchase Agreement?
 - A. Yes, they were.
- Q. And was that because you intended or she intended to complete a 1031 exchange?
- A. Yes. None of the other partners would have cared about that, including Mr. Milner. He was getting up in years and he just wanted to cash out.
- Q. So there has also been some questions about when the buyer became aware of your 1031 exchange.

 Can you quickly refer to Respondent's Exhibit B and C again?
 - A. Okay. Here's the B.
 - O. And C?
 - A. Mm-hmm.
- 28 Q. And are both these documents dated in

February 2007?

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- A. They are.
- Q. Do you believe that the buyer was aware of the intent to complete a 1031 exchange at this time?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Do you have any indication that the buyer was aware before that?
 - A. I do actually. Can I put an exhibit forth?
 No. Okay. Never mind. I'm sorry.
 I know they were.
 - Q. Okay. How do you know?
- A. I don't have any written correspondence at all except for the letter. There was that letter where they were suggesting it, and that takes way back. But I know my mom had phone conversations.

My mom was a big telephone person. She didn't type -- first of all, she never learned to type. And then secondly, her arthritis was just awful. My mom has never ever, ever, was never ever, ever, going to type you an e-mail or type you a letter, but she'll phone you.

- Q. Okay. And also, you talked about your attorney Mr. Goodman, who was your -- or your mother's attorney going on to the '80s. Did he ever indicate to you that timing could be an issue?
- A. He did, but he said he'd done -- the way he'd written the contract, and I can't remember

1 which contract it was, something that he did that 2 made it okay. I don't even remember what that was. 3 But I believed that what he -- how he was doing this 4 was the way that he would do something like this. 5 So you trusted his expertise? Q. 6 Α. Absolutely. And why was that? 7 Ο. 8 A. We had worked with him for so many years. 9 He really knew what he was doing. Not only that, he was kind of famous for being a 1031 lawyer. He's 10 11 retired now. But prior to that, he wrote a lot of 12 articles, I think, for -- I want to use the word 13 trade journalism, but I'm not sure if that's the 14 right word for lawyer magazines. But he was truly 15 an expert. 16 MS. WEED: No further questions at this 17 time. 18 JUDGE STANLEY: Mr. Cornez. 19 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 20 BY MR. CORNEZ: 21 Q. Can you turn to Exhibit 31, please, 22 Ms. Mitchell? 2.3 A. Exhibit what? 2.4 Oh, yeah. 25 And look at paragraph number one. What is Exhibit 31? 26 2.7 A. This, I do remember. This is a e-mail to

me about the -- I guess this is exactly about the

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exchange and how it has to be structured. I do remember this is the first time I had ever heard the word drop-and-swap. I thought that was a little bit cheesy, but whatever.

And this is where he basically tells how this is -- you know, how we would be doing this exchange. That when we do what we're going to do, we're not going to get the same amount of money as the other partners. But he's warning us that we could -- that, you know, whatever cash was going to get disbursed afterwards, that we'd sort of be forfeiting that, I think.

- Q. In paragraph one he references an article that he wrote?
 - A. Mm-hmm.
 - Q. Did you read that?
 - A. You know, I kind of didn't.

MR. CORNEZ: Okay. No further questions.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Any follow-up,

Ms. Weed?

MS. WEED: No, Your Honor.

JUDGE STANLEY: Judge Rosas?

JUDGE ROSAS: Just one follow-up question

24 if I may.

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Ms. Mitchell, you were testifying about your mother's active involvement in the negotiations and how she was instrumental in some of the provisions in those Counter-offers that you

discussed earlier.

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Do you know if -- excuse me. So that

Counter-offer, the final one that we have is dated
at the end of February 2007. Do you know if the
eventual sale that was consummated with the Grant

Deed that you signed in November 2007, if that was a
continuation of that transaction that your mother
helped negotiate, or whether that transaction fell
apart and there was a new deal that was struck?

MS. MITCHELL: No, that would have simply have been one sort of step of the thing, of the same kind.

JUDGE ROSAS: You said it was just an additional step in the same transaction?

MS. MITCHELL: It's like just putting one foot in front of the other. You know, you just plod your way through the purchase of a property. And that's what I would say is you do this, then you do that, then you sign that, then you file that.

JUDGE ROSAS: So your mother's involvement, which resulted in some of those provisions in those Counter-offers, those stayed all the way through, correct? That deal did not fall through? That was consummated with the eventual Grant Deed, correct?

MS. MITCHELL: It was consummated, yes.

JUDGE ROSAS: And it was the same price in that Counter-offer, 6.4, eventually that was the same price throughout?

1 MS. MITCHELL: It was. 2 JUDGE ROSAS: And just, last question, in 3 regards to something that you mentioned during Mrs. Weed's inquiries. 4 5 In Exhibit C you mentioned that -- you 6 referred to Exhibit C, which is that Counter-offer, 7 and you mentioned that that's an indication that the 8 buyers were made aware of your intent to do a -- to 9 perform a 1031 exchange. 10 Can you explain how you believe that 11 Exhibit C, which does not list you as a seller, 12 would provide the buyers with the awareness and the 1.3 knowledge that you, Sharon Mitchell, was going to 14 perform a 1031 exchange? 15 MS. MITCHELL: Yes. Because my mom, 16 there's no way that any of the other partners would 17 have cared about this. She was pushing for this for 18 so long and absolutely would have put herself front 19 and center in that to make sure that they came to 20 the table and agreed to it. 21 JUDGE ROSAS: Thank you, Mrs. Mitchell. Ι 22 have no more questions. 2.3 JUDGE STANLEY: Any follow-up questions, 2.4 Judge Geary? 25 JUDGE GEARY: No. 26 JUDGE STANLEY: Nor do I. 2.7 Do you have any rebuttal questions 28 following Judge Rosas' questions?

1 MS. WEED: One moment, please. 2 Just one or two quick questions. 3 FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. WEED: 4 5 Q. Sharon, you mentioned that your mom was 6 involved in the negotiations in this transaction and 7 we have also talked about a couple of Counter-offers. 8 9 To the best of your recollection, were 10 there ongoing negotiations after that point? 11 A. Yeah, well, there might have been, but I 12 just can't recall. I'm sorry, I can't remember. 1.3 MS. WEED: No further questions. 14 JUDGE STANLEY: Cross-examination? 15 MR. CORNEZ: No, thanks. 16 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So, Ms. Mitchell, 17 you can be excused as a witness. You're welcome to 18 stay there as the appellant. 19 Do you have any further witnesses or 20 evidence to present, Ms. Weed? 21 MS. WEED: No, Your Honor. 22 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. I'll turn it over to 2.3 the Franchise Tax Board. And you haven't listed any 2.4 witnesses. Do you have any witnesses or evidence to 25 present? 26 MR. CORNEZ: No, we do not. 2.7 MR. IMMORDINO: We'll be referring to some 28 exhibits.

MR. CORNEZ: We have no additional exhibits.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Some of the exhibits that have already been marked and summarily admitted?

MR. GEMMINGEN: Yes.

JUDGE STANLEY: The only remaining exhibit, though, is Exhibit 47, and we have not admitted that into evidence. Do you propose that we do admit that, Ms. Weed?

MS. WEED: No, Your Honor.

JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. So that one will not be admitted.

But I did, as a cleanup to cleanup to exhibits, I didn't include the exhibit lists as admitted documents. So the exhibit lists that you have both provided with your binder copies will be admitted into evidence as well so that we all know we're referring to the same thing.

Now, we would like to move to closing arguments. But in anticipation of that, since the Franchise Tax Board in particular hasn't produced any witnesses, I think that it might be helpful in this situation to have the judges, if they've got any issues or areas that they would like the parties to address in their closing and tied to the evidence, that might be helpful to both of you to be able to present missing pieces that are in our minds.

And, again, I think Judge Rosas probably has a few of those. Start with you.

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 $\,$ JUDGE ROSAS: Actually I'll defer to Judge Geary on that.

JUDGE GEARY: No, not at this time.

JUDGE STANLEY: I can ask mine if you want a minute.

So there are a couple of general areas that I just wanted the parties to address, if you wouldn't mind, when you're tying everything together; that is, the proposition that the Doctrine of Anticipatory Assignment of Income was raised early on here, and that was in the opening arguments. And I would like the parties to address how there isn't any assignment of income when you have a pass-through entity and you're talking about the individual versus the pass-through entity.

And I'd like the -- it sounds like, from the evidence presented, that this will be addressed by both. But is there a certain holding period that is backed up by any legal principle or law that says that she has to hold it more than three days or more than a year or any number of days or amount of time? And does it matter who conducted the negotiations, particularly if there was an agent working for another person?

And my final area, I don't think it's been addressed in the questions as much, but the --

I just lost my train of thought.

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It'll come back to me in a second if Judge Rosas wants to give any --

Do you have any principles or things that you particularly would like them to discuss?

JUDGE ROSAS: Actually I do, Judge Stanley, thank you.

And this comment's mostly directed towards respondent. Respondent, in the pleadings there are some indication -- indications, plural, which may best be described as a contradiction, for lack of a better word. On the one hand you described Appellant Sharon Mitchell as not being involved with the transaction as, I believe, the quote that you use was "riding the coattails of the partnership." But then on the other hand you talk about her exercising some sort of influence or control over the other partners and the partnership in terms of planning and orchestrating the Assignment of Income or the transfer of her tenancy-in-common interest.

So I'm just hoping that you can address and perhaps elaborate and explain those two opposing viewpoints.

Additionally, in regards to following up on what Judge Stanley mentioned in terms of your argument of the Assignment of Income, at least for my benefit, it would be helpful if I could understand your argument in terms of whether it is a

standard assignment of income argument that the partnership would pay additional taxes or whether you're using that argument as another way to supplement your guarded, broader argument of the concept of who is the true seller for tax purposes? I'm trying to get a better sense from respondent in terms of that argument.

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And likewise for appellant's counsel, Ms. Weed, if she can also address the issue of the Assignment of Income like Judge Stanley had mentioned.

Additionally, in regards to Caroline
Mitchell's role as an agent, I know that during the
opening statements Mr. Gemmingen mentioned a
partner's duty of loyalty and care to the
partnership. In light of the testimony that there
was a Durable Power of Attorney, I'm hoping that
respondent would address that issue and discuss the
possibility of whether it's possible for a partner
to both have that duty of loyalty and care to the
partnership, but also wear multiple hats, as might
have been the case here. Is it possible for a
partner to both have the best interests of the
partnership in mind, as well as the interests of
what we see before us today, a daughter slash fellow
partner?

And, Mrs. Weed, perhaps you can also address that issue of agency; that would be helpful.

One other point would be in regards to the benefits and burdens of ownership during that holding period. I know that today during a statement made by Mrs. Weed she mentioned the liability as being one of the burdens. But if both parties can elaborate on what other benefits and burdens of ownership took place within this short time period between the recording of the two Grant Deeds.

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And lastly, if both parties can just address one of the controlling drop-and-swap cases, both the Tax Court decision in *Bolker* as well as the Ninth Court -- I'm sorry, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in *Bolker*, that would be very helpful.

And in that discussion of Bolker it would also be helpful, just as in Bolker they discuss whether the decision in Court Holding was applicable or Cumberland, and both taxing houses discussed those cases, it would be very beneficial.

Thank you. I have nothing further.

JUDGE STANLEY: And the one question that I had that I wanted to be addressed in closing arguments that I temporarily forgot was, had the partners dropped earlier and had the 17 people negotiating a sale of one property, particularly on the Bureau's side, would that have been considered a deemed partnership anyway and disqualified it? Or

would that have sufficed to have satisfied what you considered to be the requirements of 1031?

Any additional questions?

JUDGE GEARY: No.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Then let's move to closing arguments and ask Ms. Weed to start.

MS. WEED: I just wanted to clarify with respect to Judge Rosas' point number two; I'm not quite sure what that question was asking in terms of Caroline's role as an agent, the duty of loyalty, and also -- I just need some clarification on that. I'm sorry.

JUDGE ROSAS: I'm not going to ask our stenographer to repeat my question, so no worries.

During the opening statement, counsel for respondent, Mr. Gemmingen, mentioned the duty of loyalty and care that a partner has towards the partnership. Then during the examination of Sharon Mitchell we realized that there was a valid Durable Power of Attorney.

So my question was in regards to whether Caroline Mitchell was able to both serve the best interests of the partnership on the one hand, because she was on the executive board, and, also on the other hand simultaneously wearing two hats, also look out for her daughter's best interests because she did have that Durable Power of Attorney.

JUDGE STANLEY: We really need to move on

and get to closing statements so that we can get done by the end of the day here. So, you want to just proceed and address the questions that were asked as you can.

MS. WEED: Okay. I understand we want to move this along. Can I have just one minute to organize my notes?

JUDGE STANLEY: Yes.

MS. WEED: Okay.

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So with respect to the issue of Assignment of Income -- I mean, I guess with respect to your question how a pass-through entity would assign income, that was also one of my questions. I don't believe that that argument makes sense in the connection with a 1031 exchange because, as I've stated numerous times, we're only deferring the recognition of gain, not trying to avoid tax.

I think an assertion that this is an assignment of income by the partnership wholly misunderstands the purpose of 1031. There are many other provisions in the Tax Code that allow for a deferral of recognition of gain; for example, employees and independent contractors desiring to stretch out or defer their compensation to reduce their tax burden may negotiate deferred compensation agreements. The idea is that if a taxpayer is willing to accept delayed payment of his income, he will be taxed accordingly.

Also, with 1031 exchanges if the taxpayer does not yet cash out their investment, they should be taxed accordingly and be able to defer the recognition of gain. Tax policy provides no warrant for using the Assignment of Income Doctrine to prevent tax savings through deferral.

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Not surprisingly, courts have declined to invoke the Assignment of Income Doctrine to prevent deferral of income. One such case is *Keller v. Commissioner*, that's 77 Tax Court 1014 which was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 1983, 723 F.2d 58.

In this case there was a taxpayer who carried out his pathology practice as an employee of his wholly unprofessional service corporation. The commissioner asserted -- the commissioner of Internal Revenue asserted that taxpayer was taxable on all earnings arising from his practice under Assignment of Income Doctrine.

The Tax Court agreed this might be the case if there was -- the total compensation he received was less than what he had received absent the incorporation; because at that time the amount of income that could be deferred through a qualified plan was much greater in the case of an employee than in the case of a self-employed individual.

The court's refusal to apply the Assignment of Income Doctrine under these circumstances suggests that it did not view mere deferral of

income as justifying application of the Assignment of Income Doctrine.

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Likewise here, the taxpayer Sharon Mitchell is simply deferring gain, not avoiding tax as the FTB contends. The FTB has the burden of proof with respect to evasion of tax, and the FTB has not met its burden.

With respect to the holding period, we've had testimony today from Mr. Krajewski that there is no tax law or case law that he is aware of that provides any specific holding period.

A taxpayer's intent to hold property for investment must be determined at the time of the exchange. I'm pulling that directly from Bolker.

In this case any period prior to the time of the exchange is wholly irrelevant. To qualify for nonrecognition treatment under 1031, both the property transferred and the property received must be held by the taxpayer, either for productive use in a trade or business or for investment. And that's from Treasury Regulation 1.1031(a)-1(a).

Here, like in the Bolker case, Sharon

Mitchell did not hold property for sale, personal use, or transfer as a gift. It was held for investment. She held property before the transaction for investment and after. She has not yet cashed in on her investment. Even prior to redeeming her interest she held a partnership

interest for investment purposes. This partnership's sole asset was 130 Tampico Way.

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And the Magneson court confirmed that holding an interest in a partnership can be a form of an investment. Magneson goes on to say that the central purpose of 1031, as stated by the Treasury Regulation, is to provide for nonrecognition of gain on a transfer of property in which the differences between the property parted with and the property acquired are more formal than substantial.

According to the Ninth Circuit in Magneson, the case law, the regulations, and the legislative history, they're all in agreement that the basic reason for nonrecognition of data lock on transfers is that the economic situation of the taxpayer is fundamentally the same before and after the transfer.

And there's no case law and no tax law, that I'm aware of or that has been cited, that indicates there's a specific holding period.

Section 1031 does have specific timing provisions for completing the transaction. If they wanted to include a specific timing provision that the property needed to be held, they would have included that as well.

To your question of does it matter who conducted the negotiations, I believe that I indicated in my opening statement that, you know,

sales transactions are negotiated on behalf of other individuals or entities all the time. My partner and I are currently in the process of just obtaining a lease even. We're not involved in that; our broker is involved in those negotiations.

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So, I don't believe it matters that Sharon Mitchell wasn't involved in every aspect. Her mother definitely was. Her mother was her mentor. Sharon's primary source of income is to invest in properties. That's what her mother mentored her in. Her mother helped negotiate them. But their interests were aligned.

Likewise, Sharon Mitchell's interests with the partnership were aligned. I don't believe that if there was any indication that Sharon and her mother couldn't complete a 1031 exchange without their method in every other situation, that they would have gone along with the partnership if their interests were not aligned.

With respect to the question had the partners dropped earlier and 17 people negotiated would this be deemed a partnership anyway, my understanding of a partnership is that it's two or more people carrying on a business for profit. So, to that extent, if there's two or more people, they're carrying on this joint effort for profit, I think it is arguable that there would have been a partnership in any event.

With respect to the question whether

Caroline's role as an agent, if she can have -- if

she can serve the best interests of the partnership

while also serving the best interests of her

daughter, I think in a situation where the interests

of the partnership and her daughter were adverse,

maybe that would not be able to happen. But in this

case the partnership and Sharon and her mother,

their interests were all aligned.

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The goal was to get this transaction negotiated, to have Sharon and her mom drop out of the partnership and complete the like-kind exchange. That intent had been evidenced for years prior to the like-kind exchange. And I think that remains evident because Sharon still holds the property that she ended up acquiring.

With respect to the benefits and burdens of ownership, as I've indicated, Sharon Mitchell was listed on the closing statement. If anything would have gone wrong with the transaction, the buyer wouldn't have just turned to Con Med; they would have turned directly to Con Med, Sharon Mitchell and Caroline Mitchell.

And I think with respect to Bolker, I think the main point in Bolker is that a taxpayer's intent to hold property for investment really is controlling. Bolker is the case that talks about the fact that the intent to hold property for

1 investment has to be looked at with respect to the 2 relinquished property and with respect to the 3 property that's later acquired. 4 Is there anything else that you would like 5 me to address with respect to those items? 6 JUDGE STANLEY: I think right now if you've 7 completed your statement, I'm going to let the 8 Franchise Tax Board go and we'll give you a brief 9 opportunity to make a final statement. 10 MS. WEED: Okay. 11 JUDGE STANLEY: Who's speaking on the 12 Franchise Tax Board's side? MR. GEMMINGEN: Given the variety of 1.3 14 topics, we were actually going to split some of the 15 topics. And so I was wondering if it would be okay 16 for Ciro Immordino to start and then I would like to 17 also address some of your questions and then address 18 our prepared remarks. 19 JUDGE STANLEY: Let me just ask one 20 question. 21 Ms. Skidgel, if they do that, will you be 22 able to follow through to the end? 2.3 HEARING REPORTER: That's fine. 2.4 JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Go ahead. 25 MR. IMMORDINO: Can you hear me all right? 26 How's this; is this okay? That's fine. 2.7 HEARING REPORTER: MR. IMMORDINO: Okay. Now, beginning with 28

the discussion of the case law and the testimony of Mr. Krajewski. You know, there was a discussion of these cases -- Magneson, Maloney, the Bolker case -- and they were referring to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case. There was a discussion of this held for investment requirement, the period of time, whether taxpayer intends to liquidate their investment, the continuity of investment.

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At our first prehearing conference, you know, we informed the Appellants and this Court that we're not contesting "held for investment." That's not an issue before you.

These discussions of did they intend to liquidate; did they continue their investment; what was their intent; those are completely irrelevant to the decision that your Board has to make today.

Instead, place it against the Tax Court case of Bolker. At the Tax Court case the IRS argued two things: They argued held for investment, and they argued what's known as the Court Holding Doctrine. And the Court Holding Doctrine is also the idea of who's the true seller for tax purposes, despite who the civil seller is.

And so the Court Holding Doctrine generally comes up when an entity holds property during negotiations but the entity's owners are listed on the sales contract. And so there's a question, who's the seller for tax purposes, the entity who

held the property during negotiations or the entity's owners who signed the sales contract?

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And what the U.S. Supreme Court tells us in Court Holding -- which I know has been cited, last time I checked, 1,963 times -- what the U.S. Supreme Court tells us is that if an entity holds and negotiates the sale of property, then the U.S. Supreme Court requires that the entity is the seller for tax purposes.

And this goes to another longstanding U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, which is discussed in *Mulden Properties*, another U.S. Supreme Court case. And *Mulden Properties*, the U.S. Supreme Court says, a taxpayer is free to choose any entity they want and they get the benefit of using that entity, but they're also required to abide by the limitations.

And so with the partnership, the partnership gets substantial flexibility and its other benefits for a taxpayer, but a partnership format does not allow individual partners to get different tax treatment when they sell property.

And so why does a drop-and-swap come up?
Well, it comes up because you have partners in a
partnership; some partners want to get cash when a
partnership sells property, and some partners want
to defer gain through a like-kind exchange. This
treatment is not allowed if the partnership holds
the property.

As Mr. Krajewski stated, the partnership can either exchange all or nothing. You can't give different partners different treatment.

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The taxpayers or the partnership took advantage of the partnership structure for almost 40 years. At the last minute they're attempting to get the benefits of having a partnership but not abide by the limitations.

And so in this case intent is not in dispute, it is not relevant. No one is arguing whether or not the appellant desired to do a 1031. The issue is the appellant never held the property in a format which allowed her to do a 1031.

Throughout the time she received the property in 1991 she could have distributed and held it as a tenancy-in-common interest if the partnership allowed. But from Mrs. Mitchell's testimony, from Mr. Krajewski's testimony, and from the document, it's very clear the partnership wanted to maintain a partnership; it wanted to maintain the benefits of having the partners being able to control the transaction, as well as the other flexibility, the benefits.

I note that, two points, especially in Exhibit Number 44, the partners made it clear that any partner could foul the deal by changing their minds. So they didn't want to have to take ownership. They wanted to have the partnership own

the property right through the end. In fact, in a letter dated October 23, 2007, which is, I think, attached to the Declaration of Mr. Milner, which came in, I think, as Exhibit 45 and 46 today -- and it's a letter from Goodman to Tom Milner to Caroline and to Sharon.

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And they say, they want to do a liquidation and distribution concurrent with the close of escrow. They want to get the benefits of a partnership structure right through the time escrow closes, but at the exact same time they wanted to ignore the partnership as the seller and let the taxpayer get the benefit of having individual treatment. These are contradictory ways of owning the property and they're not allowed. This goes back to Bolker.

Just one more thing on intent.

You know, as I said, intent applies in general for this "held for investment" requirement. Do you intend to hold your property for investment or for use in a trade or business? That's where intent is relevant. Intent has no relevance to who's the seller for tax purposes.

So, in the *Chase* case, there's no doubt whatsoever the taxpayer intended to sell the property individually. But the issue is that the partnership held the property.

The same thing with McManus versus

Commissioner, the taxpayer asserted they were a tenancy-in-common owner and they exchanged property for property, but the Court held they were a partnership. So you have invalid 1031 because the partnership relinquished property and you received property as an individual, and that's McManus versus Commissioner, 583 F.2d 443.

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In Sandoval versus Commissioner, 2000 case, Tax Court Memo 2000-189, an individual exchanged real property for other purported tenancy-in-common property. The Court found that the property was held by a partnership, so you have invalid 1031.

In all these cases they intended to get the treatment of individual, but what's intended doesn't matter. It's how did they hold the property? And, again, in this case they held it for almost 40 years as a partnership. At the very last minute they wanted to ignore the partnership as the seller. And that's exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court says you cannot do.

In appeal Court Holdings what it comes down to is the U.S. Supreme Court says:

"To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms which exist solely to alter tax liabilities would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress."

Say you want to have a partnership interest and you want to -- your plan is always to exchange out of it at the end, then you have to hold it as a tenancy-in-common, not as a partnership.

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A couple of other cases. In Demirjian versus Commissioner, again, the taxpayer attempted to do a like-kind exchange for property for property. The Court says you're a partnership.

Doesn't matter what you intend to be, it's how do you hold it. Okay.

And you have the precedential opinion the Appeal of Brookfield Manor, which is a Board of Equalization case. It has the same result. So it doesn't matter if you intend to hold it a certain way, it's what you actually did.

So going back to *Court Holding* -- or going back to *Bolker*. The U.S. Supreme Court says look at who negotiated the deal. And what it looks at is, like I said, the rule is the entity which holds and negotiates the property is the seller.

And so when you have a *Court Holding* situation, the entity which is holding the property is generally going to be the seller, unless some kind of exception applies, if there's some kind of fact that shows the entity holding the property should not be considered the seller.

So, in the *Bolker* case, Mr. Bolker, as part of a divorce, received real property held by the

corporation. And in light of the divorce, he decided to have that property distributed to him. He talked to his attorney, he began the distribution process. He began to have that property rezoned, and he was going to hold that property for a -- to construct apartment buildings, which would be used as personal income property.

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So the use of the property changed. It was independent of any sale. The use of the property changed because Mr. Bolker wanted to hold the property for his own personal investment property and the distribution already put in motion.

So he started talking to potential lenders and said I'd like to get financing for my property, for me personally. All the lenders felt like maybe Mr. Bolker was getting this personal loan for his own personal investment property. And then he gets an offer that says, "We don't want to give you a loan, but we want to purchase your property."

So what the Bolker Tax Court case said is that, here, the use of the property has changed, has gone from this property held by a corporation to now property held by Mr. Bolker. And so then when this negotiations for a sale later happens, it was clear Mr. Bolker was negotiating on behalf of him personally.

So it's not looking at who's doing the talking. It doesn't matter. If you're in a

partnership, you know, some partners, not all of them, might be talking. If you're in a tenancy-in-common -- you know, I know Mrs. Weed opined that if you have multiple partners negotiating when you have a TIC, and it isn't considered a partnership. Well, the IRC Rev. Proc. 2002-22, in that, you know, it's very clear you can have all the partners or all the tenancy-in-common owners negotiate and not maintaining the partnership, but it goes down to who's holding the property. And the Court Holding Doctrine said, was there a change in the use?

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So the other case cited by Judge Rosas was Cumberland. So in Cumberland you had a local utility; and a foreign utility moved into the area, and the local utility very quickly knew that they couldn't survive. And so the local utility's shareholders attempted to sell their stock in the utilities to the rival utility.

And so the U.S. Supreme Court said here the negotiations have been established between the shareholders, not the utility corporation, but between the shareholders and the rival utility. And that's why when at some point in the process there's a Counter-offer and the rival utility said, "We don't want your stock, we want your assets from the corporation," it was proper for the corporation to distribute those assets and then to have the sale

take place between the two groups which had always been negotiated.

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But that's not the case here. The case here is the type of case which is exactly the reason why the Court Holding doctrine is around, which is someone holds the property through one entity, there's no change in use, there's nothing changes through the entire process. It's 1991, they intended to do a 1031, to sell property as if they're TIC owners.

Nothing changed. The whole time they held it as a partnership. At the very end they wanted to change the ownership to do a 1031. There's no business reason for doing that. It's only tax deferral to get a tax benefit.

Now, I know Mrs. Weed spoke in detail about -- and over and over about the fact that this is a deferral, it's not taxable. Most taxpayers would like to pay the taxes 20 years later, you know. Everyone would love it. But you can only do a deferral if it's statutorily allowed, and that's what the issue is here. A deferral is a big tax benefit; it's only allowed by statute. And if you hold property of the partnership, the partnership has to do your 1031.

And so kind of to wrap this up here, at the time negotiations happened, the sale was established between the partnership and the buyer. But then

something happened which kind of went far and beyond. They signed an agreement. They signed a Purchase Sale Agreement. They signed

Counter-offers. Every single agreement was between the entity, the partnership and the buyer. At this point once you have the sale agreement, now we have --

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Well, one more point. This point about when the sale happens, you know, in her opening statement Mrs. Weed stated that negotiations don't matter. But what the U.S. Supreme Court says is that negotiations are exactly what matters. The deal is allocated to who the seller is at the time of negotiations, who negotiates the material terms. At that point the seller is locked in, for tax purposes.

And so in this case between December and February the seller was locked in, locked in as the partnership. Stuff that happened within that eight months, it doesn't change the Court Holding analysis. But what did happen is they entered into a Purchase Sale Agreement between the partnership and the buyer. At this point -- this goes to assignment of income -- the sale had ripened in the name of the partnership, and that's why you have assignment of income.

And this goes back to U.S. Supreme Court case Helvering versus Horst where the father had a

coupon bond, he took the little coupon off and gave it to his son. They say the right to this income ripened in the name of the father. You can't then assign that income, give it -- or try and transfer it, whether it's a civil transfer, simply transfer that coupon bond to your son. You can't change who earned it.

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At the time the Purchase Sale Agreement was signed and entered into, that's what Salvatore tells us, that now the sale has ripened to the partnership and any transient -- this has gone so far beyond Court Holding, there's an additional reason why it is now -- why the gain must be allocated to the partnership.

And then finally, I'll note at the very end of the transaction here, kind of a third reason, based on *Court Holding*, too, is that there's no bona fide distribution. The distribution was only going to happen if the sale went through. And so if the sale had gone through on November 30th, then the taxpayer would be a TIC owner. But what happened if on November 20th something happens and the sale's not going to go through? Then on November 30th, the partnership would have continued to hold property.

So this goes back to the *Chase* case, and other cases, to have a true tenancy-in-common owner, you've got to do a true distribution. There's no true business distribution here. And one of the

questions we asked the taxpayer was, where is the notice to the lessees, to the tenants, that there's a change in ownership? And their response was that it would be a useless gesture to inform them. And that's at --

What was that?

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MR. GEMMINGEN: Taxpayer's protest.

MR. IMMORDINO: Taxpayer's protest. That would be Exhibit --

MR. GEMMINGEN: J and K.

MR. IMMORDINO: So It would be a useless gesture because there's no change -- no true change of ownership of the property of this partnership of that TIC. It was done just for the -- just for the moment the sale happens they change who the owner is.

Taxpayer talks about she's personally liable. Well, where is the change in the insurance documents? Did they change the insurance? Did they change the bank account? Did they do a co-tenancy agreement?

These are all things that Mr. Krajewski talked about that you would do in a 1031.

Mr. Krajewski didn't understand the *Court Holding* partnership issues. He just read the Ninth Circuit court in *Bolker*. He didn't really understand the environment of 1031 law. But everything he said were things you have to do. Drop it down sooner to

show that -- change the ownership before you negotiate the sale, before negotiations you drop it down, you have to take it legitimate.

But, you know, he was talking about the separate account. He talks about the Co-tenancy Agreement. You know, if you own property, if you distribute property from a partnership to a tenant, you have a co-tenancy agreement, rules of how to --how you're going to own the property together. None of that happened. None of the business formalities have happened. None of the legitimate transfers from the partnership ownership to TIC ownership happened. That's because the taxpayers only intended to have this distribution to happen if the sale went through.

And that's why that says concurrent, working the distribution concurrently, concurrently with the sale. Only if the sale goes through, you change it. That's the third reason why there's the kind of variation core point test in *Chase* where substantive with their partnership.

That's it.

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MR. GEMMINGEN: David Gemmingen here for Franchise Tax Board. I'd like to address some of the questions you posed before I get to my prepared remarks.

And, Judge Rosas, thank you for the opportunity to clarify our briefing positions. And

in the two statements that you addressed that you thought might be opposing one another, actually address two completely different situations, two different transactions.

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And so they -- do not believe they conflict at all. But rather, the first one that the taxpayer was not involved and, as in the words of the taxpayer's own representative, the taxpayer rode the coattails of the partnership -- those are from the taxpayer's representative -- that concerns the negotiation of the sale of the property. That's a separate transaction than the later redemption by the partnership with accommodating parties at the end of the transaction where the partnership ensured that the appellant here would be responsible for her own costs that were incurred. So that's a separate transaction than actually the sales transaction.

And as Ciro mentioned a moment ago,
Exhibits J and K, when asked about whether the
partners participated in the partnership's sale, as
well as whether Mitchell had done any of the
subsequent negotiations, the response was, in the
Protest Letter and Points and Authorities, Exhibit
K, that, "The taxpayer's an artist with no business
background. It is expected that the taxpayer would
defer to the partnership expertise."

At her own handwritten declaration in Exhibit Q, she states -- or, excuse me, her own

signed declaration, I beg your pardon, she states that, "I am a painter by trade and know little of real estate investing. In carrying out the exchange, I relied upon professionals."

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And so those statements that she's relying on others as far as the negotiation goes to the question of who's the seller, the primary question today before you. And with respect to accounting and parties within the partnership to allow this disbursement, that was done in a separate transaction by a party that doesn't reflect the real issue of the case, is who's the seller? That's really what we need to determine.

And you asked about the *Bolker* tax court decision. And in *Bolker* tax court decision, it starts off after recitation of facts where the first paragraph entitled "opinion" is, the very first sentence there is, the first question you must consider is, Who made the exchange? In other words, Who is the seller?

The Bolker tax court went on to talk about the Hines case, H-i-n-e-s, and stated that the touchstone for determining whether the proceeds of the sale to be imputed to the corporation is whether the corporation actively participated in the sale. That's the test. That's the active participation. That's what we're looking for here today.

Appellant has repeatedly explained any

active participation in the sale of the partnership here, partnership sale of the property. Accordingly, she failed the test set out in Tax Court in Bolker, as emphasized in Hines, as well as Court Holding. And because of her failure to restate the sale of the property and the sale was conducted under the terms negotiated by the partnership, that allows the tax agency here to properly impute the income to the partnership.

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And the question about whether this is a pass-through entity or not, that is a very distinct and a very material item that does not allow the two sales to be treated the same. The question in Delwin Chase is, Who also is the seller? It was a partner. It was a general partner who withheld his partnership interest. He never held himself out to the third party as the seller of the property.

And part of the *Delwin Chase* case, it affirmed that the same taxpayer that does the sale has to be the same taxpayer that received the replacement property. It's the same taxpayer in both places of the transaction.

You clearly had the partnership being the seller. The partnership did not receive and identify any replacement property; thus, the partnership did not conduct an exchange. Since the taxpayer here was not the seller for tax purposes, the taxpayer did not complete the first leg of the

exchange, and her subsequent purchase of the property doesn't satisfy a 1031 because she never completed the first step to begin with, she was never the seller under *Delwin Chase*.

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So the question, though, that goes onward within the *Bolker* Tax Court opinion which dealt with the question "who was the seller," which is not addressed in the Ninth Circuit, talks about:

"The sine qua non imputed income rule is a finding for the corporation actively participated in the transaction that produced the income to be imputed. Only if the corporation in fact participated in the sale transaction, by negotiation, or participated in any other significant manner, could the corporation be charged with earning the income sought to be taxed."

Since the taxpayer here has disclaimed any participation in the sale, she cannot be imputed to the income of the sale; rather, it's the partnership's income. And being the partnership's income, it is a function of -- that the Hine's case here recognized that a corporation could still be involved solely in the analysis of the Bolker case that if you have an entity there could still be imputed income, assignment of income application in the facts.

However, in *Bolker* the taxpayer was unable to establish that the corporation's negotiations were old and cold. In fact, the court opinion says "The prior deal was dead." And so in looking at who really invested the ultimate sale negotiations for the property in the *Bolker* case, the Court found that the corporation was not involved. Here, it's quite clear that the corporation was involved and we'll get to that in a moment.

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Now you also asked about the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty in California Corporations Code for Partners, section 16404, provides that the fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are a duty of loyalty, the duty of care set forth in subdivisions (b) and (c).

And a partner -- (b) goes on. A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners includes all of the following:

The first is, to account to the partnership and hold as a trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up with a partnership business or derived from a use by a partner of partnership property.

The Partnership Agreement clearly sets forth that this partnership will be dissolved upon the sale of the property. This transaction where this purported redemption occurs is all part of the

final sale of the property and the lining up of the property.

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The fiduciary duty of a partner in 16404(b)(1) are very clear that the partner has a duty, a property duty, to account to the partnership and hold as a trustee any property received in the conduct of winding up of the partnership.

So while she may have a Deed for that property, she still has a primary obligation as a partner and a general partner in a partnership to ensure that the partners' ability to sell the property that it contracted for -- not "her" but "it" -- takes place and is not obstructed.

So there's not a allowance for partners to compete against the partnership because, also,

(b)(2) says, as far as fiduciary duties, the partner has to refrain from dealing with the partnership in conduct or winding up the business of the partnership business.

And so the partner, if she were to have that Deed, she could not withhold that Deed and kind of renegotiate the purchase price. Rather, she has the duty to honor the price that's already negotiated by her partnership. And so she cannot really exercise the ownership attributes of a property owner because she can't withhold the property; she can't renegotiate a new price; she's going to be forced to sell it at a certain date;

this is all being done at the close of escrow. Her Deed wasn't dated and wasn't even signed by the partnership until November 27th. And so the fiduciary duty's there to ensure that she still has to act as the partner in accommodating the sale of the partnership's property.

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As to the question about Magneson opposing counsel mentioned, Magneson court relied upon a Corporation's Code section that has been repealed. And the current and now standing Corporations Code section, as referred to previously, which is 16501, clearly provides that a partner does not own partnership property. And so you don't look through the partnership and treat the partner as owning the partnership property; rather, she owns the partnership interest.

You asked does it matter who conducted the sale agreement and sale negotiations? The answer to that is clearly yes. As we mentioned before in the Bolker case, as well as in the United States Supreme Court case Court Holding, the question is who actively participated in the sale negotiations? So the material facts and appellant's failure to do so means that she was not the seller for tax purposes and cannot claim to have engaged in a 1031.

As far as the distributions of 17 different partners, it all depends on how that happens; what are the facts during that? Did they distribute 17

tenant-in-common interests to the partners and now they become tenant-in-common owners, they are -- people do own tenancy-in-common interests in property. That is what a tenant-in-common interest by nature is; it's a partial, fractional interest in property. So clearly that can occur.

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But they can only engage in a 1031 transaction if they own and operate the property, either for investment or for trade or business. And then if they decide to sell and do a 1031, conduct their own separate negotiations for that property.

In this case, the taxpayer did not negotiate the sale, did not own the property during the time of the sale negotiations, and so that's a completely different situation than we have here today.

And you asked about the holding period.

While there is no definite set-out time period for a holding period, a person still first has to be the actual seller of the property for tax purposes in order to actually have a holding period to look at.

In this case, since the taxpayer is not the seller, you don't reach the question of a holding period because she, for tax purposes, is not the seller and so we never reach the question of how long she held the property because the real issue here is "Who's the seller?"

So I'd like to get back to my statement

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Have I addressed all your questions that you had separately?

JUDGE STANLEY: I just think you need to do the best you can at this point. And if you think you've answered them all, then we can just move on.

MR. GEMMINGEN: So in 1991 appellant inherited a 10-percent general-partner interest in the partnership from her aunt.

I'd like to note that appellant's expert stated that appellant held her interest in the Tampico property for more than 16 years. Please note that a general partner's interest in a partnership is an intangible personal property interest, which is not like-kind tangible real property. Appellant actually owned an intangible interest in a partnership for more than 16 years, not the real property located at Tampico Way stated by her -- appellant's witness.

If you would, if you would please turn to Exhibit E of respondent's exhibits, which provides appellant's aunt's will, which states, other than \$3,000, that the remainder of her estate is being divided to her niece, the appellant here.

And the second page there is the page from the estate tax return from her aunt, which clearly provides that there's a 10-percent general-partnership interest in Con Med properties,

which is one of her properties which is left to appellant here and has a fair market value of \$41,277.

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The 754 election, even if made in this case would be limited to \$41,277. The fair market value on the date of her aunt's death of that partnership interest is \$41,000; that would be the price that a person would pay for that interest. And that's what a fair market value goes to, a person who's either under compulsion to buy or sell but what someone would pay for that.

This is what someone would have bought for a 10-percent partnership interest at this time. That would be the purchase price for the partnership interest, and that would be the purchase price that would be used for a step up in basis if one were to have actually have occurred. It would be limited to \$41,000, not the half a quarter million dollars now proposed by appellant.

But, again, appellant has not satisfied the burdens of substantiating that actually the partnership made an election, a 754 election made by the partnership, not partners, as previously mentioned by the taxpayers here.

And so Internal Revenue Code section 1014, as incorporated in California tax law, provides that a beneficiary's new adjusted basis in inherited assets is the fair market value of the seized

property at the date of death. That is, her outside basis in the partnership is \$41,000 and the inside basis would be adjusted to a maximum of \$41,000 if that in fact occurred.

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Also briefly return to our Exhibit A, please, the Agreement of Purchase and Sale. That agreement only listed the partnership of the property as the seller.

And, at page 5, Exhibit A, at paragraph 16 of this Agreement of Sale there's a provision there that says this is a Superseding Agreement:

"This agreement expresses a complete agreement of the parties and supersedes all prior written or oral agreements between the seller and purchaser regarding the purchase and sale of the property."

So there's a lot of illusions of the taxpayer's intent to do a 1031, an intent to maybe be a seller. But this provision here, which was never modified by the Counter-offers and -- the Counter-offers, which were ultimately signed, which would be the one at C, according to the partnership's letter to Con Med partners, which is found at Exhibit D, dated March 2nd, 2007, where the partners state:

"I am pleased to inform you that on behalf of 'Con Med Properties'" -- in quotes -- "'Partnership,' I have signed a contract for the sale of the partnership's property located at 130 Tampico Way."

And so it's very clear throughout the sale negotiations that only the partnership was the contemplated seller of the property, is the only party ever designated as the seller. And at this point in time, as of March -- February 27th, as confirmed here by the March 2nd letter, that the parties had discounted in any other prior negotiations that these written documents represent the true nature of the sale of property, which was that only the partnership was selling the property.

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Then I'll also ask you to please turn to Exhibit I of respondent's, which is the Agreement of Redemption of Partnership Interests. This is dated November 17th, 2007. And Con Med Properties, the partnership complete, 100 percent ownership of the Tampico property, preceding and during the time of the sales negotiations, it's confirmed in this document. Because if you review at recital C, provides that the partnership owns the real property located at 130 Tampico Way. Appellant is not mentioned here at all as far as being the owner of the property.

Recital E goes on to state, the partnership is in the contract to sell the property.

And recital H states, Sharon Mitchell owns a 10-percent interest in the partnership.

The Board of Equalization's reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Commissioner versus*Lake, noted in appeal with Cal-American, "This course well-settled in anticipatory assignments of income or loss cannot shift the incidence of taxation."

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The Board of Equalization went on to declare, "Further, one who earns income cannot avoid taxation by diverting it to another entity, and anticipatory assignment of income is ineffective as a means of avoiding tax liability."

And the deferral that the taxpayers talk about, actually there is no guarantee that this tax will ever be paid because at some point we're all going to die. And so the point is a real estate investment is deferred, deferred, deferred, and she could probably do so. But the question here is, was this deferral proper? Was it allowed by the code, and also by the U.S. Supreme Court and Court Holding?

The court decision in Salvatore versus

Commissioner is also to uphold this appeal, to

uphold the principle that a taxpayer cannot avoid

paying taxes on the sale of a property, executing a

Deed to another, days before the property is sold.

In Salvatore, one of the challenged Deeds used to attempt to shift taxation to another was only two days old, not unlike the two- and

three-day-old Deeds present in this appeal. The fact that Salvatore concerned a taxpayer's attempt to avoid paying a high capital gains tax on the sale of her property by first executing Deeds of that property to her children, the taxpayer then attempted to only pay gift tax, which is significantly less than the property -- than the capital gains tax she would have paid if she had reported the entire sale by herself.

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Thus, tax motivations should not alter the overall sales transaction, whether involving the avoidance of taxation in *Salvatore* or the deferral of taxation in this appeal, and that supersedes the obligations to correctly attribute income to the party conducting the sale.

The Salvatore court affirmed Mrs.

Salvatore's children were only conduits through which to pass title, citing Commissioner versus

Court Holding, and Mrs. Salvatore alone, rather than she and her children, was the seller of the gas station.

Appellants later changed the transaction at issue. The partnership's sale of the property likewise did not alter its sales price of the property or in any way materially affect conveyance of the property through its intended buyers. And appellant cannot gain a warranted tax deferral gain otherwise allocated to her by virtue of the

partnership's sale of the property.

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The conduit nature of appellant's actions on behalf of the partnership in this appeal also result from appellant's fiduciary duties as general partner for fellow partners to the partnership Con Med.

Appellant's duty to get paid prohibited her from acting in a manner that interfered with the partnership's sale of the property. The fiduciary duties prevent appellant from attempting to obstruct the sale of property, from withholding her signature, she could not renegotiate a sales price, withhold possession of the land from the intended purchaser, all demonstrating a lack of ownership criteria for tax purposes.

Appellant's attempts to assert a 1031 deferred exchange are not supported by law. They're obvious and an opportunistic attempt to claim unwarranted tax benefit by attempting to deflect and usurp income that is properly allocated to her pursuant to the partnership provisions in Internal Revenue Code section 702. Quite simply, for tax purposes, appellant had no real property to sell and, thus, failed the fundamental first steps in exchange, that is operating and selling trade or business property.

Accordingly, there's no need for your panel to even reach appellant's claimed issue of exchange

even at issue of arising from an independent transaction occurring prior in time. The partnership's sale of the property is a closed transaction unrelated to the exchange of appellant's -- that appellant now asserts.

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The panel will note that in Exhibits A, B and C the property's seller is consistently and only designated Con Med Properties partnership. These documents all demonstrate that the partnership alone sold the property and the appellant's attempt to recast that is unwarranted.

Appellant's Protest Letter, Exhibits J and K, stated pertinent facts. At Exhibit J, page one, respondent's exhibits, in Appellant's Protest Letter Statement of Facts, appellant acknowledged that in late 2006, a year before the tax year at issue, the partnership entered into an agreement to sell the property. This is confirmed by the Sale Agreement found in Respondent's Exhibit A.

Contrary to appellant's current claims, appellant freely admitted that at page 2 of Exhibit J, her Protest Letter, and also noted in her tax return's occupation line, "Appellant is an artist with no business background. It is expected that the taxpayer deferred to the partnership expertise negotiating the sale and ride the coattails of the experts." Those are the words of appellant's representatives.

Appellant's mandatory interest in the property is also acknowledged in the Protest Supplement in Respondent's Exhibit K, where at line 6, other rental properties that appellant owned and reported as rental income on her tax return Schedule E, appellant failed to even list the Tampico property on that schedule.

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Appellant's representatives attempted to discount appellant's failure to keep Tampico Way like her other properties by claiming that no rents were received during the sub period of November 20th, 2007 and November 30th, the closing.

Appellant's protest representatives failed to correctly note the Deed that purportedly gave appellant her ownership, claimed signed by the partnership on November 27th, further shrinking appellant's alleged ownership period.

Clearly appellant was allowed to enter transactions by the partnership only at the last moment, when the sale was certain to close, and only before it closed.

The partnership's own attorney, Richard Goodman, in a letter dated October 23rd, 2007 to the partnership ensured that the purported distribution to Appellant Sharon Mitchell would only occur concurrent with the close of escrow; that's to say, appellant had no true desire in separately owning and operating any portion of the property, took no

action to do so, but only wanted to claim participation with respect to the property when the sale went down.

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Appellant's own disregard for the economic realities of the transaction are further demonstrated with Respondent's Exhibit K, page 1, when after being asked if appellant entered into a separate lease with the tenant operating the property, appellant's representative answered, "The law does not require a taxpayer to undertake useless gestures."

The appellant's failure to assert any ownership attributes with third parties, such as the property's tenants, during the trade of a purported ownership otherwise required by the *Delwin Chase* case previously briefed, is, as the representative clearly acknowledged, predicated on the common sense notion that any such activity would have been a useless gesture, that the property's immediate sale to new buyers was a foregone conclusion. The actions of accommodating parties cannot overturn applicable Supreme Court and Board of Equalization precedence.

And as far as the items concerning the appellant's statement and testimony today that she received no rent, I'll ask you to look at Appellant's Exhibit 30, at pages 7 and 6.

This is, I believe like 36 pages. So these

are the two First American escrow statements.

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Page 7 of 36 of Exhibit 30, which is the overall sales transaction, which is the sale price for the whole property, a hundred percent of the whole property, was \$6,400,000. You'll see that the first line on the left, under "seller charge" there's an amount of \$583. The rent for the property to the tenant was, as you can see over on the left column, \$17,516 per month. And that divided by the 30 days of November provides a \$583 rental amount per day.

Appellant's position is that she was redeemed out of the partnership on or about November 20th, and notwithstanding that the Deed was signed later on November 27th. And given her repeated testimony that she did not renegotiate the property's lease, resulted the tenant was solely in contract with the partnership. One has to -- the documents here demonstrate that appellant still was being treated as a partner by all the parties of the transaction.

If you go to page 6, please, of Exhibit 30, which is the separate segregation of the proceeds related to appellant, which is the \$640,000 sale amount, you'll note that she, too, has proration of rent relating to the November 30th date of \$58.

That's one-tenth of the total proration of the rent.

And so if she had been truly redeemed out

of the partnership, she wouldn't be entitled to any of the rent. She's claimed that she didn't receive any rent. But why is she having to pay back a prorated amount of rent into the overall pot here? Because she's still being treated as a 10-percent partner in the partnership. And that's why she's having to repay rent here, which demonstrates that she actually was allocated rent. Because you have to have rent to repay -- you first have to have rent allocated to you, which would have been done through the partnership. And that goes all the way up through the closing here of November 30th. So she's only having to repay rent only on the 30th here, not going back to the date of the recorded redemption.

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So clearly she's being treated just as everyone else, as a partner here, which is also confirmed on her Schedule K-1 where she's still listed as a 10-percent partner up on line D, as provided to you earlier.

So the United States Supreme Court stated in its Coltec Industries decision, a taxpayer is not permitted to reap tax benefits from a transaction that lacks economic reality. Real property in question that's under a contract of sale would insult the intended and contracted buyers regardless of purported recordation of appellant's partnership interests.

The transaction in question is a sale of

Con-Med's partnership's Walnut Creek property, and as is stated by the United States Supreme Court in Knetsch versus U.S., a transaction such as appellant's purported Partnership Redemption lacks objective economic substance where it does not appreciably affect taxpayer's beneficial interests except to reduce her taxes.

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Appellant and her fellow 10-percent partners all walked away from the partnership with approximately \$662,000 at the end of 2007. As shown here in Schedule K-1's and Schedule D provided by the appellant for this hearing, this is -- I believe this is marked our Exhibit T, the group of K-1's here.

Irwin's the first one of this group. He's also a 10-percent partner in the partnership. At line 10 of that first page of the K-1, over to column D, it states that his total gain from the property is \$611,000. And over to the second page of that, at line 19 A, under column B, it states that a distribution of the money is just over \$662,000.

The next person's K-1, Teresa's, states that she's a 5-percent partner. At line 10, column B, she was entitled to this allocated gain in the amount of \$305,550, so half the amount her 10-percent partner was allocated. The second page of the K-1 provides that she received distribution

of cash of just over 331,000 or half of the 10-percent partners.

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Again, this is followed by Mr. Milner's K-1, which he received the same amount allocation of \$305,000. And cash distributed to him as a 5-percent partner was also \$331,000. So if it goes up to 10-percent that's \$662,000.

The final K-1 is Appellant Sharon Mitchell's K-1. At the second page of her K-1, under "distributions," she has a distribution of cash just over \$22,000. When you couple this \$22,000 distribution, plus the \$640,000 allocation of her from the escrow, that equates to \$662,000, the same amount that the other 10-percent partners are getting and twice the amount of the 5-percent partners. So her economic position didn't change, so she comes out the same as the other partners were.

JUDGE STANLEY: Can I just point out that you guys have been closing for almost an hour? And so I'd appreciate if you could make final points and try to wrap this up.

MR. GEMMINGEN: The mere intent to effectuate an exchange is not enough. For example, in *Nixon versus Commissioner*, Tax Court case, taxpayer informed the buyer relinquishing the property that they did not want to sell the relinquished property, instead desired to trade it

for other real estate. However, in transferring the relinquished property, the taxpayers received a check. The taxpayers did not deposit the check, rather they endorsed the check to the seller of their investment property.

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The Tax Court determined that, despite the taxpayer's original intention to exchange properties, the transaction constituted a sale of the relinquished property. And denying nonrecognition treatment under section 1031 of the code, the Court stressed use of sales proceeds to pay for the replacement property did not alter the fact that taxpayer used the sales proceeds undistributed and not allowed by section 1031.

The Court opinion in *Delwin Chase*, as we previously briefed, mentions that the criteria for 1031 must be strictly complied with. And so taxpayer's intent to do something is not enough to satisfy all requirements, especially the first leg of it being so.

JUDGE STANLEY: I'll give you a little context while you're thinking about how to wrap up, is I wanted to assure you that we have read all the briefing by both parties. We have reviewed all the cases that you guys have referred us to, at least up until the ones that popped up today. So if there are any other final points that were not included in those briefs that you can tie together --

MR. GEMMINGEN: I will wrap it up here.

JUDGE STANLEY: That would be awesome.

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MR. GEMMINGEN: So essentially, if appellant here was no more than a conduit in affecting Con Med, her partnership's, sale of Tampico Way property, under longstanding principles in Commissioner versus Court Holding, shows her own fiduciary duties to the partnership. This is echoed by the Tax Court in Kimbell-Diamond Milling Company, which stated, "The essential nature of the transaction of the acquisition of property is to be viewed as a whole, and closely related steps will not be separated at the insistence of the taxpayer."

In conclusion, all contemporaneous evidence confirms the partnership was the sole seller of the property for tax purposes. The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently stated that substance rather than form of the transaction is controlling for tax purposes.

Assignment of Income Doctrine is simply another allocation of this concept. The Assignment of Income Doctrine prohibits the splitting of income among taxable parties. The Assignment of Income Doctrine provides that income is ordinarily taxed to the person who earns it, which in this case is the partnership, and the incidence of income taxation may not be shifted by anticipatory assignments.

Your panel is encouraged to endorse legal

principles raised by respondent and uphold respondent's action in this appeal. Thank you.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. Does that conclude your closing?

MR. CORNEZ: I am not saying anything.

JUDGE STANLEY: Thank you. I think that we all get the points that you're attempting to make.

Let me -- and with that same context,

Ms. Weed, that we have read all the briefing, we
have read all the cases, and we don't need you to
reiterate any of your previous arguments. If you
have something to add based on what the Franchise
Tax Board has just mentioned in their conclusion,
you're welcome to do that at this time.

MS. WEED: Thank you.

Okay. So the Treasury Regulations promulgated under 1031 require that a 1031 exchange must be a transaction, it must be an exchange, it must be an exchange of like-kind properties, and the properties must transfer and receipt must be held for productive use in a trade, business or investment.

FTB has focused on the issue of who the seller is, but that's not an issue. That's a fact. We have a closing statement. We have deeds recorded. We have the intent.

Respondent's counsel said they're not questioning the intent. They're not questioning the

holding period. They're saying that's not an issue. They're saying that the fact that Sharon Mitchell was one of the sellers is an issue. And in fact in the *Bolker* case that's not even the right question.

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In the Tax Court case of *Bolker* it states, "The first question we must consider is, 'Who made the exchange?'"

Whether the partnership sold their interest in the property or not, that's not relevant to whether or not Sharon Mitchell completed a like-kind exchange.

Con Med should not even be part of the analysis. But if they are, why isn't the partnership being audited? We have testimony from Sharon Mitchell, we have exhibits and evidence that show that the partnership did not record the full amount of the sales proceeds. So why is this an issue of only Sharon Mitchell?

Respondent's counsel has stated that most taxpayers would like to be able to defer the recognition of gain, but that's not the right issue either. Because under 1031, which California law complies with and which Congress has not made any changes to as they're relevant to the case in issue, Sharon Mitchell is entitled to complete a 1031 exchange.

If that is not what the State of California wants to allow Sharon to do, they should change

that. But the FTB should not be allowed to prevent her from exercising her right just because they don't like the fact she exchanged this property out of California. And, in fact, respondent's counsel said there's no guarantee the taxpayer will ever stop deferring gain. Well, I'm not aware of any requirement that the taxpayer do that. I am aware of 1031 and what that entitles appellant to do.

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The Starker case, which is one of the seminal cases in this -- with respect to this 1031 issue, says that 1031 is designed to avoid the imposition of a tax on those who do not cash in their investments in trade or business property. The concern is not that a taxpayer will continue their investment. The concern is that the taxpayer will have the burden of paying tax on their investment before they cash it out.

In the Magneson case, the Magneson case indicates that the purpose -- I'm sorry -- the crucial analysis is whether there's a continuity of interest in like-kind property. As we've heard in testimony, as we've seen in the exhibits, there is that continuity of interest. Sharon Mitchell has continued her investment.

To respondent's arguments regarding the changes to the Corporation Code, both at the federal level and California level, that issue, even though the law did not change in Magneson at that time,

that issue was brought before the court by the descent. And the majority in *Magneson* said that the crucial question is continuity of interest and they also said that in the argument the taxpayer does not have full alienable rights if the partnership property fails.

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The whole premise behind a 1031 exchange is that the taxpayer does not intend to alienate or transfer their property. They intend to hold it for investment.

The intent of the taxpayer controls. It's important. It goes to the legislative intent. We want taxpayers who invest in real property or other like-kind property not to have to pay tax before they cash out their investment.

Next, FTB has argued the step transaction could apply or should apply, which is really the holding in the *Court Holding* case. But even the Court in *Magneson* said it's not always appropriate to collapse the steps of the transaction when it's not readily apparent that the transaction could have been achieved directly.

Here, Sharon Mitchell could have exchanged her partnership interest with that of another partnership and there would have been further analysis of what was the primary asset of the partnership in order for it to be like-kind.

In this case the sole asset of the

partnership was 130 Tampico Way. Sharon could have redeemed her partnership sooner. She was advised not to. She was never advised that there was any law that would require her to do this.

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You know, that's not only bad tax policy to apply some sort of rule that you have to drop your interest out of the partnership at a certain time, it's certainly not in the law. And what are taxpayers supposed to do if there's no law that says there's a specific time you have to hold that property? There's no case law that specifically says, "This is the amount of time." What are taxpayers supposed to do, just guess and hope that the FTB or the IRS doesn't come audit them and say, "No, you're not entitled to do a 1031 exchange"?

Doctrine, like I said, it's not applicable. We're just deferring gain. And, if anything, the partnership is the one who would be assigning the income. They're not being audited. Sharon Mitchell on her form 8824 has reported approximately \$1 million in deferred gain. If anything, she is putting herself out there. She is saying, "I know that if I cash in on this investment, I'm going to have to pay tax at that time. I am putting it on my return. I'm letting everyone know that I'm tax-compliant. I'm reporting it like I'm supposed to. And, yes, I'm entitled to do a 1031 exchange."

And lastly, we would just -- I just wanted to close with the fact that, you know, we do think there should be a step up in basis. We don't necessarily have every document from 27 years ago. But all of the circumstantial evidence of the other partners doing appraisals, making 754 elections, of the requirement in the Second Amended Partnership Agreement that an appraisal needs to be done whenever there's an inherited interest points to the fact that this was likely done.

And the FTB's duty is not to see how much tax they can get out of the taxpayer, it's to see what the correct amount of tax is. And Sharon Mitchell is entitled to a step up in basis and she's entitled to do a like-kind exchange.

So I would respectfully urge your Board to, please, rule that this like-kind exchange did occur based on the facts and that Sharon should be entitled to a step up in basis.

Thank you.

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JUDGE STANLEY: Thank you very much. And thank you for the presentations on both sides.

I wanted to ask if there's any reason that either party thinks that the record should not be closed at this point? Ms. Weed?

MS. WEED: No reason it shouldn't be closed.

JUDGE STANLEY: Franchise Tax Board?

MR. GEMMINGEN: We agree it can be closed. Thank you. JUDGE STANLEY: Okay. The record in this matter will be closed. No further documentation or evidence will be taken under consideration. And we will deliberate and reach a decision on this that we hope to be mailed within a hundred days or less. Thank you. And we're going to adjourn today's hearing. (Whereupon the proceedings concluded at 4:35 p.m.) ---000---2.7

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	State of California)
4) ss
5	County of Sacramento)
6	
7	I, Kathleen Skidgel, Hearing Reporter for
8	the California State Office of Tax Appeals certify
9	that on April 24, 2018 I recorded verbatim, in
10	shorthand, to the best of my ability, the
11	proceedings in the above-entitled hearing; that I
12	transcribed the shorthand writing into typewriting;
13	and that the preceding pages 1 through 225
14	constitute a complete and accurate transcription of
15	the shorthand writing.
16	
17	Dated: June 14, 2018
18	
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20	
21	KATHLEEN SKIDGEL, CSR #9039
22	Hearing Reporter
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